connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical
（analytical） connection with each other？ The proposition never will be
demonstrated； nay； more； the possibility of any such pure assertion
never can be shown； without making reference to the empirical use of
the understanding； and thus； ipso facto； pletely renouncing pure
and non…sensuous judgement。 Thus the conception of pure and merely
intelligible objects is pletely void of all principles of its
application； because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be
given； and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for
them serves only； like a void space； to limit the use of empirical
principles； without containing at the same time any other object of
cognition beyond their sphere。
APPENDIX
APPENDIX。
Of the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of
Reflection from the Confusion of the Transcendental with
the Empirical use of the Understanding。
Reflection （reflexio） is not occupied about objects themselves；
for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them； but is that
state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective
conditions under which we obtain conceptions。 It is the
consciousness of the relation of given representations to the
different sources or faculties of cognition； by which alone their
relation to each other can be rightly determined。 The first question
which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty
of cognition do they belong？ To the understanding or to the senses？
Many judgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or
inclination； but； because reflection neither precedes nor follows；
it is held to be a judgement that has its origin in the understanding。
All judgements do not require examination； that is； investigation into
the grounds of their truth。 For； when they are immediately certain
（for example： 〃Between two points there can be only one straight
line〃）； no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found
than that which they themselves contain and express。 But all
judgement； nay； all parisons require reflection； that is； a
distinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions
belong。 The act whereby I pare my representations with the
faculty of cognition which originates them； and whereby I
distinguish whether they are pared with each other as belonging
to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition； I term
transcendental reflection。 Now； the relations in which conceptions can
stand to each other are those of identity and difference； agreement
and opposition； of the internal and external； finally； of the
determinable and the determining （matter and form）。 The proper
determination of these relations rests on the question； to what
faculty of cognition they subjectively belong； whether to
sensibility or understanding？ For； on the manner in which we solve
this question depends the manner in which we must cogitate these
relations。
Before constructing any objective judgement； we pare the
conceptions that are to be placed in the judgement； and observe
whether there exists identity （of many representations in one
conception）； if a general judgement is to be constructed； or
difference； if a particular； whether there is agreement when
affirmative； and opposition when negative judgements are to be
constructed； and so on。 For this reason we ought to call these
conceptions； conceptions of parison （conceptus parationis）。
But as； when the question is not as to the logical form； but as to the
content of conceptions； that is to say； whether the things
themselves are identical or different； in agreement or opposition； and
so on； the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of
cognition； to wit； a relation either to sensibility or to the
understanding； and as on this relation depends their relation to
each other； transcendental reflection； that is； the relation of
given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition； can
alone determine this latter relation。 Thus we shall not be able to
discover whether the things are identical or different； in agreement
or opposition； etc。； from the mere conception of the things by means
of parison （paratio）； but only by distinguishing the mode of
cognition to which they belong； in other words； by means of
transcendental reflection。 We may； therefore； with justice say； that
logical reflection is mere parison； for in it no account is taken
of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong； and
they are consequently； as far as regards their origin； to be treated
as homogeneous； while transcendental reflection （which applies to
the objects themselves） contains the ground of the possibility of
objective parison of representations with each other； and is
therefore very different from the former； because the faculties of
cognition to which they belong are not even the same。 Transcendental
reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to
establish an a priori judgement upon things。 We shall now proceed to
fulfil this duty； and thereby throw not a little light on the question
as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding。
1。 Identity and Difference。 When an object is presented to us
several times； but always with the same internal determinations
（qualitas et quantitas）； it； if an object of pure understanding； is
always the same； not several things； but only one thing （numerica
identitas）； but if a phenomenon； we do not concern ourselves with
paring the conception of the thing with the conception of some
other； but； although they may be in this respect perfectly the same；
the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for
asserting the numerical difference of these objects （of sense）。
Thus； in the case of two drops of water； we may make plete
abstraction of all internal difference （quality and quantity）； and；
the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different
places； is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be
numerically different。 Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in
themselves； consequently as intelligibilia； that is； objects of pure
understanding （although； on account of the confused nature of their
representations； he gave them the name of phenomena）； and in this case
his principle of the indiscernible （principium identatis
indiscernibilium） is not to be impugned。 But； as phenomena are objects
of sensibility； and； as the understanding； in respect of them； must be
employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally； plurality and
numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of
external phenomena。 For one part of space； although it may be
perfectly similar and equal to another part； is still without it；
and for this reason alone is different from the latter； which is added
to it in order to make up a greater space。 It follows that this must
hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at
the same time； however similar and equal one may be to another。
2。 Agreement and Opposition。 When reality is represented by the pure
understanding （realitas noumenon）； opposition between realities is
incogitable… such a relation； that is； that when these realities are
connected in one subject； they annihilate the effects of each other
and may be represented in the formula 3 … 3 = 0。 On the other hand；
the real in a phenomenon （realitas phaenomenon） may very well be in
mutual opposition； and； when united in the same subject； the one may
pletely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the
other； as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line
drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions； or in the case of
a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain。
3。 The Internal and External。 In an object of the pure
understanding； only that is internal which has no relation （as regards
its existence） to anything different from itself。 On the other hand；
the internal determinations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are
nothing but relations； and it is itself nothing more than a plex of
mere relations。 Substance in space we are cognizant of only through
forces operative in it； either drawing others towards itself
（attraction）； or preventing others from forcing into itself （repulsion
and impenetrability）。 We know no other properties that make up the
conception of substance phenomenal in space； and which we term matter。
On the other hand； as an object of the pure understanding； every
substance must have internal determination and forces。 But what
other internal attributes of such an object can I think than those
which my internal sense presents to me？ That； to wit； which in
either itself thought； or something analogous to it。 Hence Leibnitz；
who looked upon things as noumena； after denying them everything
like external relation； and therefore also position or bination；
declared that all substances； even the ponent parts of matter； were
simple substances with powers of representation； in one word； monads。
4。 Matter and Form。 These two conceptions lie at the foundation of
all other reflection； so inseparably are they connected with every
mode of exercising the understanding。 The former denotes the
determinable in general； the second its determination； both in a
transcendental sense； abstraction being made of every difference in
that which is given； and of the mode in which it is determined。
Logicians formerly termed the universal； matter； the specific
difference of this or that part of the universal； form。 In a judgement
one may call the given conceptions logical matter （for the judgement）；
the relation of these to each other （by means of the copula）； the form
of the judgement。 In an object； the posite parts thereof
（essentialia） are the matter； the mode in which they are connected
in the object； the form。 In respect to things in general； unlimited
reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility； the
limitation thereof （negation） as the form； by which one thing is
distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions。
The understanding demands that something be give