in existence now； unless some cause at this instant； so to
speak； produces me anew； that is to say； conserves me。 It is
as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those
who consider with attention the nature of time； that； in order
to be conserved in each moment in which it endures； a
substance has need of the same power and action as would be
necessary to produce and create it anew； supposing it did not
yet exist； so that the light of nature shows us clearly that
the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a
distinction of the reason。
All that I thus require here is that I should interrogate
myself； if I wish to know whether I possess a power which is
capable of bringing it to pass that I who now am shall still
be in the future； for since I am nothing but a thinking thing；
or at least since thus far it is only this portion of myself
which is precisely in question at present； if such a power did
reside in me； I should certainly be conscious of it。 But I am
conscious of nothing of the kind； and by this I know clearly
that I depend on some being different from myself。
Possibly； however； this being on which I depend is not
that which I call God； and I am created either by my parents
or by some other cause less perfect than God。 This cannot be；
because； as I have just said； it is perfectly evident that
there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the
effect； and thus since I am a thinking thing； and possess an
idea of God within me； whatever in the end be the cause
assigned to my existence； it must be allowed that it is
likewise a thinking thing and that it possesses in itself the
idea of all the perfections which I attribute to God。 We may
again inquire whether this cause derives its origin from
itself or from some other thing。 For if from itself； it
follows by the reasons before brought forward； that this cause
must itself be God； for since it possesses the virtue of self…
existence； it must also without doubt have the power of
actually possessing all the perfections of which it has the
idea； that is； all those which I conceive as existing in God。
But if it derives its existence from some other cause than
itself； we shall again ask； for the same reason； whether this
second cause exists by itself or through another； until from
one step to another； we finally arrive at an ultimate cause；
which will be God。
And it is perfectly manifest that in this there can be no
regression into infinity； since what is in question is not so
much the cause which formerly created me； as that which
conserves me at the present time。
Nor can we suppose that several causes may have concurred
in my production； and that from one I have received the idea
of one of the perfections which I attribute to God； and from
another the idea of some other； so that all these perfections
indeed exist somewhere in the universe； but not as plete in
one unity which is God。 On the contrary； the unity； the
simplicity or the inseparability of all things which are in
god is one of the principal perfections which I conceive to be
in Him。 And certainly the idea of this unity of all Divine
perfections cannot have been placed in me by any cause from
which I have not likewise received the ideas of all the other
perfections； for this cause could not make me able to
prehend them as joined together in an inseparable unity
without having at the same time caused me in some measure to
know what they are ＇and in some way to recognise each one of
them＇。
Finally； so far as my parents ＇from whom it appears I
have sprung＇ are concerned； although all that I have ever been
able to believe of them were true； that does not make it
follow that it is they who conserve me； nor are they even the
authors of my being in any sense； in so far as I am a thinking
being； since what they did was merely to implant certain
dispositions in that matter in which the self￥i。e。 the mind；
which alone I at present identify with myself￥is by me deemed
to exist。 And thus there can be no difficulty in their
regard； but we must of necessity conclude from the fact alone
that I exist； or that the idea of a Being supremely
perfect￥that is of God￥is in me； that the proof of God's
existence is grounded on the highest evidence。
It only remains to me to examine into the manner in which
I have acquired this idea from God； for I have not received it
through the senses； and it is never presented to me
unexpectedly； as is usual with the ideas of sensible things
when these things present themselves； or seem to present
themselves； to the external organs of my senses； nor is it
likewise a fiction of my mind； for it is not in my power to
take from or to add anything to it； and consequently the only
alternative is that it is innate in me； just as the idea of
myself is innate in me。
And one certainly ought not to find it strange that God；
in creating me； placed this idea within me to be like the mark
of the workman imprinted on his work； and it is likewise not
essential that the mark shall be something different from the
work itself。 For from the sole fact that God created me it is
most probable that in some way he has placed his image and
similitude upon me； and that I perceive this similitude （in
which the idea of God is contained） by means of the same
faculty by which I perceive myself￥that is to say； when I
reflect on myself I not only know that I am something
＇imperfect＇； inplete and dependent on another； which
incessantly aspires after something which is better and
greater than myself； but I also know that He on whom I depend
possesses in Himself all the great things towards which I
aspire ＇and the ideas of which I find within myself＇； and that
not indefinitely or potentially alone； but really； actually
and infinitely； and that thus He is God。 And the whole
strength of the argument which I have here made use of to
prove the existence of God consists in this； that I recognise
that it is not possible that my nature should be what it is；
and indeed that I should have in myself the idea of a God； if
God did not veritably exist￥a God； I say； whose idea is in me；
i。e。 who possesses all those supreme perfections of which our
mind may indeed have some idea but without understanding them
all； who is liable to no errors or defect ＇and who has none of
all those marks which denote imperfection＇。 From this it is
manifest that He cannot be a deceiver； since the light of
nature teaches us that fraud and deception necessarily proceed
from some defect。
But before I examine this matter with more care； and pass
on to the consideration of other truths which may be derived
from it； it seems to me right to pause for a while in order to
contemplate God Himself； to ponder at leisure His marvellous
attributes； to consider； and admire； and adore； the beauty of
this light so resplendent； at least as far as the strength of
my mind； which is in some measure dazzled by the sight； will
allow me to do so。 For just as faith teaches us that the
supreme felicity of the other life consists only in this
contemplation of the Divine Majesty； so we continue to learn
by experience that a similar meditation； though inparably
less perfect； causes us to enjoy the greatest satisfaction of
which we are capable in this life。
Meditation IV。
Of the True and the False。
I have been well accustomed these past days to detach my
mind from my senses； and I have accurately observed that there
are very few things that one knows with certainty respecting
corporeal objects； that there are many more which are known to
us respecting the human mind； and yet more still regarding God
Himself； so that I shall now without any difficulty abstract
my thoughts from the consideration of ＇sensible or＇ imaginable
objects； and carry them to those which； being withdrawn from
all contact with matter； are purely intelligible。 And
certainly the idea which I possess of the human mind inasmuch
as it is a thinking thing； and not extended in length； width
and depth； nor participating in anything pertaining to body；
is inparably more distinct than is the idea of any
corporeal thing。 And when I consider that I doubt； that is to
say； that I am an inplete and dependent being； the idea of
a being that is plete and independent； that is of God；
presents itself to my mind with so much distinctness and
clearness￥and from the fact alone that this idea is found in
me； or that I who possess this idea exist； I conclude so
certainly that God exists； and that my existence depends
entirely on Him in every moment of my life￥that I do not think
that the human mind is capable of knowing anything with more
evidence and certitude。 And it seems to me that I now have
before me a road which will lead us from the contemplation of
the true God （in whom all the treasures of science and wisdom
are contained） to the knowledge of the other objects of the
universe。
For； first of all； I recognise it to be impossible that
He should ever deceive me； for in all fraud and deception some
imperfection is to be found； and although it may appear that
the power of deception is a mark of subtilty or power； yet the
desire to deceive without doubt testifies to malice or
feebleness； and accordingly cannot be found in God。
In the next place I experienced in myself a certain
capacity for judging which I have doubtless received from God；
like all the other things that I possess； and as He could not
desire to deceive me； it is clear that He has not given me a
faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright。
And no doubt respecting this matter could remain； if it
were not that the consequence would seem to follow that I can
thus never be deceived； for if I hold all that I possess from
God； and if He has not placed in me the capacity for error； it
seems as though I could never fall into error。 And it is true
that when I think only of God ＇and direct my mind wholly to
Him＇；18 I discover ＇in myself＇ no cause of error； or falsity；
yet directly afterwards； when recurring to myself； experience