connection and order in cosmical events。 Freedom… independence of
the laws of nature… is certainly a deliverance from restraint； but
it is also a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule。 For it
cannot be alleged that； instead of the laws of nature； laws of freedom
may be introduced into the causality of the course of nature。 For；
if freedom were determined according to laws； it would be no longer
freedom； but merely nature。 Nature； therefore； and transcendental
freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness。
The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the
origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes；
inasmuch as causality is always conditioned thereby； while it
pensates this labour by the guarantee of a unity plete and in
conformity with law。 The latter； on the contrary； holds out to the
understanding the promise of a point of rest in the chain of causes；
by conducting it to an unconditioned causality； which professes to
have the power of spontaneous origination； but which； in its own utter
blindness； deprives it of the guidance of rules； by which alone a
pletely connected experience is possible。
OBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY。
ON THE THESIS。
The transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the
entire content of the psychological conception so termed； which is for
the most part empirical。 It merely presents us with the conception
of spontaneity of action； as the proper ground for imputing freedom to
the cause of a certain class of objects。 It is； however； the true
stumbling…stone to philosophy； which meets with unconquerable
difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned
causality。 That element in the question of the freedom of the will；
which bas for so long a time placed speculative reason in such
perplexity； is properly only transcendental； and concerns the
question； whether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous
origination of a series of successive things or states。 How such a
faculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry； for in the case of
natural causality itself； we are obliged to content ourselves with the
a priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed； although
we are quite incapable of prehending how the being of one thing
is possible through the being of another； but must for this
information look entirely to experience。 Now we have demonstrated this
necessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena； only
in so far as it is required for the prehension of an origin of
the world； all following states being regarded as a succession
according to laws of nature alone。 But； as there has thus been
proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself originate a
series in time… although we are unable to explain how it can exist… we
feel ourselves authorized to admit； even in the midst of the natural
course of events； a beginning； as regards causality； of different
successions of phenomena； and at the same time to attribute to all
substances a faculty of free action。 But we ought in this case not
to allow ourselves to fall into a mon misunderstanding； and to
suppose that； because a successive series in the world can only have a
paratively first beginning… another state or condition of things
always preceding… an absolutely first beginning of a series in the
course of nature is impossible。 For we are not speaking here of an
absolutely first beginning in relation to time； but as regards
causality alone。 When； for example； I； pletely of my own free will；
and independently of the necessarily determinative influence of
natural causes； rise from my chair； there mences with this event；
including its material consequences in infinitum； an absolutely new
series； although； in relation to time； this event is merely the
continuation of a preceding series。 For this resolution and act of
mine do not form part of the succession of effects in nature； and
are not mere continuations of it； on the contrary； the determining
causes of nature cease to operate in reference to this event； which
certainly succeeds the acts of nature； but does not proceed from them。
For these reasons； the action of a free agent must be termed； in
regard to causality； if not in relation to time； an absolutely
primal beginning of a series of phenomena。
The justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act
as the first beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from
the fact； that all philosophers of antiquity （with the exception of
the Epicurean school） felt themselves obliged； when constructing a
theory of the motions of the universe； to accept a prime mover； that
is； a freely acting cause； which spontaneously and prior to all
other causes evolved this series of states。 They always felt the
need of going beyond mere nature； for the purpose of making a first
beginning prehensible。
ON THE ANTITHESIS。
The assertor of the all…sufficiency of nature in regard to causality
（transcendental Physiocracy）； in opposition to the doctrine of
freedom； would defend his view of the question somewhat in the
following manner。 He would say； in answer to the sophistical arguments
of the opposite party： If you do not accept a mathematical first； in
relation to time； you have no need to seek a dynamical first； in
regard to causality。 Who pelled you to imagine an absolutely primal
condition of the world； and therewith an absolute beginning of the
gradually progressing successions of phenomena… and； as some
foundation for this fancy of yours； to set bounds to unlimited nature？
Inasmuch as the substances in the world have always existed… at
least the unity of experience renders such a supposition quite
necessary… there is no difficulty in believing also； that the
changes in the conditions of these substances have always existed；
and； consequently； that a first beginning； mathematical or
dynamical； is by no means required。 The possibility of such an
infinite derivation； without any initial member from which all the
others result； is certainly quite inprehensible。 But； if you are
rash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason；
you will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many
fundamental properties of natural objects （such as fundamental
forces）； which you can just as little prehend； and even the
possibility of so simple a conception as that of change must present
to you insuperable difficulties。 For if experience did not teach you
that it was real； you never could conceive a priori the possibility of
this ceaseless sequence of being and non…being。
But if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is
granted… a faculty of originating changes in the world… this faculty
must at least exist out of and apart from the world； although it is
certainly a bold assumption； that； over and above the plete content
of all possible intuitions； there still exists an object which
cannot be presented in any possible perception。 But； to attribute to
substances in the world itself such a faculty； is quite
inadmissible； for； in this case； the connection of phenomena
reciprocally determining and determined according to general laws；
which is termed nature； and along with it the criteria of empirical
truth； which enable us to distinguish experience from mere visionary
dreaming； would almost entirely disappear。 In proximity with such a
lawless faculty of freedom； a system of nature is hardly cogitable；
for the laws of the latter would be continually subject to the
intrusive influences of the former； and the course of phenomena； which
would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly； would bee
thereby confused and disconnected。
FOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS。
THESIS。
There exists either in； or in connection with the world… either as a
part of it； or as the cause of it…an absolutely necessary being。
PROOF。
The world of sense； as the sum total of all phenomena； contains a
series of changes。 For； without such a series； the mental
representation of the series of time itself； as the condition of the
possibility of the sensuous world； could not be presented to us。*
But every change stands under its condition； which precedes it in time
and renders it necessary。 Now the existence of a given condition
presupposes a plete series of conditions up to the absolutely
unconditioned； which alone is absolutely necessary。 It follows that
something that is absolutely necessary must exist； if change exists as
its consequence。 But this necessary thing itself belongs to the
sensuous world。 For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it；
the series of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning；
and yet this necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of
sense。 But this is impossible。 For； as the beginning of a series in
time is determined only by that which precedes it in time； the supreme
condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the
time in which this series itself did not exist； for a beginning
supposes a time preceding； in which the thing that begins to be was
not in existence。 The causality of the necessary cause of changes； and
consequently the cause itself； must for these reasons belong to
time… and to phenomena； time being possible only as the form of
phenomena。 Consequently； it cannot be cogitated as separated from
the world of sense… the sum total of all phenomena。 There is；
therefore； contained in the world； something that is absolutely
necessary… whether it be the whole cosmical series itself； or only a
part of it。
*Objectively； time； as the formal condition of the possibility of
change； precedes all changes； but subjectively； and in
consciousness； the representation of time； like every other； is
given solely by occasion of perception。
ANTITHESIS。
An absolutely necessary being does not exist； either in the world；
or out of it… as its cause。
PROOF。
Grant that either the world itself is necessary； or that there is