ce。 This repugnance naturally attains its utmost height in an absolute Government； and； on the other hand； the privileges of the courts of justice are extended with the increasing liberties of the people： but no European nation has at present held that all judicial controversies； without regard to their origin； can be decided by the judges of common law。
In America this theory has been actually put in practice； and the Supreme Court of the United States is the sole tribunal of the nation。 Its power extends to all the cases arising under laws and treaties made by the executive and legislative authorities； to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction； and in general to all points which affect the law of nations。 It may even be affirmed that； although its constitution is essentially judicial； its prerogatives are almost entirely political。 Its sole object is to enforce the execution of the laws of the Union； and the Union only regulates the relations of the Government with the citizens； and of the nation with Foreign Powers： the relations of citizens amongst themselves are almost exclusively regulated by the sovereignty of the States。
A second and still greater cause of the preponderance of this court may be adduced。 In the nations of Europe the courts of justice are only called upon to try the controversies of private individuals； but the Supreme Court of the United States summons sovereign powers to its bar。 When the clerk of the court advances on the steps of the tribunal； and simply says； 〃The State of New York versus the State of Ohio；〃 it is impossible not to feel that the Court which he addresses is no ordinary body； and when it is recollected that one of these parties represents one million； and the other two millions of men； one is struck by the responsibility of the seven judges whose decision is about to satisfy or to disappoint so large a number of their fellow…citizens。
The peace； the prosperity； and the very existence of the Union are vested in the hands of the seven judges。 Without their active co…operation the Constitution would be a dead letter： the Executive appeals to them for assistance against the encroachments of the legislative powers； the Legislature demands their protection from the designs of the Executive； they defend the Union from the disobedience of the States； the States from the exaggerated claims of the Union； the public interest against the interests of private citizens； and the conservative spirit of order against the fleeting innovations of democracy。 Their power is enormous； but it is clothed in the authority of public opinion。 They are the all… powerful guardians of a people which respects law； but they would be impotent against popular neglect or popular contempt。 The force of public opinion is the most intractable of agents； because its exact limits cannot be defined； and it is not less dangerous to exceed than to remain below the boundary prescribed。
The Federal judges must not only be good citizens； and men possessed of that information and integrity which are indispensable to magistrates； but they must be statesmen … politicians； not unread in the signs of the times； not afraid to brave the obstacles which can be subdued； nor slow to turn aside such encroaching elements as may threaten the supremacy of the Union and the obedience which is due to the laws。
The President； who exercises a limited power； may err without causing great mischief in the State。 Congress may decide amiss without destroying the Union； because the electoral body in which Congress originates may cause it to retract its decision by changing its members。 But if the Supreme Court is ever composed of imprudent men or bad citizens； the Union may be plunged into anarchy or civil war。
The real cause of this danger； however； does not lie in the constitution of the tribunal； but in the very nature of Federal Governments。 We have observed that in confederate peoples it is especially necessary to consolidate the judicial authority； because in no other nations do those independent persons who are able to cope with the social body exist in greater power or in a better condition to resist the physical strength of the Government。 But the more a power requires to be strengthened； the more extensive and independent it must be made； and the dangers which its abuse may create are heightened by its independence and its strength。 The source of the evil is not； therefore； in the constitution of the power； but in the constitution of those States which render its existence necessary。
In What Respects The Federal Constitution Is Superior To That Of The States
In what respects the Constitution of the Union can be compared to that of the States … Superiority of the Constitution of the Union attributable to the wisdom of the Federal legislators … Legislature of the Union less dependent on the people than that of the States … Executive power more independent in its sphere … Judicial power less subjected to the inclinations of the majority …Practical consequence of these facts … The dangers inherent in a democratic government eluded by the Federal legislators； and increased by the legislators of the States。
The Federal Constitution differs essentially from that of the States in the ends which it is intended to accomplish； but in the means by which these ends are promoted a greater analogy exists between them。 The objects of the Governments are different； but their forms are the same； and in this special point of view there is some advantage in comparing them together。
I am of opinion that the Federal Constitution is superior to all the Constitutions of the States； for several reasons。
The present Constitution of the Union was formed at a later period than those of the majority of the States； and it may have derived some ameliorations from past experience。 But we shall be led to acknowledge that this is only a secondary cause of its superiority； when we recollect that eleven new States *n have been added to the American Confederation since the promulgation of the Federal Constitution； and that these new republics have always rather exaggerated than avoided the defects which existed in the former Constitutions。
＇Footnote n： ＇The number of States has now risen to 46 （1874）； besides the District of Columbia。＇＇
The chief cause of the superiority of the Federal Constitution lay in the character of the legislators who composed it。 At the time when it was formed the dangers of the Confederation were imminent； and its ruin seemed inevitable。 In this extremity the people chose the men who most deserved the esteem； rather than those who had gained the affections； of the country。 I have already observed that distinguished as almost all the legislators of the Union were for their intelligence； they were still more so for their patriotism。 They had all been nurtured at a time when the spirit of liberty was braced by a continual struggle against a powerful and predominant authority。 When the contest was terminated； whilst the excited passions of the populace persisted in warring with dangers which had ceased to threaten them； these men stopped short in their career； they cast a calmer and more penetrating look upon the country which was now their own； they perceived that the war of independence was definitely ended； and that the only dangers which America had to fear were those which might result from the abuse of the freedom she had won。 They had the courage to say what they believed to be true； because they were animated by a warm and sincere love of liberty； and they ventured to propose restrictions； because they were resolutely opposed to destruction。 *o
＇Footnote o： At this time Alexander Hamilton； who was one of the principal founders of the Constitution； ventured to express the following sentiments in 〃The Federalist；〃 No。 71： …
〃There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current； either in the community or in the Legislature； as its best recommendation。 But such men entertain very crude notions； as well of the purposes for which government was instituted as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted。 The Republican principle demands that the deliberative sense of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust the management of their affairs； but it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden breeze of passion； or to every transient impulse which the people may receive from the arts of men who flatter their prejudices to betray their interests。 It is a just observation； that the people commonly intend the public good。 This often applies to their very errors。 But their good sense would despise the adulator who should pretend that they always reason right about the means of promoting it。 They know from experience that they sometimes err； and the wonder is that they so seldom err as they do； beset； as they continually are； by the wiles of parasites and sycophants； by the snares of the ambitious； the avaricious； the desperate； by the artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve it； and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it。 When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations； it is the duty of persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests to withstand the temporary delusion； in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection。 Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes； and has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their displeasure。〃＇
The greater number of the Constitutions of the States assign one year for the duration of the House of Representatives； and two years for that of the Senate； so that members of the legislative body are constantly and narrowly tied down by the slightest desires of their constituents。 The legislators of the Union were of opinion that this excessive dependence of the Legislature tended to alter the nature of the main conse