philebus- 第5部分

to　be　distinct　from　them…and　may　therefore　be　called　a　fourth



principle？



　　Pro。　So　let　us　call　it。



　　Soc。　Quite　right；　but　now；　having　distinguished　the　four；　I　think



that　we　had　better　refresh　our　memories　by　recapitulating　each　of　them



in　order。



　　Pro。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　Then　the　first　I　will　call　the　infinite　or　unlimited；　and　the



second　the　finite　or　limited；　then　follows　the　third；　an　essence



compound　and　generated；　and　I　do　not　think　that　I　shall　be　far　wrong



in　speaking　of　the　cause　of　mixture　and　generation　as　the　fourth。



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　And　now　what　is　the　next　question；　and　how　came　we　hither？　Were



we　not　enquiring　whether　the　second　place　belonged　to　pleasure　or



wisdom？



　　Pro。　We　were。



　　Soc。　And　now；　having　determined　these　points；　shall　we　not　be　better



able　to　decide　about　the　first　and　second　place；　which　was　the



original　subject　of　dispute？



　　Pro。　I　dare　say。



　　Soc。　We　said；　if　you　remember；　that　the　mixed　life　of　pleasure　and



wisdom　was　the　conqueror…did　we　not？



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　we　see　what　is　the　place　and　nature　of　this　life　and　to



what　class　it　is　to　be　assigned？



　　Pro。　Beyond　a　doubt。



　　Soc。　This　is　evidently　comprehended　in　the　third　or　mixed　class；



which　is　not　composed　of　any　two　particular　ingredients；　but　of　all



the　elements　of　infinity；　bound　down　by　the　finite；　and　may



therefore　be　truly　said　to　comprehend　the　conqueror　life。



　　Pro。　Most　true。



　　Soc。　And　what　shall　we　say；　Philebus；　of　your　life　which　is　all



sweetness；　and　in　which　of　the　aforesaid　classes　is　that　to　be　placed？



Perhaps　you　will　allow　me　to　ask　you　a　question　before　you　answer？



　　Phi。　Let　me　hear。



　　Soc。　Have　pleasure　and　pain　a　limit；　or　do　they　belong　to　the



class　which　admits　of　more　and　less？



　　Phi。　They　belong　to　the　class　which　admits　of　more；　Socrates；　for



pleasure　would　not　be　perfectly　good　if　she　were　not　infinite　in



quantity　and　degree。



　　Soc。　Nor　would　pain；　Philebus；　be　perfectly　evil。　And　therefore



the　infinite　cannot　be　that　element　which　imparts　to　pleasure　some



degree　of　good。　But　now…admitting；　if　you　like；　that　pleasure　is　of



the　nature　of　the　infinite…in　which　of　the　aforesaid　classes；　O



Protarchus　and　Philebus；　can　we　without　irreverence　place　wisdom　and



knowledge　and　mind？　And　let　us　be　careful；　for　I　think　that　the　danger



will　be　very　serious　if　we　err　on　this　point。



　　Phi。　You　magnify；　Socrates；　the　importance　of　your　favourite　god。



　　Soc。　And　you；　my　friend；　are　also　magnifying　your　favourite　goddess；



but　still　I　must　beg　you　to　answer　the　question。



　　Pro。　Socrates　is　quite　right；　Philebus；　and　we　must　submit　to　him。



　　Phi。　And　did　not　you；　Protarchus；　propose　to　answer　in　my　place？



　　Pro。　Certainly　I　did；　but　I　am　now　in　a　great　strait；　and　I　must



entreat　you；　Socrates；　to　be　our　spokesman；　and　then　we　shall　not



say　anything　wrong　or　disrespectful　of　your　favourite。



　　Soc。　I　must　obey　you；　Protarchus；　nor　is　the　task　which　you　impose　a



difficult　one；　but　did　I　really；　as　Philebus　implies；　disconcert　you



with　my　playful　solemnity；　when　I　asked　the　question　to　what　class



mind　and　knowledge　belong？



　　Pro。　You　did；　indeed；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　Yet　the　answer　is　easy；　since　all　philosophers　assert　with



one　voice　that　mind　is　the　king　of　heaven　and　earth…in　reality　they



are　magnifying　themselves。　And　perhaps　they　are　right。　But　still　I



should　like　to　consider　the　class　of　mind；　if　you　do　not　object；　a



little　more　fully。



　　Phi。　Take　your　own　course；　Socrates；　and　never　mind　length；　we　shall



not　tire　of　you。



　　Soc。　Very　good；　let　us　begin　then；　Protarchus；　by　asking　a　question。



　　Pro。　What　question？



　　Soc。　Whether　all　this　which　they　call　the　universe　is　left　to　the



guidance　of　unreason　and　chance　medley；　or；　on　the　contrary；　as　our



fathers　have　declared；　ordered　and　governed　by　a　marvellous



intelligence　and　wisdom。



　　Pro。　Wide　asunder　are　the　two　assertions；　illustrious　Socrates；



for　that　which　you　were　just　now　saying　to　me　appears　to　be　blasphemy；



but　the　other　assertion；　that　mind　orders　all　things；　is　worthy　of　the



aspect　of　the　world；　and　of　the　sun；　and　of　the　moon；　and　of　the　stars



and　of　the　whole　circle　of　the　heavens；　and　never　will　I　say　or



think　otherwise。



　　Soc。　Shall　we　then　agree　with　them　of　old　time　in　maintaining　this



doctrine…not　merely　reasserting　the　notions　of　others；　without　risk　to



ourselves；…but　shall　we　share　in　the　danger；　and　take　our　part　of



the　reproach　which　will　await　us；　when　an　ingenious　individual



declares　that　all　is　disorder？



　　Pro。　That　would　certainly　be　my　wish。



　　Soc。　Then　now　please　to　consider　the　next　stage　of　the　argument。



　　Pro。　Let　me　hear。



　　Soc。　We　see　that　the　elements　which　enter　into　the　nature　of　the



bodies　of　all　animals；　fire；　water；　air；　and；　as　the　storm…tossed



sailor　cries；　〃land〃　＇i。e。；　earth＇；　reappear　in　the　constitution　of



the　world。



　　Pro。　The　proverb　may　be　applied　to　us；　for　truly　the　storm　gathers



over　us；　and　we　are　at　our　wit's　end。



　　Soc。　There　is　something　to　be　remarked　about　each　of　these　elements。



　　Pro。　What　is　it？



　　Soc。　Only　a　small　fraction　of　any　one　of　them　exists　in　us；　and　that



of　a　mean　sort；　and　not　in　any　way　pure；　or　having　any　power　worthy　of



its　nature。　One　instance　will　prove　this　of　all　of　them；　there　is　fire



within　us；　and　in　the　universe。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　is　not　our　fire　small　and　weak　and　mean？　But　the　fire　in



the　universe　is　wonderful　in　quantity　and　beauty；　and　in　every　power



that　fire　has。



　　Pro。　Most　true。



　　Soc。　And　is　the　fire　in　the　universe　nourished　and　generated　and



ruled　by　the　fire　in　us；　or　is　the　fire　in　you　and　me；　and　in　other



animals；　dependent　on　the　universal　fire？



　　Pro。　That　is　a　question　which　does　not　deserve　an　answer。



　　Soc。　Right；　and　you　would　say　the　same；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；　of　the



earth　which　is　in　animals　and　the　earth　which　is　in　the　universe；



and　you　would　give　a　similar　reply　about　all　the　other　elements？



　　Pro。　Why；　how　could　any　man　who　gave　any　other　be　deemed　in　his



senses？



　　Soc。　I　do　not　think　that　he　could…but　now　go　on　to　the　next　step。



When　we　saw　those　elements　of　which　we　have　been　speaking　gathered



up　in　one；　did　we　not　call　them　a　body？



　　Pro。　We　did。



　　Soc。　And　the　same　may　be　said　of　the　cosmos；　which　for　the　same



reason　may　be　considered　to　be　a　body；　because　made　up　of　the　same



elements。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　But　is　our　body　nourished　wholly　by　this　body；　or　is　this



body　nourished　by　our　body；　thence　deriving　and　having　the　qualities



of　which　we　were　just　now　speaking？



　　Pro。　That　again；　Socrates；　is　a　question　which　does　not　deserve　to



be　asked。



　　Soc。　Well；　tell　me；　is　this　question　worth　asking？



　　Pro。　What　question？



　　Soc。　May　our　body　be　said　to　have　a　soul？



　　Pro。　Clearly。



　　Soc。　And　whence　comes　that　soul；　my　dear　Protarchus；　unless　the　body



of　the　universe；　which　contains　elements　like　those　in　our　bodies



but　in　every　way　fairer；　had　also　a　soul？　Can　there　be　another　source？



　　Pro。　Clearly；　Socrates；　that　is　the　only　source。



　　Soc。　Why；　yes；　Protarchus；　for　surely　we　cannot　imagine　that　of



the　four　classes；　the　finite；　the　infinite；　the　composition　of　the



two；　and　the　cause；　the　fourth；　which　enters　into　all　things；　giving



to　our　bodies　souls；　and　the　art　of　self…management；　and　of　healing



disease；　and　operating　in　other　ways　to　heal　and　organize；　having



too　all　the　attributes　of　wisdom；…we　cannot；　I　say；　imagine　that



whereas　the　self…same　elements　exist；　both　in　the　entire　heaven　and　in



great　provinces　of　the　heaven；　only　fairer　and　purer；　this　last　should



not　also　in　that　higher　sphere　have　designed　the　noblest　and　fairest



things？



　　Pro。　Such　a　supposition　is　quite　unreasonable。



　　Soc。　Then　if　this　be　denied；　should　we　not　be　wise　in　adopting　the



other　view　and　maintaining　that　there　is　in　the　universe　a　mighty



infinite　and　an　adequate　limit；　of　which　we　have　often　spoken；　as　well



as　a　presiding　cause　of　no　mean　power；　which　orders　and　arranges　years



and　seasons　and　months；　and　may　be　justly　called　wisdom　and　mind？



　　Pro。　Most　justly。



　　Soc。　And　wisdom　and　mind　cannot　exist　without　soul？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　And　in　the　divine　nature　of　Zeus　would　you　not　say　that　there



is　the　soul　and　mind　of　a　king；　because　there　is　in　him　the　power　of



the　cause？　And　other　gods　have　other　attributes；　by　which　they　are



pleased　to　be　called。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　Do　not　then　suppose　that　these　words　are　rashly　spoken　by　us；　O



Protarchus；　for　they　are　in　harmony　with　the　testimony　of　those　who



said　of　old　time　that　mind　rules　the　universe。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　they　furnish　an　answer　to　my　enquiry；　for　they　imply　that



mind　is　the　parent　of　that　class　of　the　four　which　we　called　the　cause



of　all；　and　I　think　that　you　now　have　my　answer。



　　Pro。　I　have　indeed；　and　yet　I　did　not　observe　that　you　had　answered。



　　Soc。　A　jest　is　sometimes　refreshing；　Protarchus；　when　it



interrupts　earnest。



　　Pro。　Very　true。



　　Soc。　I　think；　friend；　that　we　have　now　pretty　clearly　set　forth



the　class　to　which　mind　belongs　and　what　is　the　power　of　mind。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　class　to　which　pleasure　belongs　has　also　been　long



ago　discovered？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　let　us　remember；　too；　of　both　of　them；　（1）　that　mind　was



akin　to　the　cause　and　of　this　family；　and　（2）　that　pleasure　is



infinite　and　belongs　to　the　class　which　neither　has；　nor　ever　will



have　in　itself；　a　beginning；　middle；　or　end　of　its　own。



　　Pro。　I　shall　be　sure　to　remember。



　　Soc。　We　must　next　examine　what　is　their　place　and　unde