annihilated）； and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition
of reciprocal destruction； so to speak； in which one real cause
destroys the effect of another； and the conditions of whose
representation we meet with only in sensibility。
3rd。 The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than
on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of
the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding。
Substances； in general； must have something inward； which is therefore
free from external relations； consequently from that of position
also。 The simple… that which can be represented by a unit… is
therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in
themselves。 The internal state of substances cannot therefore
consist in place； shape； contact； or motion； determinations which
are all external relations； and we can ascribe to them no other than
that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself； that
is to say； the state of representation。 Thus； then； were constructed
the monads； which were to form the elements of the universe； the
active force of which consists in representation； the effects of
this force being thus entirely confined to themselves。
For the same reason； his view of the possible munity of
substances could not represent it but as a predetermined harmony；
and by no means as a physical influence。 For inasmuch as everything is
occupied only internally； that is； with its own representations； the
state of the representations of one substance could not stand in
active and living connection with that of another； but some third
cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the
different states correspond with one another。 And this did not
happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case （systema
assistentiae）； but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied
and connected with all substances； in which they necessarily
receive； according to the Leibnitzian school； their existence and
permanence； consequently also reciprocal correspondence； according
to universal laws。
4th。 This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time； in
which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility； originated in
the same delusion of transcendental reflection。 If I attempt to
represent by the mere understanding； the external relations of things；
I can do so only by employing the conception of their reciprocal
action； and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with
another state； I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause
and effect。 And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the
munity of substances； and time as the dynamical sequence of their
states。 That which space and time possess proper to themselves and
independent of things； he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our
conceptions of them； whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical
relations is held to be a self…existent intuition； antecedent even
to things themselves。 Thus space and time were the intelligible form
of the connection of things （substances and their states） in
themselves。 But things were intelligible substances （substantiae
noumena）。 At the same time； he made these conceptions valid of
phenomena； because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode
of intuition； but sought all； even the empirical representation of
objects； in the understanding； and left to sense naught but the
despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of
the former。
But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning
things in themselves by means of the pure understanding （which is
impossible）； it could not apply to phenomena； which do not represent
things in themselves。 In such a case I should be obliged in
transcendental reflection to pare my conceptions only under the
conditions of sensibility； and so space and time would not be
determinations of things in themselves； but of phenomena。 What
things may be in themselves； I know not and need not know； because a
thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon。
I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions
of reflection。 Matter is substantia phaenomenon。 That in it which is
internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies；
and in all the functions and operations it performs； and which are
indeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense。 I cannot
therefore find anything that is absolutely； but only what is
paratively internal； and which itself consists of external
relations。 The absolutely internal in matter； and as it should be
according to the pure understanding； is a mere chimera； for matter
is not an object for the pure understanding。 But the transcendental
object； which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call
matter； is a mere nescio quid； the nature of which we could not
understand； even though someone were found able to tell us。 For we can
understand nothing that does not bring with it something in
intuition corresponding to the expressions employed。 If； by the
plaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things；
it is meant that we do not prehend by the pure understanding what
the things which appear to us may be in themselves； it is a silly
and unreasonable plaint； for those who talk thus really desire that
we should be able to cognize； consequently to intuite； things
without senses； and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of
cognition perfectly different from the human faculty； not merely in
degree； but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof； so that
thus we should not be men； but belong to a class of beings； the
possibility of whose existence； much less their nature and
constitution； we have no means of cognizing。 By observation and
analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature； and no
one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time。 But those
transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature； we
could never answer； even although all nature were laid open to us；
because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other
intuition than that of our internal sense。 For herein lies the mystery
of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility。 Its
application to an object； and the transcendental ground of this
unity of subjective and objective； lie too deeply concealed for us；
who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense； consequently as
phenomena； to be able to discover in our existence anything but
phenomena； the non…sensuous cause of which we at the same time
earnestly desire to penetrate to。
The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by
the processes of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration
of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are
pared with each other in the understanding alone； while it at the
same time confirms what we particularly insisted on； namely； that；
although phenomena are not included as things in themselves among
the objects of the pure understanding； they are nevertheless the
only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality； that
is to say； which give us intuitions to correspond with our
conceptions。
When we reflect in a purely logical manner； we do nothing more
than pare conceptions in our understanding； to discover whether
both have the same content； whether they are self…contradictory or
not； whether anything is contained in either conception； which of
the two is given； and which is merely a mode of thinking that given。
But if I apply these conceptions to an object in general （in the
transcendental sense）； without first determining whether it is an
object of sensuous or intellectual intuition； certain limitations
present themselves； which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and
render all empirical use of them impossible。 And thus these
limitations prove that the representation of an object as a thing in
general is not only insufficient； but； without sensuous
determination and independently of empirical conditions；
self…contradictory； that we must therefore make abstraction of all
objects； as in logic； or； admitting them； must think them under
conditions of sensuous intuition； that； consequently； the intelligible
requires an altogether peculiar intuition； which we do not possess；
and in the absence of which it is for us nothing； while； on the
other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves。 For； when I
merely think things in general； the difference in their external
relations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves；
on the contrary； the former presupposes the latter； and if the
conception of one of two things is not internally different from
that of the other； I am merely thinking the same thing in different
relations。 Further； by the addition of one affirmation （reality） to
the other； the positive therein is really augmented； and nothing is
abstracted or withdrawn from it； hence the real in things cannot be in
contradiction with or opposition to itself… and so on。
The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of
the understanding has； as we have shown； been so misconceived by
Leibnitz； one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or
modern times； that he has been misled into the construction of a
baseless system of intellectual cognition； which professes to
determine its objects without the intervention of the senses。 For this
reason； the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these
conceptions； as the origin of these false principles； is of great
utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the
understanding。
It is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of
a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it （dictum de
omni et nullo）； but it would be absurd so to alter this logical
proposition as to say whatever is not contained in a general
conception is likewise not contained in the particular conceptions
which rank under it； for the latter are particular conceptions； for
the very reason that their content is greater than that which is
cogitated in the general c