philebus- 第3部分

have　one　genus　and　many　species＇；　and　are　not　at　once　infinite；　and



what　number　of　species　is　to　be　assigned　to　either　of　them　before　they



pass　into　infinity。



　　Pro。　That　is　a　very　serious　question；　Philebus；　to　which　Socrates



has　ingeniously　brought　us　round；　and　please　to　consider　which　of　us



shall　answer　him；　there　may　be　something　ridiculous　in　my　being　unable



to　answer；　and　therefore　imposing　the　task　upon　you；　when　I　have



undertaken　the　whole　charge　of　the　argument；　but　if　neither　of　us　were



able　to　answer；　the　result　methinks　would　be　still　more　ridiculous。



Let　us　consider；　then；　what　we　are　to　do：…Socrates；　if　I　understood



him　rightly；　is　asking　whether　there　are　not　kinds　of　pleasure；　and



what　is　the　number　and　nature　of　them；　and　the　same　of　wisdom。



　　Soc。　Most　true；　O　son　of　Callias；　and　the　previous　argument　showed



that　if　we　are　not　able　to　tell　the　kinds　of　everything　that　has



unity；　likeness；　sameness；　or　their　opposites；　none　of　us　will　be　of



the　smallest　use　in　any　enquiry。



　　Pro。　That　seems　to　be　very　near　the　truth；　Socrates。　Happy　would　the



wise　man　be　if　he　knew　all　things；　and　the　next　best　thing　for　him



is　that　he　should　know　himself。　Why　do　I　say　so　at　this　moment？　I　will



tell　you。　You；　Socrates；　have　granted　us　this　opportunity　of



conversing　with　you；　and　are　ready　to　assist　us　in　determining　what　is



the　best　of　human　goods。　For　when　Philebus　said　that　pleasure　and



delight　and　enjoyment　and　the　like　were　the　chief　good；　you



answered…No；　not　those；　but　another　class　of　goods；　and　we　are



constantly　reminding　ourselves　of　what　you　said；　and　very　properly；　in



order　that　we　may　not　forget　to　examine　and　compare　the　two。　And　these



goods；　which　in　your　opinion　are　to　be　designated　as　superior　to



pleasure；　and　are　the　true　objects　of　pursuit；　are　mind　and



knowledge　and　understanding　and　art　and　the　like。　There　was　a



dispute　about　which　were　the　best；　and　we　playfully　threatened　that



you　should　not　be　allowed　to　go　home　until　the　question　was　settled；



and　you　agreed；　and　placed　yourself　at　our　disposal。　And　now；　as



children　say；　what　has　been　fairly　given　cannot　be　taken　back；　cease



then　to　fight　against　us　in　this　way。



　　Soc。　In　what　way？



　　Phi。　Do　not　perplex　us；　and　keep　asking　questions　of　us　to　which



we　have　not　as　yet　any　sufficient　answer　to　give；　let　us　not　imagine



that　a　general　puzzling　of　us　all　is　to　be　the　end　of　our



discussion；　but　if　we　are　unable　to　answer；　do　you　answer；　as　you　have



promised。　Consider；　then；　whether　you　will　divide　pleasure　and



knowledge　according　to　their　kinds；　or　you　may　let　the　matter　drop；　if



you　are　able　and　willing　to　find　some　other　mode　of　clearing　up　our



controversy。



　　Soc。　If　you　say　that；　I　have　nothing　to　apprehend；　for　the　words　〃if



you　are　willing〃　dispel　all　my　fear；　and；　moreover；　a　god　seems　to



have　recalled　something　to　my　mind。



　　Phi。　What　is　that？



　　Soc。　I　remember　to　have　heard　long　ago　certain　discussions　about



pleasure　and　wisdom；　whether　awake　or　in　a　dream　I　cannot　tell；　they



were　to　the　effect　that　neither　the　one　nor　the　other　of　them　was



the　good；　but　some　third　thing；　which　was　different　from　them；　and



better　than　either。　If　this　be　clearly　established；　then　pleasure　will



lose　the　victory；　for　the　good　will　cease　to　be　identified　with



her：…Am　I　not　right？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　there　will　cease　to　be　any　need　of　distinguishing　the　kinds



of　pleasures；　as　I　am　inclined　to　think；　but　this　will　appear　more



clearly　as　we　proceed。



　　Pro。　Capital；　Socrates；　pray　go　on　as　you　propose。



　　Soc。　But；　let　us　first　agree　on　some　little　points。



　　Pro。　What　are　they？



　　Soc。　Is　the　good　perfect　or　imperfect？



　　Pro。　The　most　perfect；　Socrates；　of　all　things。



　　Soc。　And　is　the　good　sufficient？



　　Pro。　Yes；　certainly；　and　in　a　degree　surpassing　all　other　things。



　　Soc。　And　no　one　can　deny　that　all　percipient　beings　desire　and



hunt　after　good；　and　are　eager　to　catch　and　have　the　good　about



them；　and　care　not　for　the　attainment　of　anything　which　its　not



accompanied　by　good。



　　Pro。　That　is　undeniable。



　　Soc。　Now　let　us　part　off　the　life　of　pleasure　from　the　life　of



wisdom；　and　pass　them　in　review。



　　Pro。　How　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Let　there　be　no　wisdom　in　the　life　of　pleasure；　nor　any



pleasure　in　the　life　of　wisdom；　for　if　either　of　them　is　the　chief



good；　it　cannot　be　supposed　to　want　anything；　but　if　either　is　shown



to　want　anything；　then　it　cannot　really　be　the　chief　good。



　　Pro。　Impossible。



　　Soc。　And　will　you　help　us　to　test　these　two　lives？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Then　answer。



　　Pro。　Ask。



　　Soc。　Would　you　choose；　Protarchus；　to　live　all　your　life　long　in　the



enjoyment　of　the　greatest　pleasures？



　　Pro。　Certainly　I　should。



　　Soc。　Would　you　consider　that　there　was　still　anything　wanting　to　you



if　you　had　perfect　pleasure？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　Reflect；　would　you　not　want　wisdom　and　intelligence　and



forethought；　and　similar　qualities？　would　you　not　at　any　rate　want



sight？



　　Pro。　Why　should　I？　Having　pleasure　I　should　have　all　things。



　　Soc。　Living　thus；　you　would　always　throughout　your　life　enjoy　the



greatest　pleasures？



　　Pro。　I　should。



　　Soc。　But　if　you　had　neither　mind；　nor　memory；　nor　knowledge；　nor



true　opinion；　you　would　in　the　first　place　be　utterly　ignorant　of



whether　you　were　pleased　or　not；　because　you　would　be　entirely



devoid　of　intelligence。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　similarly；　if　you　had　no　memory　you　would　not　recollect



that　you　had　ever　been　pleased；　nor　would　the　slightest　recollection



of　the　pleasure　which　you　feel　at　any　moment　remain　with　you；　and　if



you　had　no　true　opinion　you　would　not　think　that　you　were　pleased　when



you　were；　and　if　you　had　no　power　of　calculation　you　would　not　be　able



to　calculate　on　future　pleasure；　and　your　life　would　be　the　life；



not　of　a　man；　but　of　an　oyster　or　pulmo　marinus。　Could　this　be



otherwise？



　　Pro。　No。



　　Soc。　But　is　such　a　life　eligible？



　　Pro。　I　cannot　answer　you；　Socrates；　the　argument　has　taken　away　from



me　the　power　of　speech。



　　Soc。　We　must　keep　up　our　spirits；…let　us　now　take　the　life　of　mind



and　examine　it　in　turn。



　　Pro。　And　what　is　this　life　of　mind？



　　Soc。　I　want　to　know　whether　any　one　of　us　would　consent　to　live；



having　wisdom　and　mind　and　knowledge　and　memory　of　all　things；　but



having　no　sense　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　wholly　unaffected　by　these



and　the　like　feelings？



　　Pro。　Neither　life；　Socrates；　appears　eligible　to　me；　or　is　likely；



as　I　should　imagine；　to　be　chosen　by　any　one　else。



　　Soc。　What　would　you　say；　Protarchus；　to　both　of　these　in　one；　or



to　one　that　was　made　out　of　the　union　of　the　two？



　　Pro。　Out　of　the　union；　that　is；　of　pleasure　with　mind　and　wisdom？



　　Soc。　Yes；　that　is　the　life　which　I　mean。



　　Pro。　There　can　be　no　difference　of　opinion；　not　some　but　all　would



surely　choose　this　third　rather　than　either　of　the　other　two；　and　in



addition　to　them。



　　Soc。　But　do　you　see　the　consequence？



　　Pro。　To　be　sure　I　do。　The　consequence　is；　that　two　out　of　the



three　lives　which　have　been　proposed　are　neither　sufficient　nor



eligible　for　man　or　for　animal。



　　Soc。　Then　now　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　neither　of　them　has　the



good；　for　the　one　which　had　would　certainly　have　been　sufficient　and



perfect　and　eligible　for　every　living　creature　or　thing　that　was



able　to　live　such　a　life；　and　if　any　of　us　had　chosen　any　other；　he



would　have　chosen　contrary　to　the　nature　of　the　truly　eligible；　and



not　of　his　own　free　will；　but　either　through　ignorance　or　from　some



unhappy　necessity。



　　Pro。　Certainly　that　seems　to　be　true。



　　Soc。　And　now　have　I　not　sufficiently　shown　that　Philebus；　goddess　is



not　to　be　regarded　as　identical　with　the　good？



　　Phi。　Neither　is　your　〃mind〃　the　good；　Socrates；　for　that　will　be



open　to　the　same　objections。



　　Soc。　Perhaps；　Philebus；　you　may　be　right　in　saying　so　of　my



〃mind〃；　but　of　the　true；　which　is　also　the　divine　mind；　far　otherwise。



However；　I　will　not　at　present　claim　the　first　place　for　mind　as



against　the　mixed　life；　but　we　must　come　to　some　understanding　about



the　second　place。　For　you　might　affirm　pleasure　and　I　mind　to　be　the



cause　of　the　mixed　life；　and　in　that　case　although　neither　of　them



would　be　the　good；　one　of　them　might　be　imagined　to　be　the　cause　of



the　good。　And　I　might　proceed　further　to　argue　in　opposition　to



Phoebus；　that　the　element　which　makes　this　mixed　life　eligible　and



good；　is　more　akin　and　more　similar　to　mind　than　to　pleasure。　And　if



this　is　true；　pleasure　cannot　be　truly　said　to　share　either　in　the



first　or　second　place；　and　does　not；　if　I　may　trust　my　own　mind；



attain　even　to　the　third。



　　Pro。　Truly；　Socrates；　pleasure　appears　to　me　to　have　had　a　fall；



in　fighting　for　the　palm；　she　has　been　smitten　by　the　argument；　and　is



laid　low。　I　must　say　that　mind　would　have　fallen　too；　and　may



therefore　be　thought　to　show　discretion　in　not　putting　forward　a



similar　claim。　And　if　pleasure　were　deprived　not　only　of　the　first　but



of　the　second　place；　she　would　be　terribly　damaged　in　the　eyes　of



her　admirers；　for　not　even　to　them　would　she　still　appear　as　fair　as



before。



　　Soc。　Well；　but　had　we　not　better　leave　her　now；　and　not　pain　her



by　applying　the　crucial　test；　and　finally　detecting　her？



　　Pro。　Nonsense；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　Why？　because　I　said　that　we　had　better　not　pain　pleasure；　which



is　an　impossibility？



　　Pro。　Yes；　and　more　than　that；　because　you　do　not　seem　to　be　aware



that　none　of　us　will　let　you　go　home　until　you　have　finished　the



argument。



　　Soc。　Heavens！　Protarchus；　that　will　be　a　tedious　business；　and



just　at　p