yet directly afterwards； when recurring to myself； experience
shows me that I am nevertheless subject to an infinitude of
errors； as to which； when we e to investigate them more
closely； I notice that not only is there a real and positive
idea of God or of a Being of supreme perfection present to my
mind； but also； so to speak； a certain negative idea of
nothing； that is； of that which is infinitely removed from any
kind of perfection； and that I am in a sense something
intermediate between God and nought； i。e。 placed in such a
manner between the supreme Being and non…being； that there is
in truth nothing in me that can lead to error in so far as a
sovereign Being has formed me； but that； as I in some degree
participate likewise in nought or in non…being； i。e。 in so far
as I am not myself the supreme Being； and as I find myself
subject to an infinitude of imperfections； I ought not to be
astonished if I should fall into error。 Thus do I recognise
that error； in so far as it is such； is not a real thing
depending on God； but simply a defect； and therefore； in order
to fall into it； that I have no need to possess a special
faculty given me by God for this very purpose； but that I fall
into error from the fact that the power given me by God for
the purpose of distinguishing truth from error is not
infinite。
Nevertheless this does not quite satisfy me； for error is
not a pure negation ＇i。e。 is not the dimple defect or want of
some perfection which ought not to be mine＇； but it is a lack
of some knowledge which it seems that I ought to possess。 And
on considering the nature of God it does not appear to me
possible that He should have given me a faculty which is not
perfect of its kind； that is； which is wanting in some
perfection due to it。 For if it is true that the more skilful
the artizan； the more perfect is the work of his hands； what
can have been produced by this supreme Creator of all things
that is not in all its parts perfect？ And certainly there is
no doubt that God could have created me so that I could never
have been subject to error； it is also certain that He ever
wills what is best； is it then better that I should be subject
to err than that I should not？
In considering this more attentively； it occurs to me in
the first place that I should not be astonished if my
intelligence is not capable of prehending why God acts as
He does； and that there is thus no reason to doubt of His
existence from the fact that I may perhaps find many other
things besides this as to which I am able to understand
neither for what reason nor how God has produced them。 For；
in the first place； knowing that my nature is extremely feeble
and limited； and that the nature of God is on the contrary
immense； inprehensible； and infinite； I have no further
difficulty in recognising that there is an infinitude of
matter in His power； the causes of which transcend my
knowledge； and this reason suffices to convince me that the
species of cause termed final； finds no useful employment in
physical ＇or natural＇ things； for it does not appear to me
that I can without temerity seek to investigate the
＇inscrutable＇ ends of God。
It further occurs to me that we should not consider one
single creature separately； when we inquire as to whether the
works of God are perfect； but should regard all his creations
together。 For the same thing which might possibly seem very
imperfect with some semblance of reason if regarded by itself；
is found to be very perfect if regarded as part of the whole
universe； and although； since I resolved to doubt all things；
I as yet have only known certainly my own existence and that
of God； nevertheless since I have recognised the infinite
power of God； I cannot deny that He may have produced many
other things； or at least that He has the power of producing
them； so that I may obtain a place as a part of a great
universe。
Whereupon； regarding myself more closely； and considering
what are my errors （for they alone testify to there being any
imperfection in me）； I answer that they depend on a
bination of two causes； to wit； on the faculty of knowledge
that rests in me； and on the power of choice or of free
will￥that is to say； of the understanding and at the same time
of the will。 For by the understanding alone I ＇neither assert
nor deny anything； but＇ apprehend19 the ideas of things as to
which I can form a judgment。 But no error is properly
speaking found in it； provided the word error is taken in its
proper signification； and though there is possibly an
infinitude of things in the world of which I have no idea in
my understanding； we cannot for all that say that it is
deprived of these ideas ＇as we might say of something which is
required by its nature＇； but simply it does not possess these；
because in truth there is no reason to prove that God should
have given me a greater faculty of knowledge than He has given
me； and however skillful a workman I represent Him to be； I
should not for all that consider that He was bound to have
placed in each of His works all the perfections which He may
have been able to place in some。 I likewise cannot plain
that God has not given me a free choice or a will which is
sufficient； ample and perfect； since as a matter of fact I am
conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits。
And what seems to me very remarkable in this regard is that of
all the qualities which I possess there is no one so perfect
and so prehensive that I do not very clearly recognise that
it might be yet greater and more perfect。 For； to take an
example； if I consider the faculty of prehension which I
possess； I find that it is of very small extent and extremely
limited； and at the same time I find the idea of another
faculty much more ample and even infinite； and seeing that I
can form the idea of it； I recognise from this very fact that
it pertains to the nature of God。 If in the same way I
examine the memory； the imagination； or some other faculty； I
do not find any which is not small and circumscribed； while in
God it is immense ＇or infinite＇。 It is free…will alone or
liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can
conceive no other idea to be more great； it is indeed the case
that it is for the most part this will that causes me to know
that in some manner I bear the image and similitude of God。
For although the power of will is inparably greater in God
than in me； both by reason of the knowledge and the power
which； conjoined with it； render it stronger and more
efficacious； and by reason of its object； inasmuch as in God
it extends to a great many things； it nevertheless does not
seem to me greater if I consider it formally and precisely in
itself： for the faculty of will consists alone in our having
the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it
（that is； to affirm or deny； to pursue or to shun it）； or
rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm
or deny； pursue or shun those things placed before us by the
understanding； we act so that we are unconscious that any
outside force constrains us in doing so。 For in order that I
should be free it is not necessary that I should be
indifferent as to the choice of one or the other of two
contraries； but contrariwise the more I lean to the
one￥whether I recognise clearly that the reasons of the good
and true are to be found in it； or whether God so disposes my
inward thought￥the more freely do I choose and embrace it。
And undoubtedly both divine grace and natural knowledge； far
from diminishing my liberty； rather increase it and strengthen
it。 Hence this indifference which I feel； when I am not
swayed to one side rather than to the other by lack of reason；
is the lowest grade of liberty； and rather evinces a lack or
negation in knowledge than a perfection of will： for if I
always recognised clearly what was true and good； I should
never have trouble in deliberating as to what judgment or
choice I should make； and then I should be entirely free
without ever being indifferent。
From all this I recognise that the power of will which I
have received from God is not of itself the source of my
errors￥for it is very ample and very perfect of its kind￥any
more than is the power of understanding； for since I
understand nothing but by the power which God has given me for
understanding； there is no doubt that all that I understand； I
understand as I ought； and it is not possible that I err in
this。 Whence then e my errors？ They e from the sole
fact that since the will is much wider in its range and
pass than the understanding； I do not restrain it within
the same bounds； but extend it also to things which I do not
understand： and as the will is of itself indifferent to
these； it easily falls into error and sin； and chooses the
evil for the good； or the false for the true。
For example； when I lately examined whether anything
existed in the world； and found that from the very fact that I
considered this question it followed very clearly that I
myself existed； I could not prevent myself from believing that
a thing I so clearly conceived was true： not that I found
myself pelled to do so by some external cause； but simply
because from great clearness in my mind there followed a great
inclination of my will； and I believed this with so much the
greater freedom or spontaneity as I possessed the less
indifference towards it。 Now； on the contrary； I not only
know that I exist； inasmuch as I am a thinking thing； but a
certain representation of corporeal nature is also presented
to my mind； and it es to pass that I doubt whether this
thinking nature which is in me； or rather by which I am what I
am； differs from this corporeal nature； or whether both are
not simply the same thing； and I here suppose that I do not
yet know any reason to persuade me to adopt the one belief
rather than the other。 From this it follows that I am
entirely indifferent as to which of the two I affirm or deny；
or even whether I abstain from forming any judgment in the
matter。
And this indifference does not only extend to matters as
to which the understandi