being as void and insignificant as that of any private man； the
difference between the one and the other being that the magistrate has
some authority so far and to such ends； and the private man has none
at all； for it is not the commission but the authority that gives
the right of acting； and against the laws there can be no authority。
But notwithstanding such resistance； the king's person and authority
are still both secured； and so no danger to governor or government。
207。 Thirdly。 Supposing a government wherein the person of the chief
magistrate is not thus sacred； yet this doctrine of the lawfulness
of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power will not； upon
every slight occasion； endanger him or embroil the government； for
where the injured party may be relieved and his damages repaired by
appeal to the law； there can be no pretence for force； which is only
to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law。 For
nothing is to be accounted hostile force but where it leaves not the
remedy of such an appeal。 and it is such force alone that puts him
that uses it into a state of war； and makes it lawful to resist him。 A
man with a sword in his hand demands my purse on the highway； when
perhaps I have not 12d。 in my pocket。 This man I may lawfully kill。 To
another I deliver L100 to hold only whilst I alight； which he
refuses to restore me when I am got up again； but draws his sword to
defend the possession of it by force。 I endeavour to retake it。 The
mischief this man does me is a hundred； or possibly a thousand times
more than the other perhaps intended me （whom I killed before he
really did me any）； and yet I might lawfully kill the one and cannot
so much as hurt the other lawfully。 The reason whereof is plain；
because the one using force which threatened my life； I could not have
time to appeal to the law to secure it； and when it was gone it was
too late to appeal。 The law could not restore life to my dead carcass。
The loss was irreparable； which to prevent the law of Nature gave me a
right to destroy him who had put himself into a state of war with me
and threatened my destruction。 But in the other case； my life not
being in danger； I might have the benefit of appealing to the law； and
have reparation for my L100 that way。
208。 Fourthly。 But if the unlawful acts done by the magistrate be
maintained （by the power he has got）； and the remedy； which is due
by law； be by the same power obstructed； yet the right of resisting；
even in such manifest acts of tyranny； will not suddenly； or on slight
occasions； disturb the government。 For if it reach no farther than
some private men's cases； though they have a right to defend
themselves； and to recover by force what by unlawful force is taken
from them； yet the right to do so will not easily engage them in a
contest wherein they are sure to perish； it being as impossible for
one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government where the body of
the people do not think themselves concerned in it； as for a raving
madman or heady malcontent to overturn a well…settled state； the
people being as little apt to follow the one as the other。
209。 But if either these illegal acts have extended to the
majority of the people； or if the mischief and oppression has light
only on some few； but in such cases as the precedent and
consequences seem to threaten all； and they are persuaded in their
consciences that their laws； and with them； their estates；
liberties； and lives are in danger； and perhaps their religion too；
how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against
them I cannot tell。 This is an inconvenience； I confess； that
attends all governments whatsoever； when the governors have brought it
to this pass； to be generally suspected of their people； the most
dangerous state they can possibly put themselves in； wherein they
are the less to be pitied； because it is so easy to be avoided。 It
being as impossible for a governor； if he really means the good of his
people； and the preservation of them and their laws together； not to
make them see and feel it； as it is for the father of a family not
to let his children see he loves and takes care of them。
210。 But if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind； and
actions of another； arts used to elude the law； and the trust of
prerogative （which is an arbitrary power in some things left in the
prince's hand to do good； not harm； to the people） employed contrary
to the end for which it was given； if the people shall find the
ministers and subordinate magistrates chosen； suitable to such ends；
and favoured or laid by proportionably as they promote or oppose them；
if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power； and that
religion underhand favoured； though publicly proclaimed against； which
is readiest to introduce it； and the operators in it supported as much
as may be； and when that cannot be done； yet approved still； and liked
the better； and a long train of acting show the counsels all tending
that way； how can a man any more hinder himself from being persuaded
in his own mind which way things are going； or； from casting about how
to save himself； than he could from believing the captain of a ship he
was in was carrying him and the rest of the company to Algiers； when
he found him always steering that course； though cross winds； leaks in
his ship； and want of men and provisions did often force him to turn
his course another way for some time； which he steadily returned to
again as soon as the wind； weather； and other circumstances would
let him？
Chapter XIX
Of the Dissolution of Government
211。 HE that will； with any clearness； speak of the dissolution of
government； ought in the first place to distinguish between the
dissolution of the society and the dissolution of the government。 That
which makes the community； and brings men out of the loose state of
Nature into one politic society； is the agreement which every one
has with the rest to incorporate and act as one body； and so be one
distinct commonwealth。 The usual； and almost only way whereby this
union is dissolved； is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest
upon them。 For in that case （not being able to maintain and support
themselves as one entire and independent body） the union belonging
to that body； which consisted therein； must necessarily cease； and
so every one return to the state he was in before； with a liberty to
shift for himself and provide for his own safety； as he thinks fit； in
some other society。 Whenever the society is dissolved； it is certain
the government of that society cannot remain。 Thus conquerors'
swords often cut up governments by the roots； and mangle societies
to pieces； separating the subdued or scattered multitude from the
protection of and dependence on that society which ought to have
preserved them from violence。 The world is too well instructed in； and
too forward to allow of this way of dissolving of governments； to need
any more to be said of it； and there wants not much argument to
prove that where the society is dissolved； the government cannot
remain； that being as impossible as for the frame of a house to
subsist when the materials of it are scattered and displaced by a
whirlwind； or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake。
212。 Besides this overturning from without； governments are
dissolved from within：
First。 When the legislative is altered； civil society being a
state of peace amongst those who are of it； from whom the state of war
is excluded by the umpirage which they have provided in their
legislative for the ending all differences that may arise amongst
any of them； it is in their legislative that the members of a
commonwealth are united and combined together into one coherent living
body。 This is the soul that gives form； life； and unity to the
commonwealth； from hence the several members have their mutual
influence； sympathy； and connection； and therefore when the
legislative is broken； or dissolved； dissolution and death follows。
For the essence and union of the society consisting in having one
will； the legislative； when once established by the majority； has
the declaring and； as it were； keeping of that will。 The
constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of
society； whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union
under the direction of persons and bonds of laws； made by persons
authorised thereunto； by the consent and appointment of the people；
without which no one man； or number of men； amongst them can have
authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest。 When any
one； or more； shall take upon them to make laws whom the people have
not appointed so to do； they make laws without authority； which the
people are not therefore bound to obey； by which means they come again
to be out of subjection； and may constitute to themselves a new
legislative； as they think best； being in full liberty to resist the
force of those who； without authority； would impose anything upon
them。 Every one is at the disposure of his own will； when those who
had； by the delegation of the society； the declaring of the public
will； are excluded from it； and others usurp the place who have no
such authority or delegation。
213。 This being usually brought about by such in the commonwealth；
who misuse the power they have； it is hard to consider it aright；
and know at whose door to lay it； without knowing the form of
government in which it happens。 Let us suppose； then； the
legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons：…
First； a single hereditary person having the constant； supreme；
executive power； and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the
other two within certain periods of time。 Secondly； an assembly of
hereditary nobility。 Thirdly； an assembly of representatives chosen；
pro tempore； by the people。 Such a form of government supposed； it
is evident：
214。 First； that when such a