account。
But finally here I am； having insensibly reverted to the
point I desired； for； since it is now manifest to me that even
bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the
faculty of imagination； but by the understanding only； and
since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or
touched； but only because they are understood； I see clearly
that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my
mind。 But because it is difficult to rid oneself so promptly
of an opinion to which one was accustomed for so long； it will
be well that I should halt a little at this point； so that by
the length of my meditation I may more deeply imprint on my
memory this new knowledge。
Meditation III。
Of God： that He exists。
I shall now close my eyes； I shall stop my ears； I shall
call away all my senses； I shall efface even from my thoughts
all the images of corporeal things； or at least （for that is
hardly possible） I shall esteem them as vain and false； and
thus holding converse only with myself and considering my own
nature； I shall try little by little to reach a better
knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself。
I am a thing that thinks； that is to say； that doubts；
affirms； denies； that knows a few things； that is ignorant of
many ＇that loves； that hates＇； that wills； that desires； that
also imagines and perceives； for as I remarked before；
although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps
nothing at all apart from me and in themselves； I am
nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call
perceptions and imaginations； inasmuch only as they are modes
of thought； certainly reside ＇and are met with＇ in me。
And in the little that I have just said； I think I have
summed up all that I really know； or at least all that
hitherto I was aware that I knew。 In order to try to extend
my knowledge further； I shall now look around more carefully
and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other
things which I have not hitherto perceived。 I am certain that
I am a thing which thinks； but do I not then likewise know
what is requisite to render me certain of a truth？ Certainly
in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of
its truth； excepting the clear and distinct perception of that
which I state； which would not indeed suffice to assure me
that what I say is true； if it could ever happen that a thing
which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false；
and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as
a general rule that all things which I perceive15 very clearly
and very distinctly are true。
At the same time I have before received and admitted many
things to be very certain and manifest； which yet I afterwards
recognised as being dubious。 What then were these things？
They were the earth； sky； stars and all other objects which I
apprehended by means of the senses。 But what did I clearly
＇and distinctly＇ perceive in them？ Nothing more than that the
ideas or thoughts of these things were presented to my mind。
And not even now do I deny that these ideas are met with in
me。 But there was yet another thing which I affirmed； and
which； owing to the habit which I had formed of believing it；
I thought I perceived very clearly； although in truth I did
not perceive it at all； to wit； that there were objects
outside of me from which these ideas proceeded； and to which
they were entirely similar。 And it was in this that I erred；
or； if perchance my judgment was correct； this was not due to
any knowledge arising from my perception。
But when I took anything very simple and easy in the
sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration； e。g。 that
two and three together made five； and other things of the
sort； were not these present to my mind so clearly as to
enable me to affirm that they were true？ Certainly if I
judged that since such matters could be doubted； this would
not have been so for any other reason than that it came into
my mind that perhaps a God might have endowed me with such a
nature that I may have been deceived even concerning things
which seemed to me most manifest。 But every time that this
preconceived opinion of the sovereign power of a God presents
itself to my thought； I am constrained to confess that it is
easy to Him； if He wishes it； to cause me to err； even in
matters in which I believe myself to have the best evidence。
And； on the other hand； always when I direct my attention to
things which I believe myself to perceive very clearly； I am
so persuaded of their truth that I let myself break out into
words such as these： Let who will deceive me； He can never
cause me to be nothing while I think that I am； or some day
cause it to be true to say that I have never been； it being
true now to say that I am； or that two and three make more or
less than five； or any such thing in which I see a manifest
contradiction。 And； certainly； since I have no reason to
believe that there is a God who is a deceiver； and as I have
not yet satisfied myself that there is a God at all； the
reason for doubt which depends on this opinion alone is very
slight； and so to speak metaphysical。 But in order to be able
altogether to remove it； I must inquire whether there is a God
as soon as the occasion presents itself； and if I find that
there is a God； I must also inquire whether He may be a
deceiver； for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not
see that I can ever be certain of anything。
And in order that I may have an opportunity of inquiring
into this in an orderly way ＇without interrupting the order of
meditation which I have proposed to myself； and which is
little by little to pass from the notions which I find first
of all in my mind to those which I shall later on discover in
it＇ it is requisite that I should here divide my thoughts into
certain kinds； and that I should consider in which of these
kinds there is； properly speaking； truth or error to be found。
Of my thoughts some are； so to speak； images of the things；
and to these alone is the title 〃idea〃 properly applied；
examples are my thought of a man or of a chimera； of heaven；
of an angel； or ＇even＇ of God。 But other thoughts possess
other forms as well。 For example in willing； fearing；
approving； denying； though I always perceive something as the
subject of the action of my mind；16 yet by this action I
always add something else to the idea17 which I have of that
thing； and of the thoughts of this kind some are called
volitions or affections； and others judgments。
Now as to what concerns ideas； if we consider them only
in themselves and do not relate them to anything else beyond
themselves； they cannot properly speaking be false； for
whether I imagine a goat or a chimera； it is not less true
that I imagine the one that the other。 We must not fear
likewise that falsity can enter into will and into affections；
for although I may desire evil things； or even things that
never existed； it is not the less true that I desire them。
Thus there remains no more than the judgments which we make；
in which I must take the greatest care not o deceive myself。
But the principal error and the monest which we may meet
with in them； consists in my judging that the ideas which are
in me are similar or conformable to the things which are
outside me； for without doubt if I considered the ideas only
as certain modes of my thoughts； without trying to relate them
to anything beyond； they could scarcely give me material for
error。
But among these ideas； some appear to me to be innate；
some adventitious； and others to be formed ＇or invented＇ by
myself； for； as I have the power of understanding what is
called a thing； or a truth； or a thought； it appears to me
that I hold this power from no other source than my own
nature。 But if I now hear some sound； if I see the sun； or
feel heat； I have hitherto judged that these sensations
proceeded from certain things that exist outside of me； and
finally it appears to me that sirens； hippogryphs； and the
like； are formed out of my own mind。 But again I may possibly
persuade myself that all these ideas are of the nature of
those which I term adventitious； or else that they are all
innate； or all fictitious： for I have not yet clearly
discovered their true origin。
And my principal task in this place is to consider； in
respect to those ideas which appear to me to proceed from
certain objects that are outside me； what are the reasons
which cause me to think them similar to these objects。 It
seems indeed in the first place that I am taught this lesson
by nature； and； secondly； I experience in myself that these
ideas do not depend on my will nor therefore on myself￥for
they often present themselves to my mind in spite of my will。
Just now； for instance； whether I will or whether I do not
will； I feel heat； and thus I persuade myself that this
feeling； or at least this idea of heat； is produced in me by
something which is different from me； i。e。 by the heat of the
fire near which I sit。 And nothing seems to me more obvious
than to judge that this object imprints its likeness rather
than anything else upon me。
Now I must discover whether these proofs are sufficiently
strong and convincing。 When I say that I am so instructed by
nature； I merely mean a certain spontaneous inclination which
impels me to believe in this connection； and not a natural
light which makes me recognise that it is true。 But these two
things are very different； for I cannot doubt that which the
natural light causes me to believe to be true； as； for
example； it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt；
or other facts of the same kind。 And I possess no other
faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood； which can
teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not
really true； and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy。
But as far as ＇apparently＇ natural impulses are concerned； I
have frequently remarked； when I had to make active choice
between virtue and vice； tha