distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions。
The understanding demands that something be given （at least in the
conception）； in order to be able to determine it in a certain
manner。 Hence； in a conception of the pure understanding； the matter
precedes the form； and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the
existence of things （monads） and of an internal power of
representation in them； in order to found upon this their external
relation and the munity their state （that is； of their
representations）。 Hence； with him； space and time were possible… the
former through the relation of substances； the latter through the
connection of their determinations with each other； as causes and
effects。 And so would it really be； if the pure understanding were
capable of an immediate application to objects； and if space and
time were determinations of things in themselves。 But being merely
sensuous intuitions； in which we determine all objects solely as
phenomena； the form of intuition （as a subjective property of
sensibility） must antecede all matter （sensations）； consequently space
and time must antecede all phenomena and all data of experience； and
rather make experience itself possible。 But the intellectual
philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things
themselves and determine their possibility； an objection perfectly
correct； if we assume that we intuite things as they are； although
with confused representation。 But as sensuous intuition is a
peculiar subjective condition； which is a priori at the foundation
of all perception； and the form of which is primitive； the form must
be given per se； and so far from matter （or the things themselves
which appear） lying at the foundation of experience （as we must
conclude； if we judge by mere conceptions）； the very possibility of
itself presupposes； on the contrary； a given formal intuition （space
and time）。
REMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION。
Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a
conception either in the sensibility or in the pure understanding； the
transcendental place。 In this manner； the appointment of the
position which must be taken by each conception according to the
difference in its use； and the directions for determining this place
to all conceptions according to rules； would be a transcendental
topic； a doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the
surreptitious devices of the pure understanding and the delusions
which thence arise； as it would always distinguish to what faculty
of cognition each conception properly belonged。 Every conception；
every title； under which many cognitions rank together； may be
called a logical place。 Upon this is based the logical topic of
Aristotle； of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail
themselves； in order； under certain titles of thought； to observe what
would best suit the matter they had to treat； and thus enable
themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of
profundity。
Transcendental topic； on the contrary； contains nothing more than
the above…mentioned four titles of all parison and distinction；
which differ from categories in this respect； that they do not
represent the object according to that which constitutes its
conception （quantity； reality）； but set forth merely the parison of
representations； which precedes our conceptions of things。 But this
parison requires a previous reflection； that is； a determination of
the place to which the representations of the things which are
pared belong； whether； to wit； they are cogitated by the pure
understanding； or given by sensibility。
Conceptions may be logically pared without the trouble of
inquiring to what faculty their objects belong； whether as noumena； to
the understanding； or as phenomena； to sensibility。 If； however； we
wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects； previous
transcendental reflection is necessary。 Without this reflection I
should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions； and construct
pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot
acknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental
amphiboly； that is； upon a substitution of an object of pure
understanding for a phenomenon。
For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic； and
consequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of
reflection； the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system
of the world； or rather； believed himself petent to cognize the
internal nature of things； by paring all objects merely with the
understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought。 Our
table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected
advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of
his system in all its parts； and at the same time of exposing the
fundamental principle of this peculiar mode of thought； which rested
upon naught but a misconception。 He pared all things with each
other merely by means of conceptions； and naturally found no other
differences than those by which the understanding distinguishes its
pure conceptions one from another。 The conditions of sensuous
intuition； which contain in themselves their own means of distinction；
he did not look upon as primitive； because sensibility was to him
but a confused mode of representation and not any particular source of
representations。 A phenomenon was for him the representation of the
thing in itself； although distinguished from cognition by the
understanding only in respect of the logical form… the former with its
usual want of analysis containing； according to him； a certain mixture
of collateral representations in its conception of a thing； which it
is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish。 In one
word； Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena； just as Locke； in his
system of noogony （if I may be allowed to make use of such
expressions）； sensualized the conceptions of the understanding； that
is to say； declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract
conceptions of reflection。 Instead of seeking in the understanding and
sensibility two different sources of representations； which；
however； can present us with objective judgements of things only in
conjunction； each of these great men recognized but one of these
faculties； which； in their opinion； applied immediately to things in
themselves； the other having no duty but that of confusing or
arranging the representations of the former。
Accordingly； the objects of sense were pared by Leibnitz as
things in general merely in the understanding。
1st。 He pares them in regard to their identity or difference…
as judged by the understanding。 As； therefore； he considered merely
the conceptions of objects； and not their position in intuition； in
which alone objects can be given； and left quite out of sight the
transcendental locale of these conceptions… whether； that is； their
object ought to be classed among phenomena； or among things in
themselves； it was to be expected that he should extend the
application of the principle of indiscernibles； which is valid
solely of conceptions of things in general； to objects of sense
（mundus phaenomenon）； and that he should believe that he had thereby
contributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature。 In
truth； if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as
a thing in itself； I cannot look upon one drop as different from
another； if the conception of the one is pletely identical with
that of the other。 But if it is a phenomenon in space； it has a
place not merely in the understanding （among conceptions）； but also in
sensuous external intuition （in space）； and in this case； the physical
locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal
determinations of things； and one place； B； may contain a thing
which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place； A； just as
well as if the two things were in every respect different from each
other。 Difference of place without any other conditions； makes the
plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena； not only possible
in itself； but even necessary。 Consequently； the above so…called law
is not a law of nature。 It is merely an analytical rule for the
parison of things by means of mere conceptions。
2nd。 The principle： 〃Realities （as simple affirmations） never
logically contradict each other；〃 is a proposition perfectly true
respecting the relation of conceptions； but； whether as regards
nature； or things in themselves （of which we have not the slightest
conception）； is without any the least meaning。 For real opposition； in
which A … B is = 0； exists everywhere； an opposition； that is； in
which one reality united with another in the same subject
annihilates the effects of the other… a fact which is constantly
brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and
operations in nature； which； nevertheless； as depending on real
forces； must be called realitates phaenomena。 General mechanics can
even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in
an a priori rule； as it directs its attention to the opposition in the
direction of forces… a condition of which the transcendental
conception of reality can tell us nothing。 Although M。 Leibnitz did
not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new
principle； he yet employed it for the establishment of new
propositions； and his followers introduced it into their
Leibnitzio…Wolfian system of philosophy。 According to this
principle； for example； all evils are but consequences of the
limited nature of created beings； that is； negations； because these
are the only opposite of reality。 （In the mere conception of a thing
in general this is really the case； but not in things as phenomena。）
In like manner； the upholders of this system deem it not only
possible； but natural also； to connect and unite all reality in one
being； because they acknowledge no other sort of opposition than
that of contradiction （by which the conception itself of a thing is
annihilated）； and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition
of reciprocal destruction； so to speak；