parmenides- 第8部分

no　longer　becomes；　but　is　older；　for　if　it　went　on　it　would　never　be



reached　by　the　present；　for　it　is　the　nature　of　that　which　goes　on；　to



touch　both　the　present　and　the　future；　letting　go　the　present　and



seizing　the　future；　while　in　process　of　becoming　between　them。



　　True。



　　But　that　which　is　becoming　cannot　skip　the　present；　when　it



reaches　the　present　it　ceases　to　become；　and　is　then　whatever　it　may



happen　to　be　becoming。



　　Clearly。



　　And　so　the　one；　when　in　becoming　older　it　reaches　the　present；



ceases　to　become；　and　is　then　older。



　　Certainly。



　　And　it　is　older　than　that　than　which　it　was　becoming　older；　and　it



was　becoming　older　than　itself。



　　Yes。



　　And　that　which　is　older　is　older　than　that　which　is　younger？



　　True。



　　Then　the　one　is　younger　than　itself；　when　in　becoming　older　it



reaches　the　present？



　　Certainly。



　　But　the　present　is　always　present　with　the　one　during　all　its　being；



for　whenever　it　is　it　is　always　now。



　　Certainly。



　　Then　the　one　always　both　is　and　becomes　older　and　younger　than



itself？



　　Truly。



　　And　is　it　or　does　it　become　a　longer　time　than　itself　or　an　equal



time　with　itself？



　　An　equal　time。



　　But　if　it　becomes　or　is　for　an　equal　time　with　itself；　it　is　of



the　same　age　with　itself？



　　Of　course。



　　And　that　which　is　of　the　same　age；　is　neither　older　nor　younger？



　　No。



　　The　one；　then；　becoming　and　being　the　same　time　with　itself；　neither



is　nor　becomes　older　or　younger　than　itself？



　　I　should　say　not。



　　And　what　are　its　relations　to　other　things？　Is　it　or　does　it



become　older　or　younger　than　they？



　　I　cannot　tell　you。



　　You　can　at　least　tell　me　that　others　than　the　one　are　more　than



the　one…other　would　have　been　one；　but　the　others　have　multitude；



and　are　more　than　one？



　　They　will　have　multitude。



　　And　a　multitude　implies　a　number　larger　than　one？



　　Of　course。



　　And　shall　we　say　that　the　lesser　or　the　greater　is　the　first　to　come



or　to　have　come　into　existence？



　　The　lesser。



　　Then　the　least　is　the　first？　And　that　is　the　one？



　　Yes。



　　Then　the　one　of　all　things　that　have　number　is　the　first　to　come



into　being；　but　all　other　things　have　also　number；　being　plural　and



not　singular。



　　They　have。



　　And　since　it　came　into　being　first　it　must　be　supposed　to　have



come　into　being　prior　to　the　others；　and　the　others　later；　and　the



things　which　came　into　being　later；　are　younger　than　that　which



preceded　them？　And　so　the　other　things　will　be　younger　than　the　one；



and　the　one　older　than　other　things？



　　True。



　　What　would　you　say　of　another　question？　Can　the　one　have　come　into



being　contrary　to　its　own　nature；　or　is　that　impossible？



　　Impossible。



　　And　yet；　surely；　the　one　was　shown　to　have　parts；　and　if　parts；　then



a　beginning；　middle　and　end？



　　Yes。



　　And　a　beginning；　both　of　the　one　itself　and　of　all　other　things；



comes　into　being　first　of　all；　and　after　the　beginning；　the　others



follow；　until　you　reach　the　end？



　　Certainly。



　　And　all　these　others　we　shall　affirm　to　be　parts　of　the　whole　and　of



the　one；　which；　as　soon　as　the　end　is　reached；　has　become　whole　and



one？



　　Yes；　that　is　what　we　shall　say。



　　But　the　end　comes　last；　and　the　one　is　of　such　a　nature　as　to　come



into　being　with　the　last；　and；　since　the　one　cannot　come　into　being



except　in　accordance　with　its　own　nature；　its　nature　will　require　that



it　should　come　into　being　after　the　others；　simultaneously　with　the



end。



　　Clearly。



　　Then　the　one　is　younger　than　the　others　and　the　others　older　than



the　one。



　　That　also　is　clear　in　my　judgment。



　　Well；　and　must　not　a　beginning　or　any　other　part　of　the　one　or　of



anything；　if　it　be　a　part　and　not　parts；　being　a　part；　be　also　of



necessity　one？



　　Certainly。



　　And　will　not　the　one　come　into　being　together　with　each



part…together　with　the　first　part　when　that　comes　into　being；　and



together　with　the　second　part　and　with　all　the　rest；　and　will　not　be



wanting　to　any　part；　which　is　added　to　any　other　part　until　it　has



reached　the　last　and　become　one　whole；　it　will　be　wanting　neither　to



the　middle；　nor　to　the　first；　nor　to　the　last；　nor　to　any　of　them；



while　the　process　of　becoming　is　going　on？



　　True。



　　Then　the　one　is　of　the　same　age　with　all　the　others；　so　that　if



the　one　itself　does　not　contradict　its　own　nature；　it　will　be



neither　prior　nor　posterior　to　the　others；　but　simultaneous；　and



according　to　this　argument　the　one　will　be　neither　older　nor　younger



than　the　others；　nor　the　others　than　the　one；　but　according　to　the



previous　argument　the　one　will　be　older　and　younger　than　the　others



and　the　others　than　the　one。



　　Certainly。



　　After　this　manner　then　the　one　is　and　has　become。　But　as　to　its



becoming　older　and　younger　than　the　others；　and　the　others　than　the



one；　and　neither　older。　nor　younger；　what　shall　we　say？　Shall　we　say



as　of　being　so　also　of　becoming；　or　otherwise？



　　I　cannot　answer。



　　But　I　can　venture　to　say；　that　even　if　one　thing　were　older　or



younger　than　another；　it　could　not　become　older　or　younger　in　a



greater　degree　than　it　was　at　first；　for　equals　added　to　unequals；



whether　to　periods　of　time　or　to　anything　else；　leave　the　difference



between　them　the　same　as　at　first。



　　Of　course。　Then　that　which　is；　cannot　become　older　or　younger　than



that　which　is；　since　the　difference　of　age　is　always　the　same；　the　one



is　and　has　become　older　and　the　other　younger；　but　they　are　no



longer　becoming　so。



　　True。



　　And　the　one　which　is　does　not　therefore　become　either　older　or



younger　than　the　others　which　are



　　No。



　　But　consider　whether　they　may　not　become　older　and　younger　in



another　way。



　　In　what　way？



　　Just　as　the　one　was　proven　to　be　older　than　the　others　and　the



others　than　the　one。



　　And　what　of　that？



　　If　the　one　is　older　than　the　others；　has　come　into　being　a　longer



time　than　the　others。



　　Yes。



　　But　consider　again；　if　we　add　equal　time　to　a　greater　and　a　less



time；　will　the　greater　differ　from　the　less　time　by　an　equal　or　by　a



smaller　portion　than　before？



　　By　a　smaller　portion。



　　Then　the　difference　between　the　age　of　the　one　and　the　age　of　the



others　will　not　be　afterwards　so　great　as　at　first；　but　if　an　equal



time　be　added　to　both　of　them　they　will　differ　less　and　less　in　age？



　　Yes。



　　And　that　which　differs　in　age　from　some　other　less　than　formerly；



from　being　older　will　become　younger　in　relation　to　that　other　than



which　it　was　older？



　　Yes；　younger。



　　And　if　the　one　becomes　younger　the　others　aforesaid　will　become



older　than　they　were　before；　in　relation　to　the　one。



　　Certainly。



　　Then　that　which　had　become　younger　becomes　older　relatively　to



that　which　previously　had　become　and　was　older；　it　never　really　is



older；　but　is　always　becoming；　for　the　one　is　always　growing　on　the



side　of　youth　and　the　other　on　the　side　of　age。　And　in　like　manner　the



older　is　always　in　process　of　becoming　younger　than　the　younger；　for



as　they　are　always　going　in　opposite　directions　they　become　in　ways



the　opposite　to　one　another；　the　younger　older　than　the　older　and



the　older　younger　than　the　younger。　They　cannot；　however　have



become；　for　if　they　had　already　become　they　would　be　and　not　merely



become。　But　that　is　impossible；　for　they　are　always　becoming　both



older　and　younger　than　one　another：　the　one　becomes　younger　than　the



others　because　it　was　seen　to　be　older　and　prior；　and　the　others



become　older　than　the　one　because　they　came　into　being　later；　and　in



the　same　way　the　others　are　in　the　same　relation　to　the　one；　because



they　were　seen　to　be　older；　and　prior　to　the　one。



　　That　is　clear。



　　Inasmuch　then；　one　thing　does　not　become　older　or　younger　than



another；　in　that　they　always　differ　from　each　other　by　an　equal



number；　the　one　cannot　become　older　or　younger　than　the　others；　nor



the　other　than　the　one；　but　inasmuch　as　that　which　came　into　being



earlier　and　that　which　came　into　being　later　must　continually　differ



from　each　other　by　a　different　portion…in　this　point　of　view　the



others　must　become　older　and　younger　than　the　one；　and　the　one　than



the　others。



　　Certainly。



　　For　all　these　reasons；　then；　the　one　is　and　becomes　older　and



younger　than　itself　and　the　others；　and　neither　is　nor　becomes　older



or　younger　than　itself　or　the　others。



　　Certainly。



　　But　since　the　one　partakes　of　time；　and　partakes　of　becoming　older



and　younger；　must　it　not　also　partake　of　the　past；　the　present；　and



the　future？



　　Of　course　it　must。



　　Then　the　one　was　and　is　and　will　be；　and　was　becoming　and　is



becoming　and　will　become？



　　Certainly。



　　And　there　is　and　was　and　will　be　something　which　is　in　relation　to



it　and　belongs　to　it？



　　True。



　　And　since　we　have　at　this　moment　opinion　and　knowledge　and



perception　of　the　one；　there　is　opinion　and　knowledge　and　perception



of　it？



　　Quite　right。



　　Then　there　is　name　and　expression　for　it；　and　it　is　named　and



expressed；　and　everything　of　this　kind　which　appertains　to　other：



things　appertains　to　the　one。



　　Certainly；　that　is　true。







　　Yet　once　more　and　for　the　third　time；　let　us　consider：　If　the　one　is



both　one　and　many；　as　we　have　described；　and　is；　neither　one　nor　many；



and　participates　in　time；　must　it　not；　in　as　far　as　it　is　one；　at



times　partake　of　being；　and　in　as　far　as　it　is　not　one；　at　times　not



partake　of　being？



　　Certainly。



　　But　can　it　partake　of　being　when　not　partaking　of　being；　or　not



partake　of　being　when　partaking　of　being？



　　Impossible。



　　Then　the　one　partakes　and　does　not　partake　of　being　at　differ