of London。 In the trade； therefore； to which those regulations
confine the merchant of Hamburg； his capital can keep in constant
employment a much greater quantity of German industry than it
possibly could have done in the trade from which he is excluded。
Though the one employment； therefore； may to him perhaps be less
profitable than the other； it cannot be less advantageous to his
country。 It is quite otherwise with the employment into which the
monopoly naturally attracts； if I may say so； the capital of the
London merchant。 That employment may； perhaps； be more profitable
to him than the greater part of other employments； but； on
account of the slowness of the returns； it cannot be more
advantageous to his country。
After all the unjust attempts； therefore； of every country
in Europe to engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade
of its own colonies； no country has yet been able to engross
itself anything but the expense of supporting in time of peace
and of defending in time of war the oppressive authority which it
assumes over them。 The inconveniencies resulting from the
possession of its colonies； every country has engrossed to itself
completely。 The advantages resulting from their trade it has been
obliged to share with many other countries。
At first sight； no doubt； the monopoly of the great commerce
of America naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest
value。 To the undiscerning eye of giddy ambition； it naturally
presents itself amidst the confused scramble of politics and war
as a very dazzling object to fight for。 The dazzling splendour of
the object； however； the immense greatness of the commerce； is
the very quality which renders the monopoly of it hurtful； or
which makes one employment； in its own nature necessarily less
advantageous to the country than the greater part of other
employments； absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of
the country than what would otherwise have gone to it。
The mercantile stock of every country； it has been shown in
the second book； naturally seeks； if one may say so； the
employment most advantageous to that country。 If it is employed
in the carrying trade； the country to which it belongs becomes
the emporium of the goods of all the countries whose trade that
stock carries on。 But the owner of that stock necessarily wishes
to dispose of as great a part of those goods as he can at home。
He thereby saves himself the trouble； risk； and expense of
exportation； and he will upon that account be glad to sell them
at home； not only for a much smaller price； but with somewhat a
smaller profit than he might expect to make by sending them
abroad。 He naturally； therefore； endeavours as much as he can to
turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade of consumption。 If
his stock； again； is employed in a foreign trade of consumption；
he will； for the same reason； be glad to dispose of at home as
great a part as he can of the home goods； which he collects in
order to export to some foreign market； and he will thus
endeavour； as much as he can； to turn his foreign trade of
consumption into a home trade。 The mercantile stock of every
country naturally courts in this manner the near； and shuns the
distant employment； naturally courts the employment in which the
returns are frequent； and shuns that in which they are distant
and slow； naturally courts the employment in which it can
maintain the greatest quantity of productive labour in the
country to which it belongs； or in which its owner resides； and
shuns that in which it can maintain there the smallest quantity。
It naturally courts the employment which in ordinary cases is
most advantageous； and shuns that which in ordinary cases is
least advantageous to that country。
But if in any of those distant employments； which in
ordinary cases are less advantageous to the country； the profit
should happen to rise somewhat higher than what is sufficient to
balance the natural preference which is given to nearer
employments； this superiority of profit will draw stock from
those nearer employments； till the profits of all return to their
proper level。 This superiority of profit； however； is a proof
that； in the actual circumstances of the society； those distant
employments are somewhat understocked in proportion to other
employments； and that the stock of the society is not distributed
in the properest manner among all the different employments
carried on in it。 It is a proof that something is either bought
cheaper or sold dearer than it ought to be； and that some
particular class of citizens is more or less oppressed either by
paying more or by getting less than what is suitable to that
equality which ought to take place； and which naturally does take
place among all the different classes of them。 Though the same
capital never will maintain the same quantity of productive
labour in a distant as in a near employment； yet a distant
employment may be as necessary for the welfare of the society as
a near one； the goods which the distant employment deals in being
necessary； perhaps； for carrying on many of the nearer
employments。 But if the profits of those who deal in such goods
are above their proper level； those goods will be sold dearer
than they ought to be； or somewhat above their natural price； and
all those engaged in the nearer employments will be more or less
oppressed by this high price。 Their interest； therefore； in this
case requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those
nearer employments； and turned towards that distant one； in order
to reduce its profits to their proper level； and the price of the
goods which it deals in to their natural price。 In this
extraordinary case； the public interest requires that some stock
should be withdrawn from those employments which in ordinary
cases are more advantageous； and turned towards one which in
ordinary cases is less advantageous to the public； and in this
extraordinary case the natural interests and inclinations of men
coincide as exactly with the public interest as in all other
ordinary cases； and lead them to withdraw stock from the near；
and to turn it towards the distant employment。
It is thus that the private interests and passions of
individuals naturally dispose them to turn their stocks towards
the employments which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to
the society。 But if from this natural preference they should turn
too much of it towards those employments； the fall of profit in
them and the rise of it in all others immediately dispose them to
alter this faulty distribution。 Without any intervention of law；
therefore； the private interests and passions of men naturally
lead them to divide and distribute the stock of every society
among all the different employments carried on in it as nearly as
possible in the proportion which is most agreeable to the
interest of the whole society。
All the different regulations of the mercantile system
necessarily derange more or less this natural and most
advantageous distribution of stock。 But those which concern the
trade to America and the East Indies derange it perhaps more than
any other； because the trade to those two great continents
absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches
of trade。 The regulations； however； by which this derangement is
effected in those two different branches of trade are not
altogether the same。 Monopoly is the great engine of both； but it
is a different sort of monopoly。 Monopoly of one kind or another；
indeed； seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system。
In the trade to America every nation endeavours to engross
as much as possible the whole market of its own colonies by
fairly excluding all other nations from any direct trade to them。
During the greater part of the sixteenth century； the Portuguese
endeavoured to manage the trade to the East Indies in the same
manner； by claiming the sole right of sailing in the Indian seas；
on account of the merit of having first found out the road to
them。 The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European
nations from any direct trade to their spice islands。 Monopolies
of this kind are evidently established against all other European
nations； who are thereby not only excluded from a trade to which
it might be convenient for them to turn some part of their stock；
but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals in
somewhat dearer than if they could import them themselves
directly from the countries which produce them。
But since the fall of the power of Portugal； no European
nation has claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian
seas； of which the principal ports are now open to the ships of
all European nations。 Except in Portugal； however； and within
these few years in France； the trade to the East Indies has in
every European country been subjected to an exclusive company。
Monopolies of this kind are properly established against the very
nation which erects them。 The greater part of that nation are
thereby not only excluded from a trade to which it might be
convenient for them to turn some part of their stock； but are
obliged to buy the goods which that trade deals somewhat dearer
than if it was open and free to all their countrymen。 Since the
establishment of the English East India Company； for example； the
other inhabitants of England； over and above being excluded from
the trade； must have paid in the price of the East India goods
which they have consumed； not only for all the extraordinary
profits which the company may have made upon those goods in
consequence of their monopoly； but for all the extraordinary
waste which the fraud and abuse； inseparable from the management
of the affairs of so great a company； must necessarily have
occasioned。 The absurdity of this second kind of monopoly；
therefore； is much more manifest than that of the first。
Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the
natural distribution of the stock of the society； but they do