tive to families： this also is so apparent； that it needs pity rather than proof。 Why alas； do you bind a nobility （which no generation shall deny to have been the first that freely sacrificed their blood to the ancient liberties of this people） on an unholy altar？ Why are the people taught that their liberty； which； except our noble ancestors had been born； must have long since been buried； cannot now be born except we be buried？ A commonwealth should have the innocence of the dove。 Let us leave this purchase of her birth to the serpent； which eats itself out of the womb of its mother。 〃Fifthly but it may be said； perhaps； that we are fallen from our first love； become proud and idle。 It is certain； my lords； that the hand of God is not upon us for nothing。 But take heed how you admit of such assaults and sallies upon men's estates； as may slacken the nerve of labor； and give others also reason to believe that their sweat is vain； or else； whatsoever be pretended； your agrarian （which is my fifth assertion） must indeed destroy industry。 For； that so it did in Lacedaemon is most apparent； as also that it could do no otherwise； where every man having his forty quarters of barley； with wine proportionable； supplied him out of his own lot by his laborer or helot； and being confined in that to the scantling above which he might not live； there was not any such thing as a trade； or other art； except that of war； in exercise。 Wherefore a Spartan； if he were not in arms； must sit and play with his Angers； whence ensued perpetual war； and； the estate of the city being as little capable of increase as that of the citizens； her inevitable ruin。 Now what better ends you can propose to yourselves in the like ways； I do not so well see as I perceive that there may be worse； for Lacedaemon yet was free from civil war： but if you employ your citizens no better than she did； I cannot promise you that you shall fare so well； because they are still desirous of war that hope that it may be profitable to them； and the strongest security you can give of peace； is to make it gainful。 Otherwise men will rather choose that whereby they may break your laws； than that whereby your laws may break them。 Which I speak not so much in relation to the nobility or such as would be holding； as to the people or them that would be getting； the passion in these being so much the stronger； as a man's felicity is weaker in the fruition of things； than in their prosecution and increase。 〃Truly； my lords； it is my fear； that by taking of more hands； and the best from industry； you will farther endamage it； than can be repaired by laying on a few； and the worst； while the nobility must be forced to send their sons to the plough； and； as if this were not enough； to marry their daughters also to farmers。 〃Sixthly； but I do not see （to come to the last point） how it is possible that this thing should be brought about； to your good I mean； though it may to the destruction of many。 For that the agrarian of Israel； or that of Lacedaemon； might stand； is no such miracle； the lands； without any consideration of the former proprietor； being surveyed and cast into equal lots； which could neither be bought； nor sold； nor multiplied： so that they knew whereabout to have a man。 But in this nation no such division can be introduced； the lands being already in the hands of proprietors； and such whose estates lie very rarely together； but mixed one with another being also of tenures in nature so different； that as there is no experience that an agrarian was ever introduced in such a case； so there is no appearance how or reason why it should： but that which is against reason and experience is impossible。〃
The case of my Lord Philautus was the most concerned in the whole nation； for he had four younger brothers； his father being yet living； to whom he was heir of ？0；000 a year。 Wherefore being a man both of good parts and esteem； his words wrought both upon men's reason and passions； and had borne a stroke at the head of the business； if my Lord Archon had not interposed the buckler in this oration：
〃MY LORDS； THE LEGISLATORS OF OCEANA： 〃My Lord Philautus has made a thing which is easy to seem hard； if the thanks were due to his eloquence； it would be worthy of less praise than that he owes it to his merit； and the love he has most deservedly purchased of all men： nor is it rationally to be feared that he who is so much beforehand in his private； should be in arrear in his public； capacity。 Wherefore； my lord's tenderness throughout his speech arising from no other principle than his solicitude lest the agrarian should be hurtful to his country； it is no less than my duty to give the best satisfaction I am able to so good a patriot； taking every one of his doubts in the order proposed。 And； 〃First； whereas my lord； upon observation of the modern commonwealths； is of opinion that an agrarian is not necessary： it must be confessed that at the first sight of them there is some appearance favoring his assertion； but upon accidents of no precedent to us。 For the commonwealths of Switzerland and Holland； I mean of those leagues； being situated in countries not alluring the inhabitants to wantonness； but obliging them to universal industry； have an implicit agrarian in the nature of them： and being not obnoxious to a growing nobility （which； as long as their former monarchies had spread the wing over them； could either not at all be hatched； or was soon broken） are of no example to us； whose experience in this point has been to the contrary。 But what if even in these governments there be indeed an explicit agrarian？ For when the law commands an equal or near equal distribution of a man's estate in land among his children； as it is done in those countries； a nobility cannot grow； and so there needs no agrarian； or rather there is one。 And for the growth of the nobility in Venice （if so it be； for Machiavel observes in that republic； as a cause of it； a great mediocrity of estates） it is not a point that she is to fear； but might study； seeing she consists of nothing else but nobility； by which； whatever their estates suck from the people； especially if it comes equally； is digested into the better blood of that commonwealth； which is all； or the greatest； benefit they can have by accumulation。 For how unequal soever you will have them to be in their incomes； they have officers of the pomp； to bring them equal in expenses； or at least in the ostentation or show of them。 And so unless the advantage of an estate consists more in the measure than in the use of it； the authority of Venice does but enforce our agrarian； nor shall a man evade or elude the prudence of it； by the authority of any other commonwealth。 〃For if a commonwealth has been introduced at once； as those of Israel and Lacedaemon； you are certain to find her underlaid with this as the main foundation； nor； if she is obliged more to fortune than prudence； has she raised her head without musing upon this matter； as appears by that of Athens； which through her defect in this point； says Aristotle； introduced her ostracism； as most of the democracies of Greece。 But； not to restrain a fundamental of such latitude to any one kind of government； do we not yet see that if there be a sole landlord of a vast territory； he is the Turk？ that if a few landlords overbalance a populous country； they have store of servants？ that if a people be in an equal balance； they can have no lords？ that no government can otherwise be erected； than upon some one of these foundations？ that no one of these foundations （each being else apt to change into some other） can give any security to the government； unless it be fixed？ that through the want of this fixation； potent monarchy and commonwealths have fallen upon the heads of the people； and accompanied their own sad ruins with vast effusions of innocent blood？ Let the fame； as was the merit of the ancient nobility of this nation； be equal to or above what has been already said； or can be spoken； yet have we seen not only their glory but that of a throne； the most indulgent to and least invasive for so many ages upon the liberty of a people that the world has known； through the mere want of fixing her foot by a proportionable agrarian upon her proper foundation； to have fallen with such horror as has been a spectacle of astonishment to the whole earth。 And were it well argued from one calamity； that we ought not to prevent another？ Nor is Aristotle so good a commonwealths man for deriding the invention of Phaleas as in recollecting himself； where he says that democracies； when a less part of their citizens overtop the rest in wealth； degenerate into oligarchies and principalities； and； which comes nearer to the present purpose； that the greater part of the nobility of Tarentum coming accidentally to be ruined； the government of the few came by consequence to be changed into that of the many。 〃These things considered； I cannot see how an agrarian； as to the fixation or security of a government； can be less than necessary。 And if a cure be necessary； it excuses not the patient； his disease being otherwise desperate； that it is dangerous； which was the case of Rome； not so stated by Machiavel； where he says； that the strife about the agrarian caused the destruction of that commonwealth。 As if when a senator was not rich （as Crassus held） except he could pay an army； that commonwealth could expect nothing but ruin whether in strife about the agrarian； or without it。 'Of late；' says Livy； 'riches have introduced avarice； and voluptuous pleasures abounding have through lust and luxury begot a desire of lasting and destroying all good orders。' if the greatest security of a commonwealth consists in being provided with the proper antidote against this poison； her greatest danger； must be from the absence of an agrarian； which is the whole truth of the Roman example。 For the Laconic； I shall reserve the further explication of it； as my lord also did； to another place； and first see whether an agrarian proportioned to a popular government be sufficient to keep out monarchy。 My lord is for the negative； and fortified by the people of Israel electing a king。 To which I say that the action of the peo