as something real and positive will not be improperly termed
false； and the same holds good of other similar ideas。
To these it is certainly not necessary that I should
attribute any author other than myself。 For if they are
false； i。e。 if they represent things which do not exist； the
light of nature shows me that they issue from nought； that is
to say； that they are only in me so far as something is
lacking to the perfection of my nature。 But if they are true；
nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to me that
I cannot even clearly distinguish the thing represented from
non…being； I do not see any reason why they should not be
produced by myself。
As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of
corporeal things； some of them seem as though I might have
derived them from the idea which I possess of myself； as those
which I have of substance； duration； number； and such like。
For ＇even＇ when I think that a stone is a substance； or at
least a thing capable of existing of itself； and that I am a
substance also； although I conceive that I am a thing that
thinks and not one that is extended； and that the stone on the
other hand is an extended thing which does not think； and that
thus there is a notable difference between the two
conceptions￥they seem； nevertheless； to agree in this； that
both represent substances。 In the same way； when I perceive
that I now exist and further recollect that I have in former
times existed； and when I remember that I have various
thoughts of which I can recognise the number； I acquire ideas
of duration and number which I can afterwards transfer to any
object that I please。 But as to all the other qualities of
which the ideas of corporeal things are posed； to wit；
extension； figure； situation and motion； it is true that they
are not formally in me； since I am only a thing that thinks；
but because they are merely certain modes of substance ＇and so
to speak the vestments under which corporeal substance appears
to us＇ and because I myself am also a substance； it would seem
that they might be contained in me eminently。
Hence there remains only the idea of God； concerning
which we must consider whether it is something which cannot
have proceeded from me myself。 By the name God I understand a
substance that is infinite ＇eternal； immutable＇； independent；
all…knowing； all…powerful； and by which I myself and
everything else； if anything else does exist； have been
created。 Now all these characteristics are such that the more
diligently I attend to them； the less do they appear capable
of proceeding from me alone； hence； from what has been already
said； we must conclude that God necessarily exists。
For although the idea of substance is within me owing to
the fact that I am substance； nevertheless I should not have
the idea of an infinite substance￥since I am finite￥if it had
not proceeded from some substance which was veritably
infinite。
Nor should I imagine that I do not perceive the infinite
by a true idea； but only by the negation of the finite； just
as I perceive repose and darkness by the negation of movement
and of light； for； on the contrary； I see that there is
manifestly more reality in infinite substance than in finite；
and therefore that in some way I have in me the notion of the
infinite earlier then the finite￥to wit； the notion of God
before that of myself。 For how would it be possible that I
should know that I doubt and desire； that is to say； that
something is lacking to me； and that I am not quite perfect；
unless I had within me some idea of a Being more perfect than
myself； in parison with which I should recognise the
deficiencies of my nature？
And we cannot say that this idea of God is perhaps
materially false and that consequently I can derive it from
nought ＇i。e。 that possibly it exists in me because I am
imperfect＇； as I have just said is the case with ideas of
heat； cold and other such things； for； on the contrary； as
this idea is very clear and distinct and contains within it
more objective reality than any other； there can be none which
is of itself more true； nor any in which there can be less
suspicion of falsehood。 The idea； I say； of this Being who is
absolutely perfect and infinite； is entirely true； for
although； perhaps； we can imagine that such a Being does not
exist； we cannot nevertheless imagine that His idea represents
nothing real to me； as I have said of the idea of cold。 This
idea is also very clear and distinct； since all that I
conceive clearly and distinctly of the real and the true； and
of what conveys some perfection； is in its entirety contained
in this idea。 And this does not cease to be true although I
do not prehend the infinite； or though in God there is an
infinitude of things which I cannot prehend； nor possibly
even reach in any way by thought； for it is of the nature of
the infinite that my nature； which is finite and limited；
should not prehend it； and it is sufficient that I should
understand this； and that I should judge that all things which
I clearly perceive and in which I know that there is some
perfection； and possibly likewise an infinitude of properties
of which I am ignorant； are in God formally or eminently； so
that the idea which I have of Him may bee the most true；
most clear； and most distinct of all the ideas that are in my
mind。
But possibly I am something more than I suppose myself to
be； and perhaps all those perfections which I attribute to God
are in some way potentially in me； although they do not yet
disclose themselves； or issue in action。 As a matter of fact
I am already sensible that my knowledge increases ＇and
perfects itself＇ little by little； and I see nothing which can
prevent it from increasing more and more into infinitude； nor
do I see； after it has thus been increased ＇or perfected＇；
anything to prevent my being able to acquire by its means all
the other perfections of the Divine nature； nor finally why
the power I have of acquiring these perfections； if it really
exists in me； shall not suffice to produce the ideas of them。
At the same time I recognise that this cannot be。 For；
in the first place； although it were true that every day my
knowledge acquired new degrees of perfection； and that there
were in my nature many things potentially which are not yet
there actually； nevertheless these excellences do not pertain
to ＇or make the smallest approach to＇ the idea which I have of
God in whom there is nothing merely potential ＇but in whom all
is present really and actually＇； for it is an infallible token
of imperfection in my knowledge that it increases little by
little。 and further； although my knowledge grows more and
more； nevertheless I do not for that reason believe that it
can ever be actually infinite； since it can never reach a
point so high that it will be unable to attain to any greater
increase。 But I understand God to be actually infinite； so
that He can add nothing to His supreme perfection。 And
finally I perceive that the objective being of an idea cannot
be produced by a being that exists potentially only； which
properly speaking is nothing； but only by a being which is
formal or actual。
To speak the truth； I see nothing in all that I have just
said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone
who desires to think attentively on the subject； but when I
slightly relax my attention； my mind； finding its vision
somewhat obscured and so to speak blinded by the images of
sensible objects； I do not easily recollect the reason why the
idea that I possess of a being more perfect then I； must
necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really
more perfect； and this is why I wish here to go on to inquire
whether I； who have this idea； can exist if no such being
exists。
And I ask； from whom do I then derive my existence？
Perhaps from myself or from my parents； or from some other
source less perfect than God； for we can imagine nothing more
perfect than God； or even as perfect as He is。
But ＇were I independent of every other and＇ were I myself
the author of my being； I should doubt nothing and I should
desire nothing； and finally no perfection would be lacking to
me； for I should have bestowed on myself every perfection of
which I possessed any idea and should thus be God。 And it
must not be imagined that those things that are lacking to me
are perhaps more difficult of attainment than those which I
already possess； for； on the contrary； it is quite evident
that it was a matter of much greater difficulty to bring to
pass that I； that is to say； a thing or a substance that
thinks； should emerge out of nothing； than it would be to
attain to the knowledge of many things of which I am ignorant；
and which are only the accidents of this thinking substance。
But it is clear that if I had of myself possessed this greater
perfection of which I have just spoken ＇that is to say； if I
had been the author of my own existence＇； I should not at
least have denied myself the things which are the more easy to
acquire ＇to wit； many branches of knowledge of which my nature
is destitute＇； nor should I have deprived myself of any of the
things contained in the idea which I form of God； because
there are none of them which seem to me specially difficult to
acquire： and if there were any that were more difficult to
acquire； they would certainly appear to me to be such
（supposing I myself were the origin of the other things which
I possess） since I should discover in them that my powers were
limited。
But though I assume that perhaps I have always existed
just as I am at present； neither can I escape the force of
this reasoning； and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn
from this is； that I need not seek for any author of my
existence。 For all the course of my life may be divided into
an infinite number of parts； none of which is in any way
dependent on the other； and thus from the fact that I was in
existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be
in existence now； unless some cause at this instant； so to
speak； produces me anew； that is to say； conserves me。 It is
as