sometimes indeed despite his will； and who perceives many
likewise； as by the intervention of the bodily organs？ Is
there nothing in all this which is as true as it is certain
that I exist； even though I should always sleep and though he
who has given me being employed all his ingenuity in deceiving
me？ Is there likewise any one of these attributes which can
be distinguished from my thought； or which might be said to be
separated from myself？ For it is so evident of itself that it
is I who doubts； who understands； and who desires； that there
is no reason here to add anything to explain it。 And I have
certainly the power of imagining likewise； for although it may
happen （as I formerly supposed） that none of the things which
I imagine are true； nevertheless this power of imagining does
not cease to be really in use； and it forms part of my
thought。 Finally； I am the same who feels； that is to say；
who perceives certain things； as by the organs of sense； since
it truth I see light； I hear noise； I feel heat。 But it will
be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming。
Let it be so； still it is at least quite certain that it seems
to me that I see light； that I hear noise and that I feel
heat。 That cannot be false； properly speaking it is what is
in me called feeling；11 and used in this precise sense that is
no other thing than thinking。
From this time I begin to know what I am with a little
more clearness and distinction than before； but nevertheless
it still seems to me； and I cannot prevent myself from
thinking； that corporeal things； whose images are framed by
thought； which are tested by the senses； are much more
distinctly known than that obscure part of me which does not
e under the imagination。 Although really it is very
strange to say that I know and understand more distinctly
these things whose existence seems to me dubious； which are
unknown to me； and which do not belong to me； than others of
the truth of which I am convinced； which are known to me and
which pertain to my real nature； in a word； than myself。 But
I see clearly how the case stands： my mind loves to wander；
and cannot yet suffer itself to be retained within the just
limits of truth。 Very good； let us once more give it the
freest rein； so that； when afterwards we seize the proper
occasion for pulling up； it may the more easily be regulated
and controlled。
Let us begin by considering the monest matters； those
which we believe to be the most distinctly prehended； to
wit； the bodies which we touch and see； not indeed bodies in
general； for these general ideas are usually a little more
confused； but let us consider one body in particular。 Let us
take； for example； this piece of wax： it has been taken quite
freshly from the hive； and it has not yet lost the sweetness
of the honey which it contains； it still retains somewhat of
the odour of the flowers from which it has been culled； its
colour； its figure； its size are apparent； it is hard； cold；
easily handled； and if you strike it with the finger； it will
emit a sound。 Finally all the things which are requisite to
cause us distinctly to recognise a body； are met with in it。
But notice that while I speak and approach the fire what
remained of the taste is exhaled； the smell evaporates； the
colour alters； the figure is destroyed； the size increases； it
bees liquid； it heats； scarcely can one handle it； and when
one strikes it； now sound is emitted。 Does the same wax
remain after this change？ We must confess that it remains；
none would judge otherwise。 What then did I know so
distinctly in this piece of wax？ It could certainly be
nothing of all that the senses brought to my notice； since all
these things which fall under taste； smell； sight； touch； and
hearing； are found to be changed； and yet the same wax
remains。
Perhaps it was what I now think； viz。 that this wax was
not that sweetness of honey； nor that agreeable scent of
flowers； nor that particular whiteness； nor that figure； nor
that sound； but simply a body which a little while before
appeared tome as perceptible under these forms； and which is
now perceptible under others。 But what； precisely； is it that
I imagine when I form such conceptions？ Let us attentively
consider this； and； abstracting from all that does not belong
to the wax； let us see what remains。 Certainly nothing
remains excepting a certain extended thing which is flexible
and movable。 But what is the meaning of flexible and movable？
Is it not that I imagine that this piece of wax being round is
capable of being square and of passing from a square to a
triangular figure？ No； certainly it is not that； since I
imagine it admits of an infinitude of similar changes； and I
nevertheless do not know how to pass the infinitude by my
imagination； and consequently this conception which I have of
the wax is not brought about by the faculty of imagination。
What now is this extension？ Is it not also unknown？ For it
bees greater when the wax is melted； greater when it is
boiled； and greater still when the heat increases； and I
should not conceive ＇clearly＇ according to truth what wax is；
if I did not think that even this piece that we are
considering is capable of receiving more variations in
extension than I have ever imagined。 We must then grant that
I could not even understand through the imagination what this
piece of wax is； and that it is my mind12 alone which
perceives it。 I say this piece of wax in particular； for as
to wax in general it is yet clearer。 But what is this piece
of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the
＇understanding or＇ mind？ It is certainly the same that I see；
touch； imagine； and finally it is the same which I have always
believed it to be from the beginning。 But what must
particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an
act of vision； nor of touch； nor of imagination； and has never
been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so； but
only an intuition13 of the mind； which may be imperfect and
confused as it was formerly； or clear and distinct as it is at
present； according as my attention is more or less directed to
the elements which are found in it； and of which it is
posed。
Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I
consider ＇the great feebleness of mind＇ and its proneness to
fall ＇insensibly＇ into error； for although without giving
expression to my thought I consider all this in my own mind；
words often impede me and I am almost deceived by the terms of
ordinary language。 For we say that we see the same wax； if it
is present； and not that we simply judge that it is the same
from its having the same colour and figure。 From this I
should conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision and not
simply by the intuition of the mind； unless by chance I
remember that； when looking from a window and saying I see men
who pass in the street； I really do not see them； but infer
that what I see is men； just as I say that I see wax。 And yet
what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may
cover automatic machines？ Yet I judge these to be men。 And
similarly solely by the faculty of judgment which rests in my
mind； I prehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes。
A man who makes it his aim to raise his knowledge above
the mon should be ashamed to derive the occasion for
doubting from the forms of speech invented by the vulgar； I
prefer to pass on and consider whether I had a more evident
and perfect conception of what the wax was when I first
perceived it； and when I believed I knew it by means of the
external senses or at least by the mon sense14 as it is
called； that is to say by the imaginative faculty； or whether
my present conception is clearer now that I have most
carefully examined what it is； and in what way it can be
known。 It would certainly be absurd to doubt as to this。 For
what was there in this first perception which was distinct？
What was there which might not as well have been perceived by
any of the animals？ But when I distinguish the wax from its
external forms； and when； just as if I had taken from it its
vestments； I consider it quite naked； it is certain that
although some error may still be found in my judgment； I can
nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind。
But finally what shall I say of this mind； that is； of
myself； for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything
but mind？ What then； I who seem to perceive this piece of wax
so distinctly； do I not know myself； not only with much more
truth and certainty； but also with much more distinctness and
clearness？ For if I judge that the wax is or exists from the
fact that I see it； it certainly follows much more clearly
that I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it。
For it may be that what I see is not really wax； it may also
be that I do not possess eyes with which to see anything； but
it cannot be that when I see； or （for I no longer take account
of the distinction） when I think I see； that I myself who
think am nought。 So if I judge that the wax exists from the
fact that I touch it； the same thing will follow； to wit； that
I am； and if I judge that my imagination； or some other cause；
whatever it is； persuades me that the wax exists； I shall
still conclude the same。 And what I have here remarked of wax
may be applied to all other things which are external to me
＇and which are met with outside of me＇。 And further； if the
＇notion or＇ perception of wax has seemed to me clearer and
more distinct； not only after the sight or the touch； but also
after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me；
with how much more ＇evidence＇ and distinctness must it be said
that I now know myself； since all the reasons which contribute
to the knowledge of wax； or any other body whatever； are yet
better proofs of the nature of my mind！ And there are so many
other things in the mind itself which may contribute to the
elucidation of its nature； that those which depend on body
such as these just mentioned； hardly merit being taken into
account。
But finally here I am； having insensibly reverted to the