yet I do not see in what manner I can resolve them； and； just
as if I had all of a sudden fallen into very deep water； I am
so disconcerted that I can neither make certain of setting my
feet on the bottom； nor can I swim and so support myself on
the surface。 I shall nevertheless make an effort and follow
anew the same path as that on which I yesterday entered； i。e。
I shall proceed by setting aside all that in which the least
doubt could be supposed to exist； just as if I had discovered
that it was absolutely false； and I shall ever follow in this
road until I have met with something which is certain； or at
least； if I can do nothing else； until I have learned for
certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain。
Archimedes； in order that he might draw the terrestrial globe
out of its place； and transport it elsewhere； demanded only
that one point should be fixed and immoveable； in the same way
I shall have the right to conceive high hopes if I am happy
enough to discover one thing only which is certain and
indubitable。
I suppose； then； that all the things that I see are
false； I persuade myself that nothing has ever existed of all
that my fallacious memory represents to me。 I consider that I
possess no senses； I imagine that body； figure； extension；
movement and place are but the fictions of my mind。 What；
then； can be esteemed as true？ Perhaps nothing at all； unless
that there is nothing in the world that is certain。
But how can I know there is not something different from
those things that I have just considered； of which one cannot
have the slightest doubt？ Is there not some God； or some
other being by whatever name we call it； who puts these
reflections into my mind？ That is not necessary； for is it
not possible that I am capable of producing them myself？ I
myself； am I not at least something？ But I have already
denied that I had senses and body。 Yet I hesitate； for what
follows from that？ Am I so dependent on body and senses that
I cannot exist without these？ But I was persuaded that there
was nothing in all the world； that there was no heaven； no
earth； that there were no minds； nor any bodies： was I not
then likewise persuaded that I did not exist？ Not at all； of
a surety I myself did exist since I persuaded myself of
something ＇or merely because I thought of something＇。 But
there is some deceiver or other； very powerful and very
cunning； who ever employs his ingenuity in deceiving me。 Then
without doubt I exist also if he deceives me； and let him
deceive me as much as he will； he can never cause me to be
nothing so long as I think that I am something。 So that after
having reflected well and carefully examined all things； we
must e to the definite conclusion that this proposition： I
am； I exist； is necessarily true each time that I pronounce
it； or that I mentally conceive it。
But I do not yet know clearly enough what I am； I who am
certain that I am； and hence I must be careful to see that I
do not imprudently take some other object in place of myself；
and thus that I do not go astray in respect of this knowledge
that I hold to be the most certain and most evident of all
that I have formerly learned。 That is why I shall now
consider anew what I believed myself to be before I embarked
upon these last reflections； and of my former opinions I shall
withdraw all that might even in a small degree be invalidated
by the reasons which I have just brought forward； in order
that there may be nothing at all left beyond what is
absolutely certain and indubitable。
What then did I formerly believe myself to be？
Undoubtedly I believed myself to be a man。 But what is a man？
Shall I say a reasonable animal？ Certainly not； for then I
should have to inquire what an animal is； and what is
reasonable； and thus from a single question I should
insensibly fall into an infinitude of others more difficult；
and I should not wish to waste the little time and leisure
remaining to me in trying to unravel subtleties like these。
But I shall rather stop here to consider the thoughts which of
themselves spring up in my mind； and which were not inspired
by anything beyond my own nature alone when I applied myself
to the consideration of my being。 In the first place； the； I
considered myself as having a face； hands； arms； and all that
system of members posed on bones and flesh as seen in a
corpse which I designated by the name of body。 In addition to
this I considered that I was nourished； that I walked； that I
felt； and that I thought； and I referred all these actions to
the soul： but I did not stop to consider what the soul was；
or if I did stop； I imagined that it was something extremely
rare and subtle like a wind； a flame； or an ether； which was
spread throughout my grosser parts。 As to body I had no
manner of doubt about its nature； but thought I had a very
clear knowledge of it； and if I had desired to explain it
according to the notions that I had then formed of it； I
should have described it thus： By the body I understand all
that which can be defined by a certain figure： something
which can be confined in a certain place； and which can fill a
given space in such a way that every other body will be
excluded from it； which can be perceived either by tough； or
by sight； or by hearing； or by taste； or by smell： which can
be moved in many ways not； in truth； by itself； but by
something which is foreign to it； by which it is touched ＇and
from which it receives impressions＇： for to have the power of
self…movement； as also of feeling or of thinking； I did not
consider to appertain to the nature of body： on the contrary；
I was rather astonished to find that faculties similar to them
existed in some bodies。
But what am I； now that I suppose that there is a certain
genius which is extremely powerful； and； if I may say so；
malicious； who employs all his powers in deceiving me？ Can I
affirm that I possess the least of all those things which I
have just said pertain to the nature of body？ I pause to
consider； I revolve all these things in my mind； and I find
none of which I can say that it pertains to me。 It would be
tedious to stop to enumerate them。 Let us pass to the
attributes of soul and see if there is any one which is in me？
What of nutrition or walking ＇the first mentioned＇？ But if it
is so that I have no body it is also true that I can neither
walk nor take nourishment。 Another attribute is sensation。
But one cannot feel without body； and besides I have thought I
perceived many things during sleep that I recognised in my
waking moments as not having been experienced at all。 What of
thinking？ I find here that thought is an attribute that
belongs to me； it alone cannot be separated from me。 I am； I
exist； that is certain。 But how often？ Just when I think；
for it might possibly be the case if I ceased entirely to
think； that I should likewise cease altogether to exist。 I do
not now admit anything which is not necessarily true： to
speak accurately I am not more than a thing which thinks； that
is to say a mind or a soul； or an understanding； or a reason；
which are terms whose significance was formerly unknown to me。
I am； however； a real thing and really exist； but what thing？
I have answered： a thing which thinks。
And what more？ I shall exercise my imagination ＇in order
to see if I am not something more＇。 I am not a collection of
members which we call the human body： I am not a subtle air
distributed through these members； I am not a wind； a fire； a
vapour； a breath； nor anything at all which I can imagine or
conceive； because I have assumed that all these were nothing。
Without changing that supposition I find that I only leave
myself certain of the fact that I am somewhat。 But perhaps it
is true that these same things which I supposed were non…
existent because they are unknown to me； are really not
different from the self which I know。 I am not sure about
this； I shall not dispute about it now； I can only give
judgment on things that are known to me。 I know that I exist；
and I inquire what I am； I whom I know to exist。 But it is
very certain that the knowledge of my existence taken in its
precise significance does not depend on things whose existence
is not yet known to me； consequently it does not depend on
those which I can feign in imagination。 And indeed the very
term feign in imagination10 proves to me my error； for I
really do this if I image myself a something； since to imagine
is nothing else than to contemplate the figure or image of a
corporeal thing。 But I already know for certain that I am；
and that it may be that all these images； and； speaking
generally； all things that relate to the nature of body are
nothing but dreams ＇and chimeras＇。 For this reason I see
clearly that I have as little reason to say； 〃I shall
stimulate my imagination in order to know more distinctly what
I am；〃 than if I were to say； 〃I am now awake； and I perceive
somewhat that is real and true： but because I do not yet
perceive it distinctly enough； I shall go to sleep of express
purpose； so that my dreams may represent the perception with
greatest truth and evidence。〃 And； thus； I know for certain
that nothing of all that I can understand by means of my
imagination belongs to this knowledge which I have of myself；
and that it is necessary to recall the mind from this mode of
thought with the utmost diligence in order that it may be able
to know its own nature with perfect distinctness。
But what then am I？ A thing which thinks。 What is a
thing which thinks？ It is a thing which doubts； understands；
＇conceives＇； affirms； denies； wills； refuses； which also
imagines and feels。
Certainly it is no small matter if all these things
pertain to my nature。 But why should they not so pertain？ Am
I not that being who now doubts nearly everything； who
nevertheless understands certain things； who affirms that one
only is true； who denies all the others； who desires to know
more； is averse from being deceived； who imagines many things；
sometimes indeed despite his will； and who perceives many
likewise； as by the intervent