pro tempore； by the people。 Such a form of government supposed； it
is evident：
214。 First； that when such a single person or prince sets up his own
arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of the
society declared by the legislative； then the legislative is
changed。 For that being； in effect； the legislative whose rules and
laws are put in execution； and required to be obeyed； when other
laws are set up； and other rules pretended and enforced than what
the legislative； constituted by the society； have enacted； it is plain
that the legislative is changed。 Whoever introduces new laws； not
being thereunto authorised； by the fundamental appointment of the
society； or subverts the old； disowns and overturns the power by which
they were made； and so sets up a new legislative。
215。 Secondly； when the prince hinders the legislative from
assembling in its due time； or from acting freely； pursuant to those
ends for which it was constituted； the legislative is altered。 For
it is not a certain number of men… no； nor their meeting； unless
they have also freedom of debating and leisure of perfecting what is
for the good of the society； wherein the legislative consists； when
these are taken away； or altered； so as to deprive the society of
the due exercise of their power； the legislative is truly altered。 For
it is not names that constitute governments； but the use and
exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them； so that
he who takes away the freedom； or hinders the acting of the
legislative in its due seasons； in effect takes away the
legislative； and puts an end to the government。
216。 Thirdly； when； by the arbitrary power of the prince； the
electors or ways of election are altered without the consent and
contrary to the common interest of the people； there also the
legislative is altered。 For if others than those whom the society hath
authorised thereunto do choose； or in another way than what the
society hath prescribed； those chosen are not the legislative
appointed by the people。
217。 Fourthly； the delivery also of the people into the subjection
of a foreign power； either by the prince or by the legislative； is
certainly a change of the legislative； and so a dissolution of the
government。 For the end why people entered into society being to be
preserved one entire； free； independent society to be governed by
its own laws； this is lost whenever they are given up into the power
of another。
218。 Why； in such a constitution as this； the dissolution of the
government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident；
because he； having the force； treasure； and offices of the State to
employ； and often persuading himself or being flattered by others；
that； as supreme magistrate； he is incapable of control； he alone is
in a condition to make great advances towards such changes under
pretence of lawful authority； and has it in his hands to terrify or
suppress opposers as factious； seditious； and enemies to the
government； whereas no other part of the legislative； or people； is
capable by themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative
without open and visible rebellion； apt enough to be taken notice
of； which； when it prevails； produces effects very little different
from foreign conquest。 Besides； the prince； in such a form of
government； having the power of dissolving the other parts of the
legislative； and thereby rendering them private persons； they can
never； in opposition to him； or without his concurrence； alter the
legislative by a law； his consent being necessary to give any of their
decrees that sanction。 But yet so far as the other parts of the
legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government； and
do either promote； or not； what lies in them； hinder such designs；
they are guilty； and partake in this； which is certainly the
greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another。
219。 There is one way more whereby such a government may be
dissolved； and that is： When he who has the supreme executive power
neglects and abandons that charge； so that the laws already made can
no longer be put in execution； this is demonstratively to reduce all
to anarchy； and so effectively to dissolve the government。 For laws
not being made for themselves； but to be； by their execution； the
bonds of the society to keep every part of the body politic in its due
place and function。 When that totally ceases； the government visibly
ceases； and the people become a confused multitude without order or
connection。 Where there is no longer the administration of justice for
the securing of men's rights； nor any remaining power within the
community to direct the force； or provide for the necessities of the
public； there certainly is no government left。 Where the laws cannot
be executed it is all one as if there were no laws； and a government
without laws is； I suppose； a mystery in politics inconceivable to
human capacity； and inconsistent with human society。
220。 In these； and the like cases； when the government is dissolved；
the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a
new legislative differing from the other by the change of persons；
or form； or both； as they shall find it most for their safety and
good。 For the society can never； by the fault of another； lose the
native and original right it has to preserve itself； which can only be
done by a settled legislative and a fair and impartial execution of
the laws made by it。 But the state of mankind is not so miserable that
they are not capable of using this remedy till it be too late to
look for any。 To tell people they may provide for themselves by
erecting a new legislative； when； by oppression； artifice； or being
delivered over to a foreign power； their old one is gone； is only to
tell them they may expect relief when it is too late； and the evil
is past cure。 This is； in effect； no more than to bid them first be
slaves； and then to take care of their liberty； and； when their chains
are on； tell them they may act like free men。 This； if barely so； is
rather mockery than relief； and men can never be secure from tyranny
if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it；
and； therefore； it is that they have not only a right to get out of
it； but to prevent it。
221。 There is； therefore； secondly； another way whereby
governments are dissolved； and that is； when the legislative； or the
prince； either of them act contrary to their trust。
For the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them when they
endeavour to invade the property of the subject； and to make
themselves； or any part of the community； masters or arbitrary
disposers of the lives； liberties； or fortunes of the people。
222。 The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of
their property； and the end while they choose and authorise a
legislative is that there may be laws made； and rules set； as guards
and fences to the properties of all the society； to limit the power
and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society。 For
since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that
the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one
designs to secure by entering into society； and for which the people
submitted themselves to legislators of their own making： whenever
the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the
people； or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power； they put
themselves into a state of war with the people； who are thereupon
absolved from any farther obedience； and are left to the common refuge
which God hath provided for all men against force and violence。
Whensoever； therefore； the legislative shall transgress this
fundamental rule of society； and either by ambition； fear； folly； or
corruption； endeavour to grasp themselves； or put into the hands of
any other； an absolute power over the lives； liberties； and estates of
the people； by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the
people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends； and it
devolves to the people； who have a right to resume their original
liberty； and by the establishment of a new legislative （such as they
shall think fit）； provide for their own safety and security； which
is the end for which they are in society。 What I have said here
concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the
supreme executor； who having a double trust put in him； both to have a
part in the legislative and the supreme execution of the law； acts
against both； when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will as
the law of the society。 He acts also contrary to his trust when he
employs the force； treasure； and offices of the society to corrupt the
representatives and gain them to his purposes； when he openly
pre…engages the electors； and prescribes； to their choice； such whom
he has； by solicitation； threats； promises； or otherwise； won to his
designs； and employs them to bring in such who have promised
beforehand what to vote and what to enact。 Thus to regulate candidates
and electors； and new model the ways of election； what is it but to
cut up the government by the roots； and poison the very fountain of
public security？ For the people having reserved to themselves the
choice of their representatives as the fence to their properties；
could do it for no other end but that they might always be freely
chosen； and so chosen； freely act and advise as the necessity of the
commonwealth and the public good should； upon examination and mature
debate； be judged to require。 This； those who give their votes
before they hear the debate； and have weighed the reasons on all
sides； are not capable of doing。 To prepare such an assembly as
this； and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will；
for the true representatives of the people； and the law…makers of
the society； is certainly as great a breach of trust； and as perfect a
declaration of a design to subvert the government； as is possible t