all； genuine insight and intelligence。 These prejudicial
consequences bee still more evident； in the case of the
dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence； and the
theological system of nature （physico…theology） which is falsely based
upon it。 For； in this case； the aims which we observe in nature； and
often those which we merely fancy to exist； make the investigation
of causes a very easy task； by directing us to refer such and such
phenomena immediately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the
Supreme Wisdom； while we ought to investigate their causes in the
general laws of the mechanism of matter。 We are thus remended to
consider the labour of reason as ended； when we have merely
dispensed with its employment； which is guided surely and safely
only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world…
which are arranged according to immanent and general laws。 This
error may be avoided； if we do not merely consider from the view…point
of final aims certain parts of nature； such as the division and
structure of a continent； the constitution and direction of certain
mountain…chains； or even the organization existing in the vegetable
and animal kingdoms； but look upon this systematic unity of nature
in a perfectly general way； in relation to the idea of a Supreme
Intelligence。 If we pursue this advice； we lay as a foundation for all
investigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature in
accordance with universal laws； for which no particular arrangement of
nature is exempt； but only cognized by us with more or less
difficulty； and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic
unity of a teleological connection； which we do not attempt to
anticipate or predetermine。 All that we do； and ought to do； is to
follow out the physico…mechanical connection in nature according to
general laws； with the hope of discovering； sooner or later； the
teleological connection also。 Thus； and thus only； can the principle
of final unity aid in the extension of the employment of reason in the
sphere of experience； without being in any case detrimental to its
interests。
*This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical
argument； which ran thus： If it is your fate to die of this disease；
you will die； whether you employ a physician or not。 Cicero says
that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation； because； if
followed； it puts an end to the employment of reason in the affairs of
life。 For a similar reason； I have applied this designation to the
sophistical argument of pure reason。
The second error which arises from the misconception of the
principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason （perversa
ratio； usteron roteron rationis）。 The idea of systematic unity is
available as a regulative principle in the connection of phenomena
according to general natural laws； and； how far soever we have to
travel upon the path of experience to discover some fact or event；
this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the
more nearly to the pletion of its use in the sphere of nature；
although that pletion can never be attained。 But this error
reverses the procedure of reason。 We begin by hypostatizing the
principle of systematic unity； and by giving an anthropomorphic
determination to the conception of a Supreme Intelligence； and then
proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature。 Thus not only does
teleology； which ought to aid in the pletion of unity in accordance
with general laws； operate to the destruction of its influence； but it
hinders reason from attaining its proper aim； that is； the proof； upon
natural grounds； of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause。 For；
if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in nature a priori； that
is； as essentially belonging to nature； how can we be directed to
endeavour to discover this unity and； rising gradually through its
different degrees； to approach the supreme perfection of an author
of all… a perfection which is absolutely necessary； and therefore
cognizable a priori？ The regulative principle directs us to presuppose
systematic unity absolutely and； consequently； as following from the
essential nature of things… but only as a unity of nature； not
merely cognized empirically； but presupposed a priori； although only
in an indeterminate manner。 But if I insist on basing nature upon
the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being； the unity of nature is in
effect lost。 For； in this case； it is quite foreign and unessential to
the nature of things； and cannot be cognized from the general laws
of nature。 And thus arises a vicious circular argument； what ought
to have been proved having been presupposed。
To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a
constitutive principle； and to hypostatize and make a cause out of
that which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and
harmonious exercise of reason； involves reason in inextricable
embarrassments。 The investigation of nature pursues its own path under
the guidance of the chain of natural causes； in accordance with the
general laws of nature； and ever follows the light of the idea of an
author of the universe… not for the purpose of deducing the
finality； which it constantly pursues； from this Supreme Being； but to
attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which it
seeks in the existence of the phenomena of nature； and； if possible；
in that of all things to cognize this being； consequently； as
absolutely necessary。 Whether this latter purpose succeed or not；
the idea is and must always be a true one； and its employment； when
merely regulative； must always be acpanied by truthful and
beneficial results。
plete unity； in conformity with aims； constitutes absolute
perfection。 But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the
things which go to constitute the world of experience； that is； of
objective cognition； consequently in the universal and necessary
laws of nature； how can we infer from this unity the idea of the
supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being； which
is the origin of all causality？ The greatest systematic unity； and
consequently teleological unity； constitutes the very foundation of
the possibility of the most extended employment of human reason。 The
idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with
the nature of our reason。 This idea is a legislative one； and hence it
is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative
reason corresponding to it； from which the systematic unity of nature…
the object of the operations of reason… must be derived。
In the course of our discussion of the antinomies； we stated that it
is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may
raise； and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition； which
is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural
phenomena； cannot in this case be admitted； because the questions
raised do not relate to the nature of things； but are necessarily
originated by the nature of reason itself； and relate to its own
internal constitution。 We can now establish this assertion； which at
first sight appeared so rash； in relation to the two questions in
which reason takes the greatest interest； and thus plete our
discussion of the dialectic of pure reason。
If； then； the question is asked； in relation to transcendental
theology；* first； whether there is anything distinct from the world；
which contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according
to general laws？ The answer is： Certainly。 For the world is a sum of
phenomena； there must； therefore； be some transcendental basis of
these phenomena； that is； a basis cogitable by the pure
understanding alone。 If； secondly； the question is asked whether
this being is substance； whether it is of the greatest reality；
whether it is necessary； and so forth？ I answer that this question
is utterly without meaning。 For all the categories which aid me in
forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the
world of sense； and are without meaning when not applied to objects of
actual or possible experience。 Out of this sphere； they are not
properly conceptions； but the mere marks or indices of conceptions；
which we may admit； although they cannot； without the help of
experience； help us to understand any subject or thing。 If； thirdly；
the question is whether we may not cogitate this being； which is
distinct from the world； in analogy with the objects of experience？
The answer is： Undoubtedly； but only as an ideal； and not as a real
object。 That is； we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum
of the systematic unity； order； and finality of the world… a unity
which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its
investigation of nature。 Nay； more； we may admit into the idea certain
anthropomorphic elements； which are promotive of the interests of this
regulative principle。 For it is no more than an idea； which does not
relate directly to a being distinct from the world； but to the
regulative principle of the systematic unity of the world； by means；
however； of a schema of this unity… the schema of a Supreme
Intelligence； who is the wisely…designing author of the universe。 What
this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself； we know not… we
cannot discover from the idea； we merely know how we ought to employ
the idea of this unity； in relation to the systematic operation of
reason in the sphere of experience。
*After what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and
its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of
reason； I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental
illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of
the internal sense is hypostatized。 The procedure is in this case very
similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the
theological ideal。
But； it will be asked again； can we on these grounds； admit the
existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world？ Without doubt；
and not only so； but we must assume the existence of such a being。 But
do we thus extend th