no condition… determining man and his volition in conformity with this
character… which does not itself form part of the series of effects in
nature； and is subject to their law… the law according to which an
empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist。 For
this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous
origination； all actions being phenomena； and belonging to the world
of experience。 But it cannot be said of reason； that the state in
which it determines the will is always preceded by some other state
determining it。 For reason is not a phenomenon； and therefore not
subject to sensuous conditions； and； consequently； even in relation to
its causality； the sequence or conditions of time do not influence
reason； nor can the dynamical law of nature； which determines the
sequence of time according to certain rules； be applied to it。
Reason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the
human will。 Each of these is determined in the empirical character
of the man； even before it has taken place。 The intelligible
character； of which the former is but the sensuous schema； knows no
before or after； and every action； irrespective of the time…relation
in which it stands with other phenomena； is the immediate effect of
the intelligible character of pure reason； which； consequently； enjoys
freedom of action； and is not dynamically determined either by
internal or external preceding conditions。 This freedom must not be
described； in a merely negative manner； as independence of empirical
conditions； for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a
cause of phenomena； but it must be regarded； positively； as a
faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events。 At the
same time； it must not be supposed that any beginning can take place
in reason； on the contrary； reason； as the unconditioned condition
of all action of the will； admits of no time…conditions； although
its effect does really begin in a series of phenomena… a beginning
which is not； however； absolutely primal。
I shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an
example； from its employment in the world of experience； proved it
cannot be by any amount of experience； or by any number of facts；
for such arguments cannot establish the truth of transcendental
propositions。 Let us take a voluntary action… for example； a
falsehood… by means of which a man has introduced a certain degree
of confusion into the social life of humanity； which is judged
according to the motives from which it originated； and the blame of
which and of the evil consequences arising from it； is imputed to
the offender。 We at first proceed to examine the empirical character
of the offence； and for this purpose we endeavour to penetrate to
the sources of that character； such as a defective education； bad
pany； a shameless and wicked disposition； frivolity； and want of
reflection… not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed
at the moment of the transgression。 In this the procedure is exactly
the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of
causes which determine a given physical effect。 Now； although we
believe the action to have been determined by all these circumstances；
we do not the less blame the offender。 We do not blame him for his
unhappy disposition； nor for the circumstances which influenced him；
nay； not even for his former course of life； for we presuppose that
all these considerations may be set aside； that the series of
preceding conditions may be regarded as having never existed； and that
the action may be considered as pletely unconditioned in relation
to any state preceding； just as if the agent menced with it an
entirely new series of effects。 Our blame of the offender is
grounded upon a law of reason； which requires us to regard this
faculty as a cause； which could have and ought to have otherwise
determined the behaviour of the culprit； independently of all
empirical conditions。 This causality of reason we do not regard as a
co…operating agency； but as plete in itself。 It matters not whether
the sensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this
causality； the offence is estimated according to its intelligible
character… the offender is decidedly worthy of blame； the moment he
utters a falsehood。 It follows that we regard reason； in spite of
the empirical conditions of the act； as pletely free； and
therefore； therefore； as in the present case； culpable。
The above judgement is plete evidence that we are accustomed to
think that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions； that in it
no change takes place… although its phenomena； in other words； the
mode in which it appears in its effects； are subject to change… that
in it no preceding state determines the following； and；
consequently； that it does not form a member of the series of sensuous
conditions which necessitate phenomena according to natural laws。
Reason is present and the same in all human actions and at all
times； but it does not itself exist in time； and therefore does not
enter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist。 It is；
relatively to new states or conditions； determining； but not
determinable。 Hence we cannot ask： 〃Why did not reason determine
itself in a different manner？〃 The question ought to be thus stated：
〃Why did not reason employ its power of causality to determine certain
phenomena in a different manner？〃 〃But this is a question which admits
of no answer。 For a different intelligible character would have
exhibited a different empirical character； and； when we say that； in
spite of the course which his whole former life has taken； the
offender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood； this
means merely that the act was subject to the power and authority…
permissive or prohibitive… of reason。 Now； reason is not subject in
its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time； and a
difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of
phenomena to each other… for these are not things and therefore not
causes in themselves… but it cannot produce any difference in the
relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason。
Thus； then； in our investigation into free actions and the causal
power which produced them； we arrive at an intelligible cause；
beyond which； however； we cannot go； although we can recognize that it
is free； that is； independent of all sensuous conditions； and that； in
this way； it may be the sensuously unconditioned condition of
phenomena。 But for what reason the intelligible character generates
such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical
character under certain circumstances； it is beyond the power of our
reason to decide。 The question is as much above the power and the
sphere of reason as the following would be： 〃Why does the
transcendental object of our external sensuous intuition allow of no
other form than that of intuition in space？〃 But the problem； which we
were called upon to solve； does not require us to entertain any such
questions。 The problem was merely this… whether freedom and natural
necessity can exist without opposition in the same action。 To this
question we have given a sufficient answer； for we have shown that； as
the former stands in a relation to a different kind of condition
from those of the latter； the law of the one does not affect the law
of the other and that； consequently； both can exist together in
independence of and without interference with each other。
The reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the
above remarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom；
as a faculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena。
For； not to mention that such an argument would not have a
transcendental character； nor have been limited to the discussion of
pure conceptions… all attempts at inferring from experience what
cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws； must ever be
unsuccessful。 Nay； more； I have not even aimed at demonstrating the
possibility of freedom； for this too would have been a vain endeavour；
inasmuch as it is beyond the power of the mind to cognize the
possibility of a reality or of a causal power by the aid of mere a
priori conceptions。 Freedom has been considered in the foregoing
remarks only as a transcendental idea； by means of which reason aims
at originating a series of conditions in the world of phenomena with
the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned； involving
itself； however； in an antinomy with the laws which itself
prescribes for the conduct of the understanding。 That this antinomy is
based upon a mere illusion； and that nature and freedom are at least
not opposed… this was the only thing in our power to prove； and the
question which it was our task to solve。
IV。 Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of
the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences。
In the preceding remarks； we considered the changes in the world
of sense as constituting a dynamical series； in which each member is
subordinated to another… as its cause。 Our present purpose is to avail
ourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an
existence which may be the highest condition of all changeable
phenomena； that is； to a necessary being。 Our endeavour to reach；
not the unconditioned causality； but the unconditioned existence； of
substance。 The series before us is therefore a series of
conceptions； and not of intuitions （in which the one intuition is
the condition of the other）。
But it is evident that； as all phenomena are subject to change and
conditioned in their existence； the series of dependent existences
cannot embrace an unconditioned member； the existence of which would
be absolutely necessary。 It follows that； if phenomena were things
in themselves； and… as an immediate consequence from this supposition…
condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena；
the existence of a necessary being； as the condition of the
existence of sensuous phenomena； would be perfectly impossible。
An important distinction； however； exists between the dynamical
and the mathe