the society； is certainly as great a breach of trust； and as perfect a
declaration of a design to subvert the government； as is possible to
be met with。 To which； if one shall add rewards and punishments
visibly employed to the same end； and all the arts of perverted law
made use of to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of
such a design； and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties
of their country； it will be past doubt what is doing。 What power they
ought to have in the society who thus employ it contrary to the
trust that along with it in its first institution； is easy to
determine； and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any
such thing as this cannot any longer be trusted。
223。 To this； perhaps； it will be said that the people being
ignorant and always discontented； to lay the foundation of
government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people；
is to expose it to certain ruin； and no government will be able long
to subsist if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they
take offence at the old one。 To this I answer； quite the contrary。
People are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to
suggest。 They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the
acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to。 And
if there be any original defects； or adventitious ones introduced by
time or corruption； it is not an easy thing to get them changed；
even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it。 This
slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions
has in the many revolutions ＇that＇ have been seen in this kingdom；
in this and former ages； still kept us to； or after some interval of
fruitless attempts； still brought us back again to； our old
legislative of king； lords and commons； and whatever provocations have
made the crown be taken from some of our princes' heads； they never
carried the people so far as to place it in another line。
224。 But it will be said this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent
rebellion。 To which I answer：
First： no more than any other hypothesis。 For when the people are
made miserable； and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of
arbitrary power； cry up their governors as much as you will for sons
of Jupiter； let them be sacred and divine； descended or authorised
from Heaven； give them out for whom or what you please； the same
will happen。 The people generally ill treated； and contrary to
right； will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a
burden that sits heavy upon them。 They will wish and seek for the
opportunity； which in the change； weakness； and accidents of human
affairs； seldom delays long to offer itself He must have lived but a
little while in the world； who has not seen examples of this in his
time； and he must have read very little who cannot produce examples of
it in all sorts of governments in the world。
225。 Secondly： I answer； such revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in public affairs。 Great mistakes in the ruling
part； many wrong and inconvenient laws； and all the slips of human
frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur。 But if a
long train of abuses； prevarications； and artifices； all tending the
same way； make the design visible to the people； and they cannot but
feel what they lie under； and see whither they are going； it is not to
be wondered that they should then rouse themselves； and endeavour to
put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for
which government was at first erected； and without which； ancient
names and specious forms are so far from being better； that they are
much worse than the state of Nature or pure anarchy； the
inconveniencies being all as great and as near； but the remedy farther
off and more difficult。
226。 Thirdly： I answer； that this power in the people of providing
for their safety anew by a new legislative when their legislators have
acted contrary to their trust by invading their property； is the
best fence against rebellion； and the probable means to hinder it。 For
rebellion being an opposition； not to persons； but authority； which is
founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government： those；
whoever they be； who； by force； break through； and； by force；
justify their violation of them； are truly and properly rebels。 For
when men； by entering into society and civil government； have excluded
force； and introduced laws for the preservation of property； peace；
and unity amongst themselves； those who set up force again in
opposition to the laws； do rebellare… that is； bring back again the
state of war； and are properly rebels； which they who are in power； by
the pretence they have to authority； the temptation of force they have
in their hands； and the flattery of those about them being likeliest
to do； the proper way to prevent the evil is to show them the danger
and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation to run
into it。
227。 In both the forementioned cases； when either the legislative is
changed； or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they
were constituted； those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion。 For if
any one by force takes away the established legislative of any
society； and the laws by them made； pursuant to their trust； he
thereby takes away the umpirage which every one had consented to for a
peaceable decision of all their controversies； and a bar to the
state of war amongst them。 They who remove or change the legislative
take away this decisive power； which nobody can have but by the
appointment and consent of the people； and so destroying the authority
which the people did； and nobody else can； set up； and introducing a
power which the people hath not authorised； actually introduce a state
of war； which is that of force without authority； and thus by removing
the legislative established by the society； in whose decisions the
people acquiesced and united as to that of their own will； they
untie the knot； and expose the people anew to the state of war。 And if
those； who by force take away the legislative； are rebels； the
legislators themselves； as has been shown； can be no less esteemed so；
when they who were set up for the protection and preservation of the
people； their liberties and properties shall by force invade and
endeavour to take them away； and so they putting themselves into a
state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians
of their peace； are properly； and with the greatest aggravation；
rebellantes； rebels。
228。 But if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion mean
that it may occasion civil wars or intestine broils to tell the people
they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon
their liberties or properties； and may oppose the unlawful violence of
those who were their magistrates when they invade their properties；
contrary to the trust put in them； and that； therefore； this
doctrine is not to be allowed； being so destructive to the peace of
the world； they may as well say； upon the same ground； that honest men
may not oppose robbers or pirates； because this may occasion
disorder or bloodshed。 If any mischief come in such cases； it is not
to be charged upon him who defends his own right； but on him that
invades his neighbour's。 If the innocent honest man must quietly
quit all he has for peace sake to him who will lay violent hands
upon it； I desire it may be considered what kind of a peace there will
be in the world which consists only in violence and rapine； and
which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and
oppressors。 Who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the
mighty and the mean； when the lamb； without resistance； yielded his
throat to be torn by the imperious wolf？ Polyphemus's den gives us a
perfect pattern of such a peace。 Such a government wherein Ulysses and
his companions had nothing to do but quietly to suffer themselves to
be devoured。 And no doubt Ulysses； who was a prudent man； preached
up passive obedience； and exhorted them to a quiet submission by
representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind； and
by showing ＇what＇ inconveniencies might happen if they should offer to
resist Polyphemus； who had now the power over them。
229。 The end of government is the good of mankind； and which is best
for mankind； that the people should be always exposed to the boundless
will of tyranny； or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be
opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power； and
employ it for the destruction； and not the preservation； of the
properties of their people？
230。 Nor let any one say that mischief can arise from hence as often
as it shall please a busy head or turbulent spirit to desire the
alteration of the government。 It is true such men may stir whenever
they please； but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition。
For till the mischief be grown general； and the ill designs of the
rulers become visible； or their attempts sensible to the greater part；
the people； who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by
resistance； are not apt to stir。 The examples of particular
injustice or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man moves
them not。 But if they universally have a persuasion grounded upon
manifest evidence that designs are carrying on against their
liberties； and the general course and tendency of things cannot but
give them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their
governors； who is to be blamed for it？ Who can help it if they； who
might avoid it； bring themselves into this suspicion？ Are the people
to be blamed if they have the sense of rational creatures； and can
think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them？ And is
it not rather their fault who put things in such a posture that they
would not have them thought as they are？ I grant that the pride；
ambition； and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great
disorders in commonw