of the forms and rules of the government； for if the usurper extend
his power beyond what； of right； belonged to the lawful princes or
governors of the commonwealth； it is tyranny added to usurpation。
198。 In all lawful governments the designation of the persons who
are to bear rule being as natural and necessary a part as the form
of the government itself； and that which had its establishment
originally from the people… the anarchy being much alike； to have no
form of government at all； or to agree that it shall be monarchical；
yet appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power
and be the monarch… all commonwealths； therefore； with the form of
government established； have rules also of appointing and conveying
the right to those who are to have any share in the public
authority； and whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power
by other ways than what the laws of the community have prescribed hath
no right to be obeyed； though the form of the commonwealth be still
preserved； since he is not the person the laws have appointed； and；
consequently； not the person the people have consented to。 Nor can
such an usurper； or any deriving from him； ever have a title till
the people are both at liberty to consent； and have actually
consented； to allow and confirm in him the power he hath till then
usurped。
Chapter XVIII
Of Tyranny
199。 As usurpation is the exercise of power which another hath a
right to； so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right； which
nobody can have a right to； and this is making use of the power any
one has in his hands； not for the good of those who are under it；
but for his own private； separate advantage。 When the governor；
however entitled； makes not the law； but his will； the rule； and his
commands and actions are not directed to the preservation of the
properties of his people； but the satisfaction of his own ambition；
revenge； covetousness； or any other irregular passion。
200。 If one can doubt this to be truth or reason because it comes
from the obscure hand of a subject； I hope the authority of a king
will make it pass with him。 King James； in his speech to the
Parliament； 16O3； tells them thus： 〃I will ever prefer the weal of the
public and of the whole commonwealth； in making of good laws and
constitutions； to any particular and private ends of mine； thinking
ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal
and worldly felicity… a point wherein a lawful king doth directly
differ from a tyrant； for I do acknowledge that the special and
greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an
usurping tyrant is this… that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant
doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction
of his desires and unreasonable appetites； the righteous and just king
doth； by the contrary； acknowledge himself to be ordained for the
procuring of the wealth and property of his people。〃 And again； in his
speech to the Parliament； 1609； he hath these words： 〃The king binds
himself； by a double oath； to the observation of the fundamental
laws of his kingdom… tacitly； as by being a king； and so bound to
protect； as well the people as the laws of his kingdom； and
expressly by his oath at his coronation； so as every just king； in a
settled kingdom； is bound to observe that paction made to his
people； by his laws； in framing his government agreeable thereunto；
according to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge：
'Hereafter； seed…time； and harvest； and cold； and heat； and summer；
and winter； and day； and night； shall not cease while the earth
remaineth。' And therefore a king； governing in a settled kingdom；
leaves to be a king； and degenerates into a tyrant； as soon as he
leaves off to rule according to his laws。〃 And a little after：
〃Therefore； all kings that are not tyrants； or perjured； will be
glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws； and they
that persuade them the contrary are vipers； pests； both against them
and the commonwealth。〃 Thus； that learned king； who well understood
the notions of things； makes the difference betwixt a king and a
tyrant to consist only in this： that one makes the laws the bounds
of his power and the good of the public the end of his government； the
other makes all give way to his own will and appetite。
201。 It is a mistake to think this fault is proper only to
monarchies。 Other forms of government are liable to it as well as
that； for wherever the power that is put in any hands for the
government of the people and the preservation of their properties is
applied to other ends； and made use of to impoverish； harass； or
subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have
it； there it presently becomes tyranny； whether those that thus use it
are one or many。 Thus we read of the thirty tyrants at Athens； as well
as one at Syracuse； and the intolerable dominion of the Decemviri at
Rome was nothing better。
202。 Wherever law ends； tyranny begins； if the law be transgressed
to another's harm； and whosoever in authority exceeds the power
given him by the law； and makes use of the force he has under his
command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not；
ceases in that to be a magistrate； and acting without authority may be
opposed； as any other man who by force invades the right of another。
This is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates。 He that hath
authority to seize my person in the street may be opposed as a thief
and a robber if he endeavours to break into my house to execute a
writ； notwithstanding that I know he has such a warrant and such a
legal authority as will empower him to arrest me abroad。 And why
this should not hold in the highest； as well as in the most inferior
magistrate； I would gladly be informed。 Is it reasonable that the
eldest brother； because he has the greatest part of his father's
estate； should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger
brothers' portions？ Or that a rich man； who possessed a whole country；
should from thence have a right to seize； when he pleased； the cottage
and garden of his poor neighbour？ The being rightfully possessed of
great power and riches； exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the
sons of Adam； is so far from being an excuse； much less a reason for
rapine and oppression； which the endamaging another without
authority is； that it is a great aggravation of it。 For exceeding
the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than a petty
officer； no more justifiable in a king than a constable。 But so much
the worse in him as that he has more trust put in him； is supposed；
from the advantage of education and counsellors； to have better
knowledge and less reason to do it； having already a greater share
than the rest of his brethren。
203。 May the commands； then； of a prince be opposed？ May he be
resisted； as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved； and but
imagine he has not right done him？ This will unhinge and overturn
all polities； and instead of government and order； leave nothing but
anarchy and confusion。
204。 To this I answer： That force is to be opposed to nothing but to
unjust and unlawful force。 Whoever makes any opposition in any other
case draws on himself a just condemnation； both from God and man；
and so no such danger or confusion will follow； as is often suggested。
For…
205。 First。 As in some countries the person of the prince by the law
is sacred； and so whatever he commands or does； his person is still
free from all question or violence； not liable to force； or any
judicial censure or condemnation。 But yet opposition may be made to
the illegal acts of any inferior officer or other commissioned by him；
unless he will； by actually putting himself into a state of war with
his people； dissolve the government； and leave them to that defence；
which belongs to every one in the state of Nature。 For of such things；
who can tell what the end will be？ And a neighbour kingdom has
showed the world an odd example。 In all other cases the sacredness
of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies； whereby he is
secure； whilst the government stands； from all violence and harm
whatsoever； than which there cannot be a wiser constitution。 For the
harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often； nor
to extend itself far； nor being able by his single strength to subvert
the laws nor oppress the body of the people； should any prince have so
much weakness and ill…nature as to be willing to do it。 The
inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes
when a heady prince comes to the throne are well recompensed by the
peace of the public and security of the government in the person of
the chief magistrate； thus set out of the reach of danger； it being
safer for the body that some few private men should be sometimes in
danger to suffer than that the head of the republic should be easily
and upon slight occasions exposed。
206。 Secondly。 But this privilege； belonging only to the king's
person； hinders not but they may be questioned； opposed； and resisted；
who use unjust force； though they pretend a commission from him
which the law authorises not； as is plain in the case of him that
has the king's writ to arrest a man which is a full commission from
the king； and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do
it； nor execute this command of the king upon certain days nor in
certain places； though this commission have no such exception in it；
but they are the limitations of the law； which； if any one transgress；
the king's commission excuses him not。 For the king's authority
being given him only by the law； he cannot empower any one to act
against the law； or justify him by his commission in so doing。 The
commission or command of any magistrate where he has no authority；
being as void and insignificant as that of any private man； the
difference between the one and the