the commonwealth of oceana- 第6部分

id　reason　a　beardless　boy　that　has　newly　read　Livy。　And　how　solid　his　reason　is；　may　appear　where　he　grants　the　great　prosperity　of　ancient　commonwealths；　which　is　to　give　up　the　controversy。　For　such　an　effect　must　have　some　adequate　cause；　which　to　evade　he　insinuates　that　it　was　nothing　else　but　the　emulation　of　particular　men；　as　if　so　great　an　emulation　could　have　been　generated　without　as　great　virtue；　so　great　virtue　without　the　best　education；　and　best　education　without　the　best　law；　or　the　best　laws　any　otherwise　than　by　the　excellency　of　their　polity。　　　　　But　if　some　of　these　commonwealths；　as　being　less　perfect　in　their　polity　than　others；　have　been　more　seditious；　it　is　not　more　an　argument　of　the　infirmity　of　this　or　that　commonwealth　in　particular；　than　of　the　excellency　of　that　kind　of　polity　in　general；　which　if　they；　that　have　not　altogether　reached；　have　nevertheless　had　greater　prosperity；　what　would　befall　them　that　should　reach？　　　　　In　answer　to　which　question　let　me　invite　Leviathan；　who　of　all　other　governments　gives　the　advantage　to　monarchy　for　perfection；　to　a　better　disquisition　of　it　by　these　three　assertions。　　　　　The　first；　that　the　perfection　of　government　lies　upon　such　a　libration　in　the　frame　of　it；　that　no　man　or　men　in　or　under　it　can　have　the　interest；　or；　having　the　interest；　can　have　the　power　to　disturb　it　with　sedition。　　　　　The　second；　that　monarchy；　reaching　the　perfection　of　the　kind；　reaches　not　to　the　perfection　of　government；　but　must　have　some　dangerous　flaw　in　it。　　　　　The　third；　that　popular　government；　reaching　the　perfection　of　the　kind；　reaches　the　perfection　of　government；　and　has　no　flaw　in　it。　　　　　The　first　assertion　requires　no　proof。　　　　　For　the　proof　of　the　second；　monarchy；　as　has　been　shown；　is　of　two　kinds：　the　one　by　arms；　the　other　by　a　nobility　and　there　is　no　other　kind　in　art　or　nature；　for　if　there　have　'been　anciently　some　governments　called　kingdoms；　as　one　of　the　Goths　in　Spain；　and　another　of　the　Vandals　in　Africa；　where　the　King　ruled　without　a　nobility　and　by　a　council　of　the　people　only　it　is　expressly　said　by　the　authors　that　mention　them　that　the；　kings　were　but　the　captains；　and　that　the　people　not　only　gave　them　laws；　but　deposed　them　as　often　as　they　pleased。　Nor　is　it　possible　in　reason　that　it　should　be　otherwise　in　like　cases；　wherefore　these　were　either　no　monarchies；　or　had　greater　flaws　in　them　than　any　other。　　　　　But　for　a　monarchy　by　arms；　as　that　of　the　Turk　（which；　of　all　models　that　ever　were；　comes　up　to　the　perfection　of　the　kind）；　it　is　not　in　the　wit　or　power　of　man　to　cure　it　of　this　dangerous　flaw；　that　the　Janizaries　have　frequent　interest　and　perpetual　power　to　raise　sedition；　and　to　tear　the　magistrate；　even　the　prince　himself；　in　pieces。　Therefore　the　monarchy　of　Turkey　is　no　perfect　government。　　　　　And　for　a　monarchy　by　nobility；　as　of　late　in　Oceana　（which　of　all　other　models；　before　the　declination　of　it；　came　up　to　the　perfection　in　that　kind）；　it　was　not　in　the　power　or　wit　of　man　to　cure　it　of　that　dangerous　flaw；　that　the　nobility　had　frequent　interest　and　perpetual　power　by　their　retainers　and　tenants　to　raise　sedition；　and　（whereas　the　Janizaries　occasion　this　kind　of　calamity　no　sooner　than　they　make　an　end　of　it）　to　levy　a　lasting　war；　to　the　vast　effusion　of　blood；　and　that　even　upon　occasions　wherein　the　people；　but　for　their　dependence　upon　their　lords；　had　no　concernment；　as　in　the　feud　of　the　Red　and　White。　The　like　has　been　frequent　in　Spain；　France；　Germany；　and　other　monarchies　of　this　kind；　wherefore　monarchy　by　a　nobility　is　no　perfect　government。　　　　　For　the　proof　of　the　third　assertion：　Leviathan　yields　it　to　me；　that　there　is　no　other　commonwealth　but　monarchical　or　popular；　wherefore　if　no　monarchy　be　a　perfect　government；　then　either　there　is　no　perfect　government；　or　it　must　be　popular；　for　which　kind　of　constitution　I　have　something　more　to　say　than　Leviathan　has　said　or　ever　will　be　able　to　say　for　monarchy。　As；　　　　　First；　that　it　is　the　government　that　was　never　conquered　by　any　monarch；　from　the　beginning　of　the　world　to　this　day；　for　if　the　commonwealths　of　Greece　came　under　the　yoke　of　the　Kings　of　Macedon；　they　were　first　broken　by　themselves。　　　　　Secondly；　that　it　is　the　government　that　has　frequently　led　mighty　monarchs　in　triumph。　　　　　Thirdly；　that　it　is　the　government；　which；　if　it　has　been　seditious；　it　has　not　been　so　from　any　imperfection　in　the　kind；　but　in　the　particular　constitution；　which；　wherever　the　like　has　happened；　must　have　been　unequal。　　　　　Fourthly；　that　it　is　the　government；　which；　if　it　has　been　anything　near　equal；　was　never　seditious；　or　let　him　show　me　what　sedition　has　happened　in　Lacedaemon　or　Venice。　　　　　Fifthly；　that　it　is　the　government；　which；　attaining　to　perfect　equality；　has　such　a　libration　in　the　frame　of　it；　that　no　man　living　can　show　which　way　any　man　or　men；　in　or　under　it；　can　contract　any　such　interest　or　power　as　should　be　able　to　disturb　the　commonwealth　with　sedition；　wherefore　an　equal　commonwealth　is　that　only　which　is　without　flaw　and　contains　in　it　the　full　perfection　of　government。　But　to　return。　　　　　By　what　has　been　shown　in　reason　and　experience；　it　may　appear；　that　though　commonwealths　in　general　be　governments　of　the　senate　proposing；　the　people　resolving；　and　the　magistracy　executing；　yet　some　are　not　so　good　at　these　orders　as　others；　through　some　impediment　or　defect　in　the　frame；　balance；　or　capacity　of　them；　according　to　which　they　are　of　divers　kinds。　　　　　The　first　division　of　them　is　into　such　as　are　single；　as　Israel；　Athens；　Lacedaemon；　etc。；　and　such　as　are　by　leagues；　as　those　of　the　Achaeans；　AEtolians；　Lycians；　Switz；　and　Hollanders。　　　　　The　second　（being　Machiavel's）　is　into　such　as　are　for　preservation；　as　Lacedaemon　and　Venice；　and　such　as　are　for　increase；　as　Athens　and　Rome；　in　which　I　can　see　no　more　than　that　the　former　takes　in　no　more　citizens　than　are　necessary　for　defence；　and　the　latter　so　many　as　are　capable　of　increase。　　　　　The　third　division　（unseen　hitherto）　is　into　equal　and　Unequal；　and　this　is　the　main　point；　especially　as　to　domestic　peace　and　tranquillity；　for　to　make　a　commonwealth　unequal；　is　to　divide　it　into　parties；　which　sets　them　at　perpetual　variance；　the　one　party　endeavoring　to　preserve　their　eminence　and　inequality　and　the　other　to　attain　to　equality；　whence　the　people　of　Rome　derived　their　perpetual　strife　with　the　nobility　and　Senate。　But　in　an　equal　commonwealth　there　can　be　no　more　strife　than　there　can　be　overbalance　in　equal　weights；　wherefore　the　Commonwealth　of　Venice；　being　that　which　of　all　others　is　the　most　equal　in　the　constitution；　is　that　wherein　there　never　happened　any　strife　between　the　Senate　and　the　people。　　　　　An　equal　commonwealth　is　such　a　one　as　is　equal　both　in　the　balance　or　foundation；　and　in　the　superstructure；　that　is　to　say；　in　her　agrarian　law　and　in　her　rotation。　　　　　An　equal　agrarian　is　a　perpetual　law；　establishing　and　preserving　the　balance　of　dominion　by　such　a　distribution；　that　no　one　man　or　number　of　men；　within　the　compass　of　the　few　or　aristocracy；　can　come　to　overpower　the　whole　people　by　their　possessions　in　lands。　　　　　As　the　agrarian　answers　to　the　foundation；　so　does　rotation　to　the　superstructures。　　　　　Equal　rotation　is　equal　vicissitude　in　government；　or　succession　to　magistracy　conferred　for　such　convenient　terms；　enjoying　equal　vacations；　as　take　in　the　whole　body　by　parts；　succeeding　others；　through　the　free　election　or　suffrage　of　the　people。　　　　　The　contrary；　whereunto　is　prolongation　of　magistracy；　which；　trashing　the　wheel　of　rotation；　destroys　the　life　or　natural　motion　of　a　commonwealth。　　　　　The　election　or　suffrage　of　the　people　is　most　free；　where　it　is　made　or　given　in　such　a　manner　that　it　can　neither　oblige　nor　disoblige　another；　nor　through　fear　of　an　enemy；　or　bashfulness　toward　a　friend；　impair　a　man's　liberty。　　　　　Wherefore；　says　Cicero；　the　tablet　or　ballot　of　the　people　of　Rome　（who　gave　their　votes　by　throwing　tablets　or　little　pieces　of　wood　secretly　into　urns　marked　for　the　negative　or　affirmative）　was　a　welcome　constitution　to　the　people；　as　that　which；　not　impairing　the　assurance　of　their　brows；　increased　the　freedom　of　their　judgment。　I　have　not　stood　upon　a　more　particular　description　of　this　ballot；　because　that　of　Venice　exemplified　in　the　model　is　of　all　others　the　most　perfect。　　　　　An　equal　commonwealth　（by　that　which　has　been　said）　is　a　government　established　upon　an　equal　agrarian；　arising　into　the　superstructures　or　three　orders；　the　Senate　debating　and　proposing；　the　people　resolving；　and　the　magistracy　executing；　by　an　equal　rotation　through　the　suffrage　of　the　people　given　by　the　ballot。　For　though　rotation　may　be　without　the　ballot；　and　the　ballot　without　rotation；　yet　the　ballot　not　only　as　to　the　ensuing　model　includes　both；　but　is　by　far　the　most　equal　way；　for　which　cause　under　the　name　of　the　ballot　I　shall　hereafter　understand　both　that　and　rotation　too。　　　　　Now　having　reasoned　the　principles　of　an　equal　commonwealth；　I　should　come　to　give　an　instance　of　such　a　one　in　experience；　if　I　could　find　it；　but　if　this　work　be　of　any　value；　it　lies　in　that　it　is　the　first　example　of　a　commonwealth　that　is　perfectly　equal。　For　Venice；　though　it　comes　the　nearest；　yet　is　a　commonwealth　for　preservation；　and　such　a　one；　considering　the　paucity　of　citizens　taken　in；　and　the　number　not　taken　in；　is　externally　unequal；　and　though　every　commonwealth　that　holds　provinces　must　in　that　regard　be　such；　yet　not　to　that　degree。　Nevertheless；　Venice　internally；　and　for　her　capacity；　is　by　far　the　most　equal；　though　it　has　not；　in　my　judgment；　arrived　at　the　full　perfection　of　equality；　both　because　her　laws　supplying　the　defect　of　an　agrarian　are　not　so　clear　nor　effectual　at　the　foundation；　nor　her　superstructures；　by　the　virtue　of　her　ballot　or　rotation；　exactly　librated；　in　regard　that　through　the　paucity　of　her　citizens　her　greater　magistracies　are　continually　wheeled　through　a　few　hands；　as　is　confessed　by　Janotti；　where　he　says；　that　if　a　gentleman　comes　once　to　be　Savio　di　terra　ferma；　it　seldom　happens　that　he　fails　from　thenceforward　to　be　adorned　with　some　one　of　the　greater　magistracies；　as　Savi　di　mare；　Savi　di　terra　ferma；　Savi　Grandi；