the commonwealth of oceana- 第3部分

without　participation　of　it；　are　such　as　have　since　either　voluntarily　chosen　so　to　do；　or　were　subdued　by　arms。　Wherefore　the　subject　of　Venice　is　governed　by　provinces；　and　the　balance　of　dominion　not　standing；　as　has　been　said；　with　provincial　government；　as　the　Mamelukes　durst　not　cast　their　government　upon　this　balance　in　their　provinces；　lest　the　national　interest　should　have　rooted　out　the　foreign；　so　neither　dare　the　Venetians　take　in　their　subjects　upon　this　balance；　lest　the　foreign　interest　should　root　out　the　national　（which　is　that　of　the　3；000　now　governing）；　and　by　diffusing　the　commonwealth　throughout　her　territories；　lose　the　advantage　of　her　situation；　by　which　in　great　part　it　subsists。　And　such　also　is　the　government　of　the　Spaniard　in　the　Indies；　to　which　he　deputes　natives　of　his　own　country；　not　admitting　the　creoles　to　the　government　of　those　provinces；　though　descended　from　Spaniards。　　　　　But　if　a　prince　or　a　commonwealth　may　hold　a　territory　that　is　foreign　in　this；　it　may　be　asked　why　he　may　not　hold　one　that　is　native　in　the　like　manner？　To　which　I　answer；　because　he　can　hold　a　foreign　by　a　native　territory；　but　not　a　native　by　a　foreign；　and　as　hitherto　I　have　shown　what　is　not　the　provincial　balance；　so　by　this　answer　it　may　appear　what　it　is；　namely；　the　overbalance　of　a　native　territory　to　a　foreign；　for　as　one　country　balances　itself　by　the　distribution　of　property　according　to　the　proportion　of　the　same；　so　one　country　overbalances　another　by　advantage　of　divers　kinds。　For　example；　the　Commonwealth　of　Rome　overbalanced　her　provinces　by　the　vigor　of　a　more　excellent　government　opposed　to　a　crazier。　Or　by　a　more　exquisite　militia　opposed　to　one　inferior　in　courage　or　discipline。　The　like　was　that　of　the　Mamelukes；　being　a　hardy　people；　to　the　Egyptians；　that　were　a　soft　one。　And　the　balance　of　situation　is　in　this　kind　of　wonderful　effect；　seeing　the　King　of　Denmark；　being　none　of　the　most　potent　princes；　is　able　at　the　Sound　to　take　toll　of　the　greatest；　and　as　this　King；　by　the　advantage　of　the　land；　can　make　the　sea　tributary；　so　Venice；　by　the　advantage　of　the　sea；　in　whose　arms　she　is　impregnable；　can　make　the　land　to　feed　her　gulf。　For　the　colonies　in　the　Indies；　they　are　yet　babes　that　cannot　live　without　sucking　the　breasts　of　their　mother　cities；　but　such　as　I　mistake　if　when　they　come　of　age　they　do　not　wean　themselves；　which　causes　me　to　wonder　at　princes　that　delight　to　be　exhausted　in　that　way。　And　so　much　for　the　principles　of　power；　whether　national　or　provincial；　domestic　or　foreign；　being　such　as　are　external；　and　founded　in　the　goods　of　fortune。　　　　　I　come　to　the　principles　of　authority；　which　are　internal；　and　founded　upon　the　goods　of　the　mind。　These　the　legislator　that　can　unite　in　his　government　with　those　of　fortune；　comes　nearest　to　the　work　of　God；　whose　government　consists　of　heaven　and　earth；　which　was　said　by　Plato；　though　in　different　words；　as；　when　princes　should　be　philosophers；　or　philosophers　princes；　the　world　would　be　happy。　And　says　Solomon：　〃There　is　an　evil　which　I　have　seen　under　the　sun；　which　proceeds　from　the　ruler　（enimvero　neque　nobilem；　neque　ingenuum；　nec　libertinum　quidem　armis　praeponere；　regia　utilitas　est）。　Folly　is　set　in　great　dignity；　and　the　rich　（either　in　virtue　and　wisdom；　in　the　goods　of　the　mind；　or　those　of　fortune　upon　that　balance　which　gives　them　a　sense　of　the　national　interest）　sit　in　low　places。　I　have　seen　servants　upon　horses；　and　princes　walking　as　servants　upon　the　earth。〃　Sad　complaints；　that　the　principles　of　power　and　of　authority；　the　goods　of　the　mind　and　of　fortune；　do　not　meet　and　twine　in　the　wreath　or　crown　of　empire！　Wherefore；　if　we　have　anything　of　piety　or　of　prudence；　let　us　raise　ourselves　out　of　the　mire　of　private　interest　to　the　contemplation　of　virtue；　and　put　a　hand　to　the　removal　of　〃this　evil　from　under　the　sun；〃　this　evil　against　which　no　government　that　is　not　secured　can　be　good；　this　evil　from　which　the　government　that　is　secure　must　be　perfect。　Solomon　tells　us　that　the　cause　of　it　is　from　the　ruler；　from　those　principles　of　power；　which；　balanced　upon　earthly　trash；　exclude　the　heavenly　treasures　of　virtue；　and　that　influence　of　it　upon　government　which　is　authority。　We　have　wandered　the　earth　to　find　out　the　balance　of　power；　but　to　find　out　that　of　authority　we　must　ascend；　as　I　said；　nearer　heaven；　or　to　the　image　of　God；　which　is　the　soul　of　man。　　　　　The　soul　of　man　（whose　life　or　motion　is　perpetual　contemplation　or　thought）　is　the　mistress　of　two　potent　rivals；　the　one　reason；　the　other　passion；　that　are　in　continual　suit；　and；　according　as　she　gives　up　her　will　to　these　or　either　of　them；　is　the　felicity　or　misery　which　man　partakes　in　this　mortal　life。　　　　　For；　as　whatever　was　passion　in　the　contemplation　of　a　man；　being　brought　forth　by　his　will　into　action；　is　vice　and　the　bondage　of　sin；　so　whatever　was　reason　in　the　contemplation　of　a　man；　being　brought　forth　by　his　will　into　action；　is　virtue　and　the　freedom　of　soul。　　　　　Again；　as　those　actions　of　a　man　that　were　sin　acquire　to　himself　repentance　or　shame；　and　affect　others　with　scorn　or　pity；　so　those　actions　of　a　man　that　are　virtue　acquire　to　himself　honor；　and　upon　others　authority。　　　　　Now　government　is　no　other　than　the　soul　of　a　nation　or　city：　wherefore　that　which　was　reason　in　the　debate　of　a　commonwealth　being　brought　forth　by　the　result；　must　be　virtue；　and　forasmuch　as　the　soul　of　a　city　or　nation　is　the　sovereign　power；　her　virtue　must　be　law。　But　the　government　whose　law　is　virtue；　and　whose　virtue　is　law；　is　the　same　whose　empire　is　authority；　and　whose　authority　is　empire。　　　　　Again；　if　the　liberty　of　a　man　consists　in　the　empire　of　his　reason；　the　absence　whereof　would　betray　him　to　the　bondage　of　his　passions；　then　the　liberty　of　a　commonwealth　consists　in　the　empire　of　her　laws；　the　absence　whereof　would　betray　her　to　the　lust　of　tyrants。　And　these　I　conceive　to　be　the　principles　upon　which　Aristotle　and　Livy　（injuriously　accused　by　Leviathan　for　not　writing　out　of　nature）　have　grounded　their　assertion；　〃that　a　commonwealth　is　an　empire　of　laws　and　not　of　men。〃　But　they　must　not　carry　it　so。　〃For；〃　says　he；　〃the　liberty　whereof　there　is　so　frequent　and　honorable　mention　in　the　histories　and　philosophy　of　the　ancient　Greeks　and　Romans；　and　the　writings　and　discourses　of　those　that　from　them　have　received　all　their　learning　in　the　politics；　is　not　the　liberty　of　particular　men；　but　the　liberty　of　the　commonwealth。〃　He　might　as　well　have　said　that　the　estates　of　particular　men　in　a　commonwealth　are　not　the　riches　of　particular　men；　but　the　riches　of　the　commonwealth；　for　equality　of　estates　causes　equality　of　power；　and　equality　of　power　is　the　liberty；　not　only　of　the　commonwealth；　but　of　every　man。　　　　　But　sure　a　man　would　never　be　thus　irreverent　with　the　greatest　authors；　and　positive　against　all　antiquity　without　some　certain　demonstration　of　truth　　and　what　is　it？　Why；　〃there　is　written　on　the　turrets　of　the　city　of　Lucca　in　great　characters　at　this　day　the　word　LIBERTAS；　yet　no　man　can　thence　infer　that　a　particular　man　has　more　liberty　or　immunity　from　the　service　of　the　commonwealth　there　than　in　Constantinople。　Whether　a　commonwealth　be　monarchical　or　popular　the　freedom　is　the　same。〃　The　mountain　has　brought　forth；　and　we　have　a　little　equivocation！　For　to　say　that　a　Lucchese　has　no　more　liberty　or　immunIty　from　the　laws　of　Lucca　than　a　Turk　has　from　those　of　Constantinople；　and　to　say　that　a　Lucchese　has　no　more　liberty　or　immunity　by　the　laws　of　Lucca；　than　a　Turk　has　by　those　of　Constantinople；　are　pretty　different　speeches。　The　first　may　be　said　of　all　governments　alike；　the　second　scarce　of　any　two；　much　less　of　these；　seeing　it　is　known　that；　whereas　the　greatest　Bashaw　is　a　tenant；　as　well　of　his　head　as　of　his　estate；　at　the　will　of　his　lord；　the　meanest　Lucchese　that　has　land　is　a　freeholder　of　both；　and　not　to　be　controlled　but　by　the　law；　and　that　framed　by　every　private　man　to　no　other　end　（or　they　may　thank　themselves）　than　to　protect　the　liberty　of　every　private　man；　which　by　that　means　comes　to　be　the　liberty　of　the　commonwealth。　　　　　But　seeing　they　that　make　the　laws　in　commonwealths　are　but　men；　the　main　question　seems　to　be；　how　a　commonwealth　comes　to　be　an　empire　of　laws；　and　not　of　men？　or　how　the　debate　or　result　of　a　commonwealth　is　so　sure　to　be　according　to　reason；　seeing　they　who　debate；　and　they　who　resolve；　be　but　men？　〃And　as　often　as　reason　is　against　a　man；　so　often　will　a　man　be　against　reason。〃　　　　　This　is　thought　to　be　a　shrewd　saying；　but　will　do　no　harm；　for　be　it　so　that　reason　is　nothing　but　interest；　there　be　divers　interests；　and　so　divers　reasons。　　　　　As　first；　there　is　private　reason；　which　is　the　interest　of　a　private　man。　　　　　Secondly；　there　is　reason　of　state；　which　is　the　interest　（or　error；　as　was　said　by　Solomon）　of　the　ruler　or　rulers；　that　is　to　say；　of　the　prince；　of　the　nobility；　or　of　the　people。　　　　　Thirdly　there　is　that　reason；　which　is　the　interest　of　mankind；　or　of　the　whole。　〃Now　if　we　see　even　in　those　natural　agents　that　want　sense；　that　as　in　themselves　they　have　a　law　which　directs　them　in　the　means　whereby　they　tend　to　their　own　perfection；　so　likewise　that　another　law　there　is；　which　touches　them　as　they　are　sociable　parts　united　into　one　body；　a　law　which　binds　them　each　to　serve　to　others'　good；　and　all　to　prefer　the　good　of　the　whole；　before　whatsoever　their　own　particular；　as　when　stones；　or　heavy　things；　forsake　their　ordinary　wont　or　centre；　and　fly　upward；　as　if　they　heard　themselves　commanded　to　let　go　the　good　they　privately　wish；　and　to　relieve　the　present　distress　of　nature　in　common。〃　There　is　a　common　right；　law　of　nature；　or　interest　of　the　whole；　which　is　more　excellent；　and　so　acknowledged　to　be　by　the　agents　themselves；　than　the　right　or　interest　of　the　parts　only。　〃Wherefore；　though　it　may　be　truly　said　that　the　creatures　are　naturally　carried　forth　to　their　proper　utility　or　profit；　that　ought　not　to　be　taken　in　too　general　a　sense；　seeing　divers　of　them　abstain　from　their　own　profit；　either　in　regard　of　those　of　the　same　kind；　or　at　least　of　their　young。〃　　　　　Mankind　then　must　either　be　less　just　than　the　creature；　or　acknowledge　also　his　com