democracy in america-1- 第40部分

＇Footnote　i：　It　is　perfectly　clear；　says　Mr。　Story　（〃Commentaries；〃　p。　503；　or　in　the　large　edition　Section　1379）；　that　any　law　which　enlarges；　abridges；　or　in　any　manner　changes　the　intention　of　the　parties；　resulting　from　the　stipulations　in　the　contract；　necessarily　impairs　it。　　He　gives　in　the　same　place　a　very　long　and　careful　definition　of　what　is　understood　by　a　contract　in　Federal　jurisprudence。　　A　grant　made　by　the　State　to　a　private　individual；　and　accepted　by　him；　is　a　contract；　and　cannot　be　revoked　by　any　future　law。　A　charter　granted　by　the　State　to　a　company　is　a　contract；　and　equally　binding　to　the　State　as　to　the　grantee。　　The　clause　of　the　Constitution　here　referred　to　insures；　therefore；　the　existence　of　a　great　part　of　acquired　rights；　but　not　of　all。　　Property　may　legally　be　held；　though　it　may　not　have　passed　into　the　possessor's　hands　by　means　of　a　contract；　and　its　possession　is　an　acquired　right；　not　guaranteed　by　the　Federal　Constitution。＇　

＇Footnote　j：　A　remarkable　instance　of　this　is　given　by　Mr。　Story　（p。　508；　or　in　the　large　edition　Section　1388）：　〃Dartmouth　College　in　New　Hampshire　had　been　founded　by　a　charter　granted　to　certain　individuals　before　the　American　Revolution；　and　its　trustees　formed　a　corporation　under　this　charter。　　The　legislature　of　New　Hampshire　had；　without　the　consent　of　this　corporation；　passed　an　act　changing　the　organization　of　the　original　provincial　charter　of　the　college；　and　transferring　all　the　rights；　privileges；　and　franchises　from　the　old　charter　trustees　to　new　trustees　appointed　under　the　act。　　The　constitutionality　of　the　act　was　contested；　and；　after　solemn　arguments；　it　was　deliberately　held　by　the　Supreme　Court　that　the　provincial　charter　was　a　contract　within　the　meaning　of　the　Constitution　（Art。　I。　Section　10）；　and　that　the　emendatory　act　was　utterly　void；　as　impairing　the　obligation　of　that　charter。　　The　college　was　deemed；　like　other　colleges　of　private　foundation；　to　be　a　private　eleemosynary　institution；　endowed　by　its　charter　with　a　capacity　to　take　property　unconnected　with　the　Government。　　Its　funds　were　bestowed　upon　the　faith　of　the　charter；　and　those　funds　consisted　entirely　of　private　donations。　　It　is　true　that　the　uses　were　in　some　sense　public；　that　is；　for　the　general　benefit；　and　not　for　the　mere　benefit　of　the　corporators；　but　this　did　not　make　the　corporation　a　public　corporation。　　It　was　a　private　institution　for　general　charity。　　It　was　not　distinguishable　in　principle　from　a　private　donation；　vested　in　private　trustees；　for　a　public　charity；　or　for　a　particular　purpose　of　beneficence。　　And　the　State　itself；　if　it　had　bestowed　funds　upon　a　charity　of　the　same　nature；　could　not　resume　those　funds。〃＇

This　provision　appears　to　me　to　be　the　most　serious　attack　upon　the　independence　of　the　States。　　The　rights　awarded　to　the　Federal　Government　for　purposes　of　obvious　national　importance　are　definite　and　easily　comprehensible；　but　those　with　which　this　last　clause　invests　it　are　not　either　clearly　appreciable　or　accurately　defined。　　For　there　are　vast　numbers　of　political　laws　which　influence　the　existence　of　obligations　of　contracts；　which　may　thus　furnish　an　easy　pretext　for　the　aggressions　of　the　central　authority。


Chapter　VIII：　The　Federal　Constitution　…　Part　IV

Procedure　Of　The　Federal　Courts

Natural　weakness　of　the　judiciary　power　in　confederations　…　Legislators　ought　to　strive　as　much　as　possible　to　bring　private　individuals；　and　not　States；　before　the　Federal　Courts　…　How　the　Americans　have　succeeded　in　this　…　Direct　prosecution　of　private　individuals　in　the　Federal　Courts　…　Indirect　prosecution　of　the　States　which　violate　the　laws　of　the　Union　…　The　decrees　of　the　Supreme　Court　enervate　but　do　not　destroy　the　provincial　laws。　

I　have　shown　what　the　privileges　of　the　Federal　courts　are；　and　it　is　no　less　important　to　point　out　the　manner　in　which　they　are　exercised。　　The　irresistible　authority　of　justice　in　countries　in　which　the　sovereignty　in　undivided　is　derived　from　the　fact　that　the　tribunals　of　those　countries　represent　the　entire　nation　at　issue　with　the　individual　against　whom　their　decree　is　directed；　and　the　idea　of　power　is　thus　introduced　to　corroborate　the　idea　of　right。　　But　this　is　not　always　the　case　in　countries　in　which　the　sovereignty　is　divided；　in　them　the　judicial　power　is　more　frequently　opposed　to　a　fraction　of　the　nation　than　to　an　isolated　individual；　and　its　moral　authority　and　physical　strength　are　consequently　diminished。　　In　federal　States　the　power　of　the　judge　is　naturally　decreased；　and　that　of　the　justiciable　parties　is　augmented。　　The　aim　of　the　legislator　in　confederate　States　ought　therefore　to　be　to　render　the　position　of　the　courts　of　justice　analogous　to　that　which　they　occupy　in　countries　where　the　sovereignty　is　undivided；　in　other　words；　his　efforts　ought　constantly　to　tend　to　maintain　the　judicial　power　of　the　confederation　as　the　representative　of　the　nation；　and　the　justiciable　party　as　the　representative　of　an　individual　interest。　

Every　government；　whatever　may　be　its　constitution；　requires　the　means　of　constraining　its　subjects　to　discharge　their　obligations；　and　of　protecting　its　privileges　from　their　assaults。　　As　far　as　the　direct　action　of　the　Government　on　the　community　is　concerned；　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States　contrived；　by　a　master…stroke　of　policy；　that　the　federal　courts；　acting　in　the　name　of　the　laws；　should　only　take　cognizance　of　parties　in　an　individual　capacity。　　For；　as　it　had　been　declared　that　the　Union　consisted　of　one　and　the　same　people　within　the　limits　laid　down　by　the　Constitution；　the　inference　was　that　the　Government　created　by　this　Constitution；　and　acting　within　these　limits；　was　invested　with　all　the　privileges　of　a　national　government；　one　of　the　principal　of　which　is　the　right　of　transmitting　its　injunctions　directly　to　the　private　citizen。　　When；　for　instance；　the　Union　votes　an　impost；　it　does　not　apply　to　the　States　for　the　levying　of　it；　but　to　every　American　citizen　in　proportion　to　his　assessment。　　The　Supreme　Court；　which　is　empowered　to　enforce　the　execution　of　this　law　of　the　Union；　exerts　its　influence　not　upon　a　refractory　State；　but　upon　the　private　taxpayer；　and；　like　the　judicial　power　of　other　nations；　it　is　opposed　to　the　person　of　an　individual。　　It　is　to　be　observed　that　the　Union　chose　its　own　antagonist；　and　as　that　antagonist　is　feeble；　he　is　naturally　worsted。


But　the　difficulty　increases　when　the　proceedings　are　not　brought　forward　by　but　against　the　Union。　　The　Constitution　recognizes　the　legislative　power　of　the　States；　and　a　law　so　enacted　may　impair　the　privileges　of　the　Union；　in　which　case　a　collision　in　unavoidable　between　that　body　and　the　State　which　has　passed　the　law：　and　it　only　remains　to　select　the　least　dangerous　remedy；　which　is　very　clearly　deducible　from　the　general　principles　I　have　before　established。　*k

＇Footnote　k：　See　Chapter　VI。　on　〃Judicial　Power　in　America。〃＇　

It　may　be　conceived　that；　in　the　case　under　consideration；　the　Union　might　have　used　the　State　before　a　Federal　court；　which　would　have　annulled　the　act；　and　by　this　means　it　would　have　adopted　a　natural　course　of　proceeding；　but　the　judicial　power　would　have　been　placed　in　open　hostility　to　the　State；　and　it　was　desirable　to　avoid　this　predicament　as　much　as　possible。　The　Americans　hold　that　it　is　nearly　impossible　that　a　new　law　should　not　impair　the　interests　of　some　private　individual　by　its　provisions：　these　private　interests　are　assumed　by　the　American　legislators　as　the　ground　of　attack　against　such　measures　as　may　be　prejudicial　to　the　Union；　and　it　is　to　these　cases　that　the　protection　of　the　Supreme　Court　is　extended。

Suppose　a　State　vends　a　certain　portion　of　its　territory　to　a　company；　and　that　a　year　afterwards　it　passes　a　law　by　which　the　territory　is　otherwise　disposed　of；　and　that　clause　of　the　Constitution　which　prohibits　laws　impairing　the　obligation　of　contracts　violated。　　When　the　purchaser　under　the　second　act　appears　to　take　possession；　the　possessor　under　the　first　act　brings　his　action　before　the　tribunals　of　the　Union；　and　causes　the　title　of　the　claimant　to　be　pronounced　null　and　void。　*l　Thus；　in　point　of　fact；　the　judicial　power　of　the　Union　is　contesting　the　claims　of　the　sovereignty　of　a　State；　but　it　only　acts　indirectly　and　upon　a　special　application　of　detail：　it　attacks　the　law　in　its　consequences；　not　in　its　principle；　and　it　rather　weakens　than　destroys　it。

＇Footnote　l：　See　Kent's　〃Commentaries；〃　vol。　i。　p。　387。＇

The　last　hypothesis　that　remained　was　that　each　State　formed　a　corporation　enjoying　a　separate　existence　and　distinct　civil　rights；　and　that　it　could　therefore　sue　or　be　sued　before　a　tribunal。　　Thus　a　State　could　bring　an　action　against　another　State。　　In　this　instance　the　Union　was　not　called　upon　to　contest　a　provincial　law；　but　to　try　a　suit　in　which　a　State　was　a　party。　　This　suit　was　perfectly　similar　to　any　other　cause；　except　that　the　quality　of　the　parties　was　different；　and　here　the　danger　pointed　out　at　the　beginning　of　this　chapter　exists　with　less　chance　of　being　avoided。　　The　inherent　disadvantage　of　the　very　essence　of　Federal　constitutions　is　that　they　engender　parties　in　the　bosom　of　the　nation　which　present　powerful　obstacles　to　the　free　course　of　justice。

High　Rank　Of　The　Supreme　Court　Amongst　The　Great　Powers　Of　State　　No　nation　ever　constituted　so　great　a　judicial　power　as　the　Americans　…　Extent　of　its　prerogative　…　Its　political　influence　…　The　tranquillity　and　the　very　existence　of　the　Union　depend　on　the　discretion　of　the　seven　Federal　Judges。

When　we　have　successively　examined　in　detail　the　organization　of　the　Supreme　Court；　and　the　entire　prerogatives　which　it　exercises；　we　shall　readily　admit　that　a　more　imposing　judicial　power　was　never　constituted　by　any　people。　　The　Supreme　Court　is　placed　at　the　head　of　all　known　tribunals；　both　by　the　nature　of　its　rights　and　the　class　of　justiciable　parties　which　it　controls。　

In　all　the　civilized　countries　of　Europe　the　Government　has　always　shown　the　greatest　repugnance　to　allow　the　cases　to　which　it　was　itself　a　party　to　be　decided　by　the　ordinary　course　of　justice。　　This　repugnance　naturally　at