by means of observation and mathematical thought… which he can
determine synthetically in intuition； to those which neither sense nor
imagination can ever present in concreto； he will not concede the
existence of a faculty in nature； operating independently of the
laws of nature… a concession which would introduce uncertainty into
the procedure of the understanding； which is guided by necessary
laws to the observation of phenomena； nor； finally； will he permit
himself to seek a cause beyond nature； inasmuch as we know nothing but
it； and from it alone receive an objective basis for all our
conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws of things。
In truth； if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the
establishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a
reason which mistakes its true destination； which boasts of its
insight and its knowledge； just where all insight and knowledge
cease to exist； and regards that which is valid only in relation to
a practical interest； as an advancement of the speculative interests
of the mind （in order； when it is convenient for itself； to break
the thread of our physical investigations； and； under pretence of
extending our cognition； connect them with transcendental ideas； by
means of which we really know only that we know nothing）… if； I say；
the empiricist rested satisfied with this benefit； the principle
advanced by him would be a maxim remending moderation in the
pretensions of reason and modesty in its affirmations； and at the same
time would direct us to the right mode of extending the province of
the understanding； by the help of the only true teacher； experience。
In obedience to this advice； intellectual hypotheses and faith would
not be called in aid of our practical interests； nor should we
introduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight。 For
speculative cognition cannot find an objective basis any other where
than in experience； and； when we overstep its limits our synthesis；
which requires ever new cognitions independent of experience； has no
substratum of intuition upon which to build。
But if… as often happens… empiricism； in relation to ideas；
bees itself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the
sphere of its phenomenal cognition； it falls itself into the error
of intemperance… an error which is here all the more reprehensible； as
thereby the practical interest of reason receives an irreparable
injury。
And this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism* and
Platonism。
*It is； however； still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever
propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment
of the understanding。 If； indeed； they were nothing more than maxims
for the speculative exercise of reason； he gives evidence therein a
more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of
antiquity。 That； in the explanation of phenomena； we must proceed as
if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor mencement
in time； that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience
in reference to the material of which the world is posed； that we must
not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that
which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature； and finally；
that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world
to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself… are principles
for the extension of speculative philosophy； and the discovery of
the true sources of the principles of morals； which； however little
conformed to in the present day； are undoubtedly correct。 At the
same time； any one desirous of ignoring； in mere speculation； these
dogmatical propositions； need not for that reason be accused of
denying them。
Both Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know。
The former encourages and advances science… although to the
prejudice of the practical； the latter presents us with excellent
principles for the investigation of the practical； but； in relation to
everything regarding which we can attain to speculative cognition；
permits reason to append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena；
to the great injury of physical investigation。
3。 In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a
party in this war of assertions； it seems very extraordinary that
empiricism should be utterly unpopular。 We should be inclined to
believe that the mon understanding would receive it with
pleasure… promising as it does to satisfy it without passing the
bounds of experience and its connected order； while transcendental
dogmatism obliges it to rise to conceptions which far surpass the
intelligence and ability of the most practised thinkers。 But in
this； in truth； is to be found its real motive。 For the mon
understanding thus finds itself in a situation where not even the most
learned can have the advantage of it。 If it understands little or
nothing about these transcendental conceptions； no one can boast of
understanding any more； and although it may not express itself in so
scholastically correct a manner as others； it can busy itself with
reasoning and arguments without end； wandering among mere ideas； about
which one can always be very eloquent； because we know nothing about
them； while； in the observation and investigation of nature； it
would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter ignorance。
Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong remendations of
these principles。 Besides； although it is a hard thing for a
philosopher to assume a principle； of which he can give to himself
no reasonable account； and still more to employ conceptions； the
objective reality of which cannot be established； nothing is more
usual with the mon understanding。 It wants something which will
allow it to go to work with confidence。 The difficulty of even
prehending a supposition does not disquiet it； because… not knowing
what prehending means… it never even thinks of the supposition it
may be adopting as a principle； and regards as known that with which
it has bee familiar from constant use。 And； at last； all
speculative interests disappear before the practical interests which
it holds dear； and it fancies that it understands and knows what its
necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe。 Thus the
empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all
popularity； and； however prejudicial it may be to the highest
practical principles； there is no fear that it will ever pass the
limits of the schools； or acquire any favour or influence in society
or with the multitude a
Human reason is by nature architectonic。 That is to say； it
regards all cognitions as parts of a possible system； and hence
accepts only such principles as at least do not incapacitate a
cognition to which we may have attained from being placed along with
others in a general system。 But the propositions of the antithesis are
of a character which renders the pletion of an edifice of
cognitions impossible。 According to these； beyond one state or epoch
of the world there is always to be found one more ancient； in every
part always other parts themselves divisible； preceding every event
another； the origin of which must itself be sought still higher； and
everything in existence is conditioned； and still not dependent on
an unconditioned and primal existence。 As； therefore； the antithesis
will not concede the existence of a first beginning which might be
available as a foundation； a plete edifice of cognition； in the
presence of such hypothesis； is utterly impossible。 Thus the
architectonic interest of reason； which requires a unity… not
empirical； but a priori and rational… forms a natural remendation
for the assertions of the thesis in our antinomy。
But if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations
of interest； and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason；
attending only to their content； irrespective of the consequences
which follow from them； such a person； on the supposition that he knew
no other way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or
other of the conflicting doctrines； would live in a state of continual
hesitation。 Today； he would feel convinced that the human will is
free； to…morrow； considering the indissoluble chain of nature； he
would look on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be
all…in…all。 But； if he were called to action； the play of the merely
speculative reason would disappear like the shapes of a dream； and
practical interest would dictate his choice of principles。 But； as
it well befits a reflective and inquiring being to devote certain
periods of time to the examination of its own reason… to divest itself
of all partiality； and frankly to municate its observations for the
judgement and opinion of others； so no one can be blamed for； much
less prevented from； placing both parties on their trial； with
permission to end themselves； free from intimidation； before
intimidation； before a sworn jury of equal condition with
themselves… the condition of weak and fallible men。
SECTION IV。 Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason
of presenting a Solution of its Transcendental
Problems。
To avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions
would be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of
extravagant boasting and self…conceit； and at once to destroy the
confidence that might otherwise have been reposed in him。 There are；
however； sciences so constituted that every question arising within
their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving an answer from
the knowledge already possessed； for the answer must be received
from the same sources whence the question arose。 In such sciences it
is not allowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and
unavoidable ignorance； a solution is absolutely requisite。 The rule of
right and wrong must help us to the knowledge of what is right or
wrong in all possible cases； otherwise； the idea of obligation or duty
would be utterly null； for we cannot have any obligation to that which
we cannot know。 On the other hand； in our investi