the origins of contemporary france-2- 第52部分

to　both。



Experience；　however；　is　unimportant　to　the　members　of　the

Constituent　Assembly；　under　the　banner　of　principles　they　sunder　one

after　another　all　the　ties　which　keep　the　two　powers　together

harmoniously。　…　There　must　not　be　an　Upper　Chamber；　because　this

would　be　an　asylum　or　a　nursery　for　aristocrats。　　Moreover；　〃the

nation　being　of　one　mind；〃　it　is　averse　to　〃the　creation　of

different　organs。〃　So；　applying　ready…made　formulas　and　metaphors；

they　continue　to　produce　ideological　definitions　and　distinctions。



The　King　must　not　have　a　hold　on　the　legislative　body：　the　executive

is　an　arm；　whose　business　it　is　to　obey；　it　is　absurd　for　the　arm　to

constrain　or　direct　the　head。　　Scarcely　is　the　monarch　allowed　a

delaying　veto。　　Sieyès　here　enters　with　his　protest　declaring　that

this　is　a　〃lettre　de　cachet＇1＇　launched　against　the　universal　will；〃

and　there　is　excluded　from　the　action　of　the　veto　the　articles　of

the　Constitution；　all　money…bills；　and　some　other　laws。　…　…Neither

the　monarch　nor　the　electors　of　the　Assembly　are　to　convoke　the

Assembly；　he　has　no　voice　in　or　oversight　of　the　details　of　its

formation；　the　electors　are　to　meet　together　and　vote　without　his

summons　or　supervision。　　Once　the　Assembly　is　elected　he　can　neither

adjourn　nor　dissolve　it。　　He　cannot　even　propose　a　law；＇2＇　per…

mission　is　only　granted　to　him　〃to　invite　it　to　take　a　subject　into

consideration。〃　He　is　limited　to　his　executive　duties；　and　still

more；　a　sort　of　wall　is　built　up　between　him　and　the　Assembly；　and

the　opening　in　it；　by　which　each　could　take　the　other's　hand；　is

carefully　closed　up。　　The　deputies　are　forbidden　to　become　ministers

throughout　the　term　of　their　service　and　for　two　years　afterwards。

This　is　because　fears　are　entertained　that　they　might　be　corrupted

through　contact　with　the　Court；　and；　again；　whoever　the　ministers

might　be；　there　is　no　disposition　to　accept　their　ascendancy。＇3＇　　If

one　of　them　is　admitted　into　the　Assembly　it　is　not　for　the　purpose

of　giving　advice；　but　to　furnish　information；　reply　to

interrogatories；　and　make　protestations　of　his　zeal　in　humble　terms

and　in　a　dubious　position。＇4＇　　By　virtue　of　being　a　royal　agent　he

is　under　suspicion　like　the　King　himself；　and　he　is　sequestered　in

his　bureau　as　the　King　is　sequestered　in　his　palace。…　Such　is　the

spirit　of　the　Constitution：　by　force　of　the　theory；　and　the　better

to　secure　a　separation　of　the　powers；＇5＇　a　common　understanding

between　them　is　for　ever　rendered　impossible；　and　to　make　up　for

this　impossibility　there　remains　nothing　but　to　make　one　the　master

and　the　other　the　clerk。



This　they　did　not　fail　to　do；　and　for　greater　security；　the　latter

is　made　an　honorary　clerk；　The　executive　power　is　conferred　on　him

nominally　and　in　appearance；　he　does　not　possess　it　in　fact；　care

having　been　taken　to　place　it　in　other　hands。　…　In　effect；　all

executive　agents　and　all　secondary　and　local　powers　are　elective。

The　King　has　no　voice；　directly　or　indirectly；　in　the　choice　of

judges；　public　prosecutors；　bishops；　curés；　collectors　and　assessors

of　the　taxes；　commissaries　of　police；　district　and　departmental

administrators；　mayors；　and　municipal　officers。　　At　most；　should　an

administrator　violate　a　law；　he　may　annul　his　acts　and　suspend　him；

but　the　Assembly；　the　superior　power；　has　the　right　to　cancel　this

suspension。　…　As　to　the　armed　force；　of　which　he　is　supposed　to　be

the　commander…in…chief；　this　escapes　from　him　entirely：　the　National

Guard　is　not　to　receive　orders　from　him；　the　gendarmerie　and　the

troops　are　bound　to　respond　to　the　requisitions　of　the　municipal

authorities；　whom　the　King　can　neither　select　nor　displace：　in

short；　local　action　of　any　kind　…　that　is　to　say；　all　effective

action　…　is　denied　to　him。　…　The　executive　instrument　is　purposely

destroyed。　　The　connection　which　existed　between　the　wheels　of　the

extremities　and　the　central　shaft　is　broken；　and　henceforth；

incapable　of　distributing　its　energy；　this　shaft；　in　the　hands　of

the　monarch；　stands　still　or　else　turns　to　no　purpose。　　The　King；

〃supreme　head　of　the　general　administration；　of　the　army；　and　of　the

navy；　guardian　of　public　peace　and　order；　hereditary　representative

of　the　nation；〃　is　without　the　means；　in　spite　of　his　lofty　titles；

of　directly　applying　his　pretended　powers；　of　causing　a　schedule　of

assessments　to　be　drawn　up　in　a　refractory　commune；　of　compelling

payment　by　a　delinquent　tax…payer；　of　enforcing　the　free　circulation

of　a　convoy　of　grain；　of　executing　the　judgment　of　a　court；　of

suppressing　an　outbreak；　or　of　securing　protection　to　persons　and

property。　　For　he　can　bring　no　constraint　to　bear　on　the　agents　who

are　declared　to　be　subordinate　to　him；　he　has　no　resources　but　those

of　warning　and　persuasion。　　He　sends　to　each　Departmental　Assembly

the　decrees　which　he　has　sanctioned；　requesting　it　to　transmit　them

and　cause　them　to　be　carried　out；　he　receives　its　correspondence　and

bestows　his　censure　or　approval　…　and　that　is　all。　　He　is　merely　a

powerless　medium　of　communication；　a　herald　or　public　advertiser；　a

sort　of　central　echo；　sonorous　and　empty；　to　which　news　is　brought；

and　from　which　laws　depart；　to　spread　abroad　like　a　common　rumor。

Such　as　he　is；　and　thus　diminished；　he　is　still　considered　to　be　too

strong。　　He　is　deprived　of　the　right　of　pardon；　〃which　severs　the

last　artery　of　monarchical　government。〃＇6＇　　All　sorts　of　precautions

are　taken　against　him。　　He　cannot　declare　war　without　a　decree　of

the　Assembly；　he　is　obliged　to　bring　war　to　an　end　on　the　decree　of

the　Assembly；　he　cannot　make　a　treaty　of　peace；　an　alliance；　or　a

commercial　treaty；　without　the　ratification　of　these　by　the

Assembly。　　It　is　expressly　declared　that　he　is　to　nominate　but　two…

thirds　of　the　rear…admirals；　one…half　of　the　lieutenant…generals；

field…marshals；　captains　of　Vessels　and　colonels　of　the　gendarmerie；

one…third　of　the　colonels　and　lieutenant…colonels　of　the　line；　and　a

sixth　of　the　naval　lieutenants。　　He　must　not　allow　troops　to　stay　or

pass　within　30；000　yards　of　the　Assembly。　　His　guard　must　not

consist　of　more　than　1；800　men；　duly　verified；　and　protected　against

his　seductions　by　the　civil　oath。　　The　heir…presumptive　must　not

leave　the　country　without　the　Assembly's　assent。　　It　is　the　Assembly

which　is　to　regulate　by　law　the　education　of　his　son　during

minority。　…　All　these　precautions　are　accompanied　with　threats。

There　are　against　him　five　possible　causes　of　dethronement；　against

his　responsible　Ministers；　eight　causes　for　condemnation　to　from

twelve　to　twenty　years　of　constraint；　and　eight　grounds　for

condemnations　to　death。＇7＇　　Everywhere　between　the　lines　of　the

Constitution；　we　read　the　constant　disposition　to　assume　an　attitude

of　defense；　the　secret　dread　of　treachery；　the　conviction　that

executive　power；　of　whatever　kind；　is　in　its　nature　inimical　to　the

public　welfare。　…　For　withholding　the　nomination　of　judges；　the

reason　alleged　is　that　〃the　Court　and　the　Ministers　are　the　most

contemptible　portion　of　the　nation。〃＇8＇　　If　the　nomination　of

Ministers　is　conceded；　it　is　on　the　ground　that〃　Ministers　appointed

by　the　people　would　necessarily　be　too　highly　esteemed。〃　The

principle　is　that　〃the　legislative　body　alone　must　possess　the

confidence　of　the　people；〃　that　royal　authority　corrupts　its

depository；　and　that　executive　power　is　always　tempted　to　commit

abuses　and　to　engage　in　conspiracies。　　If　it　is　provided　for　in　the

Constitution　it　is　with　regret；　through　the　necessity　of　the　case；

and　on　the　condition　of　its　being　trammeled　by　impediments；　it　will

prove　so　much　the　less　baneful　in　proportion　as　it　is　restrained；

guarded；　threatened；　and　denounced。　…　A　position　of　this　kind　is

manifestly　intolerable；　and　only　a　man　as　passive　as　Louis　XVI。

could　have　put　up　with　it。　　Do　what　he　will；　however；　he　cannot　make

it　a　tenable　one。　　In　vain　does　he　scrupulously　adhere　to　the

Constitution；　and　fulfill　it　to　the　letter。　　Because　he　is　powerless

the　Assembly　regards　him　as　lukewarm；　and　imputes　to　him　the

friction　of　the　machine　which　is　not　under　his　control。　　If　he

presumes　once　to　exercise　his　veto　it　is　rebellion；　and　the

rebellion　of　an　official　against　his　superior；　which　is　the

Assembly；　the　rebellion　of　a　subject　against　his　Sovereign；　which　is

the　people。　　In　this　case　dethronement　is　proper；　and　the　Assembly

has　only　to　pass　the　decree；　the　people　have　simply　to　execute　the

act；　and　the　Constitution　ends　in　a　Revolution。　…　A　piece　of

machinery　of　this　stamp　breaks　down　through　its　own　movement。　　In

conformity　with　the　philosophic　theory　the　two　wheels　of　government

must　be　separated；　and　to　do　this　they　have　to　be　disconnected　and

isolated　one　from　the　other。　　In　conformity　with　the　popular　creed；

the　driving…wheel　　must　be　subordinated　and　its　influence

neutralized：　to　do　this　it　is　necessary　to　reduce　its　energy　to　a

minimum；　break　up　its　connections；　and　raise　it　up　in　the　air　to

turn　round　like　a　top；　or　to　remain　there　as　an　obstacle　to

something　else。　　It　is　certain　that；　after　much　ill…usage　as　a

plaything；　it　will　finally　be　removed　as　a　hindrance。







II。　　THE　CREATION　OF　POPULAR　DEMOCRACY。



Administrative　powers。　…　The　Assembly　on　the　hierarchy。　…　Grades

abolished。　…　Collective　powers。　…　Election　introduced；　and　the

influence　of　subordinates　in　all　branches　of　the　service。　…

Certainty　of　disorganization。　…　Power　in　the　hands　of　municipal

bodies。



Let　us　leave　the　center　of　government　and　go　to　the　extremities；　and

observe　the　various　administrations　in　working　operation。＇9＇



For　any　service　to　work　well　and　with　precision；　there　must　be　a

single　and　unique　chief　who　can　appoint；　pay；　punish　and　dismiss　his

subordinates。　…　For；　on　the　one　hand；　he　stands　alone　and　feels　his

responsibility；　he　brings　to　bear　on　the　management　of　affairs　a

degree　of　attention　and　consistency；　a　tact　a