of phenomena； to the directions of nature alone； we need not trouble
ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental subject；
which is pletely unknown to us； stands to these phenomena and their
connection in nature。 The intelligible ground of phenomena in this
subject does not concern empirical questions。 It has to do only with
pure thought； and； although the effects of this thought and action
of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena； these
phenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and plete
explanation； upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with
natural laws。 And in this case we attend solely to their empirical and
omit all consideration of their intelligible character （which is the
transcendental cause of the former） as pletely unknown； except in
so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol。 Now
let us apply this to experience。 Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous
world and； at the same time； therefore； a natural cause； the causality
of which must be regulated by empirical laws。 As such； he must possess
an empirical character； like all other natural phenomena。 We remark
this empirical character in his actions； which reveal the presence
of certain powers and faculties。 If we consider inanimate or merely
animal nature； we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves
any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous
manner。 But man； to whom nature reveals herself only through sense；
cognizes himself not only by his senses； but also through pure
apperception； and this in actions and internal determinations； which
he cannot regard as sensuous impressions。 He is thus to himself； on
the one hand； a phenomenon； but on the other hand； in respect of
certain faculties； a purely intelligible object… intelligible； because
its action cannot be ascribed to sensuous receptivity。 These faculties
are understanding and reason。 The latter； especially； is in a peculiar
manner distinct from all empirically…conditioned faculties； for it
employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects； and by
means of these determines the understanding； which then proceeds to
make an empirical use of its own conceptions； which； like the ideas of
reason； are pure and non…empirical。
That reason possesses the faculty of causality； or that at least
we are pelled so to represent it； is evident from the
imperatives； which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of
our executive powers。 The words I ought express a species of
necessity； and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not
and cannot present to the mind of man。 Understanding knows nothing
in nature but that which is； or has been； or will be。 It would be
absurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is
in the relations of time in which it stands； indeed； the ought； when
we consider merely the course of nature； bas neither application nor
meaning。 The question； 〃What ought to happen in the sphere of nature？〃
is just as absurd as the question； 〃What ought to be the properties of
a circle？〃 All that we are entitled to ask is； 〃What takes place in
nature？〃 or； in the latter case； 〃What are the properties of a
circle？〃
But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action； the
ground of which is a pure conception； while the ground of a merely
natural action is； on the contrary； always a phenomenon。 This action
must certainly be possible under physical conditions； if it is
prescribed by the moral imperative ought； but these physical or
natural conditions do not concern the determination of the will
itself； they relate to its effects alone； and the consequences of
the effect in the world of phenomena。 Whatever number of motives
nature may present to my will； whatever sensuous impulses… the moral
ought it is beyond their power to produce。 They may produce a
volition； which； so far from being necessary； is always conditioned… a
volition to which the ought enunciated by reason； sets an aim and a
standard； gives permission or prohibition。 Be the object what it
may； purely sensuous… as pleasure； or presented by pure reason… as
good； reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical origin。
Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience；
but； with perfect spontaneity； rearranges them according to ideas；
with which it pels empirical conditions to agree。 It declares； in
the name of these ideas； certain actions to be necessary which
nevertheless have not taken place and which perhaps never will take
place； and yet presupposes that it possesses the faculty of
causality in relation to these actions。 For； in the absence of this
supposition； it could not expect its ideas to produce certain
effects in the world of experience。
Now； let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that
reason does stand in a really causal relation to phenomena。 In this
case it must… pure reason as it is… exhibit an empirical character。
For every cause supposes a rule； according to which certain
phenomena follow as effects from the cause； and every rule requires
uniformity in these effects； and this is the proper ground of the
conception of a cause… as a faculty or power。 Now this conception
（of a cause） may be termed the empirical character of reason； and this
character is a permanent one； while the effects produced appear； in
conformity with the various conditions which acpany and partly
limit them； in various forms。
Thus the volition of every man has an empirical character； which
is nothing more than the causality of his reason； in so far as its
effects in the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule；
according to which we are enabled to examine； in their several kinds
and degrees； the actions of this causality and the rational grounds
for these actions； and in this way to decide upon the subjective
principles of the volition。 Now we learn what this empirical character
is only from phenomenal effects； and from the rule of these which is
presented by experience； and for this reason all the actions of man in
the world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character；
and the co…operative causes of nature。 If； then； we could
investigate all the phenomena of human volition to their lowest
foundation in the mind； there would be no action which we could not
anticipate with certainty； and recognize to be absolutely necessary
from its preceding conditions。 So far as relates to this empirical
character； therefore； there can be no freedom； and it is only in the
light of this character that we can consider the human will； when we
confine ourselves to simple observation and； as is the case in
anthropology； institute a physiological investigation of the motive
causes of human actions。
But when we consider the same actions in relation to reason… not for
the purpose of explaining their origin； that is； in relation to
speculative reason； but to practical reason； as the producing cause of
these actions… we shall discover a rule and an order very different
from those of nature and experience。 For the declaration of this
mental faculty may be that what has and could not but take place in
the course of nature； ought not to have taken place。 Sometimes； too；
we discover； or believe that we discover； that the ideas of reason did
actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man； and
that these actions have taken place because they were determined；
not by empirical causes； but by the act of the will upon grounds of
reason。
Now； granting that reason stands in a causal relation to
phenomena； can an action of reason be called free； when we know
that； sensuously； in its empirical character； it is pletely
determined and absolutely necessary？ But this empirical character is
itself determined by the intelligible character。 The latter we
cannot cognize； we can only indicate it by means of phenomena； which
enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical
character。* An action； then； in so far as it is to be ascribed to an
intelligible cause； does not result from it in accordance with
empirical laws。 That is to say； not the conditions of pure reason； but
only their effects in the internal sense； precede the act。 Pure
reason； as a purely intelligible faculty； is not subject to the
conditions of time。 The causality of reason in its intelligible
character does not begin to be； it does not make its appearance at a
certain time； for the purpose of producing an effect。 If this were not
the case； the causality of reason would be subservient to the
natural law of phenomena； which determines them according to time； and
as a series of causes and effects in time； it would consequently cease
to be freedom and bee a part of nature。 We are therefore
justified in saying： 〃If reason stands in a causal relation to
phenomena； it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition
of an empirical series of effects。〃 For the condition； which resides
in the reason； is non…sensuous； and therefore cannot be originated； or
begin to be。 And thus we find… what we could not discover in any
empirical series… a condition of a successive series of events
itself empirically unconditioned。 For； in the present case； the
condition stands out of and beyond the series of phenomena… it is
intelligible； and it consequently cannot be subjected to any
sensuous condition； or to any time…determination by a preceding cause。
*The real morality of actions… their merit or demerit； and even that
of our own conduct； is pletely unknown to us。 Our estimates can
relate only to their empirical character。 How much is the result of
the action of free will； how much is to be ascribed to nature and to
blameless error； or to a happy constitution of temperament （merito
fortunae）； no one can discover； nor； for this reason； determine with
perfect justice。
But； in another respect； the same cause belongs also to the series
of phenomena。 Man is himself a phenomenon。 His will has an empirical
character； which is the empirical cause of all his actions。 There is
no condition… determining man and his volition in conformity with this
character… which does not itself form part of the series