cognize a priori what ought to happen。 Now； if it is an indubitably
certain； though at the same time an entirely conditioned truth； that
something is； or ought to happen； either a certain determinate
condition of this truth is absolutely necessary； or such a condition
may be arbitrarily presupposed。 In the former case the condition is
postulated （per thesin）； in the latter supposed （per hypothesin）。
There are certain practical laws… those of morality… which are
absolutely necessary。 Now； if these laws necessarily presuppose the
existence of some being； as the condition of the possibility of
their obligatory power； this being must be postulated； because the
conditioned； from which we reason to this determinate condition； is
itself cognized a priori as absolutely necessary。 We shall at some
future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the
existence of a Supreme Being； but also； as themselves absolutely
necessary in a different relation； demand or postulate it… although
only from a practical point of view。 The discussion of this argument
we postpone for the present。
When the question relates merely to that which is； not to that which
ought to be； the conditioned which is presented in experience is
always cogitated as contingent。 For this reason its condition cannot
be regarded as absolutely necessary； but merely as relatively
necessary； or rather as needful； the condition is in itself and a
priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition； by
reason； of the conditioned。 If； then； we are to possess a
theoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing； we
cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori by means of
conceptions； while it is impossible in this way to cognize the
existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in
experience。
Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or
certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be
discovered by means of experience。 It is opposed to the cognition of
nature； which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be
presented in a possible experience。
The principle that everything which happens （the empirically
contingent） must have a cause； is a principle of the cognition of
nature； but not of speculative cognition。 For； if we change it into an
abstract principle； and deprive it of its reference to experience
and the empirical； we shall find that it cannot with justice be
regarded any longer as a synthetical proposition； and that it is
impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists
to something entirely different… termed cause。 Nay； more； the
conception of a cause likewise that of the contingent… loses； in
this speculative mode of employing it； all significance； for its
objective reality and meaning are prehensible from experience
alone。
When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the
existence of a cause of the universe is inferred； reason is proceeding
not in the natural； but in the speculative method。 For the principle
of the former enounces； not that things themselves or substances；
but only that which happens or their states… as empirically
contingent； have a cause： the assertion that the existence of
substance itself is contingent is not justified by experience； it is
the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative
manner。 If； again； I infer from the form of the universe； from the way
in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other；
the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the universe… this
would again be a judgement of purely speculative reason； because the
object in this case… the cause… can never be an object of possible
experience。 In both these cases the principle of causality； which is
valid only in the field of experience… useless and even meaningless
beyond this region； would be diverted from its proper destination。
Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology
by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless； that the principles
of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological
truths； and； consequently； that a rational theology can have no
existence； unless it is founded upon the laws of morality。 For all
synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent
in experience； while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates
their being employed transcendentally； and of this the understanding
is quite incapable。 If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us
to a Supreme Being； this being must belong to the chain of empirical
objects… in which case it would be； like all phenomena； itself
conditioned。 If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be
admitted； by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect
to its cause； what kind of conception shall we obtain by this
procedure？ Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being； because
experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible
effects； and it is only an effect of this character that could witness
to the existence of a corresponding cause。 If； for the purpose of
fully satisfying the requirements of Reason； we recognize her right to
assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely necessary being； this
can be admitted only from favour； and cannot be regarded as the result
or irresistible demonstration。 The physico…theological proof may add
weight to others… if other proofs there are… by connecting speculation
with experience； but in itself it rather prepares the mind for
theological cognition； and gives it a right and natural direction；
than establishes a sure foundation for theology。
It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only
of transcendental answers… those presented a priori by pure
conceptions without the least empirical admixture。 But the question in
the present case is evidently synthetical… it aims at the extension of
our cognition beyond the bounds of experience… it requires an
assurance respecting the existence of a being corresponding with the
idea in our minds； to which no experience can ever be adequate。 Now it
has been abundantly proved that all a priori synthetical cognition
is possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a
possible experience； and that the validity of all principles depends
upon their immanence in the field of experience； that is； their
relation to objects of empirical cognition or phenomena。 Thus all
transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is
without result。
If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of
our analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and
time honoured arguments； he at least cannot decline answering the
question… how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the
help of mere ideas。 If he talks of new arguments； or of improvements
upon old arguments； I request him to spare me。 There is certainly no
great choice in this sphere of discussion； as all speculative
arguments must at last look for support to the ontological； and I
have； therefore； very little to fear from the argumentative
fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non…sensuous reason。
Without looking upon myself as a remarkably bative person； I
shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy
the pretensions of every attempt of speculative theology。 And yet
the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to
the dogmatical mode of procedure。 I shall； therefore； restrict
myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will
demonstrate； from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of
the other sources of knowledge； how we are to proceed to extend our
cognition pletely a priori； and to carry it to that point where
experience abandons us； and no means exist of guaranteeing the
objective reality of our conceptions。 In whatever way the
understanding may have attained to a conception； the existence of
the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis；
because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon
the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the
conception。 But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our
conception； without the aid of experience… which presents to the
mind nothing but phenomena； or to attain by the help of mere
conceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects
or supernatural beings。
But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being； it is of the highest
utility in correcting our conception of this being… on the supposition
that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means… in
making it consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of
intelligible objects； clearing it from all that is inpatible with
the conception of an ens summun； and eliminating from it all
limitations or admixtures of empirical elements。
Transcendental theology is still therefore； notwithstanding its
objective insufficiency； of importance in a negative respect； it is
useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure
ideas； no other than a transcendental standard being in this case
admissible。 For if； from a practical point of view； the hypothesis
of a Supreme and All…sufficient Being is to maintain its validity
without opposition； it must be of the highest importance to define
this conception in a correct and rigorous manner… as the
transcendental conception of a necessary being； to eliminate all
phenomenal elements （anthropomorphism in its most extended
signification）； and at the same time to overflow all contradictory
assertions… be they atheistic； deistic； or anthropomorphic。 This is of
course very easy； as the same arguments which demonstrated the
inability of human reason to affirm the existence of a Supreme Being
must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial。 For it
is impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason
demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being； as the ground of all
that exists； or that this being possesses none of those