hyself； what proper virtue nature hath furnished man with； against such a vice； or to encounter with a disposition vicious in this kind。 As for example； against the unthankful； it hath given goodness and meekness； as an antidote； and so against another vicious in another kind some other peculiar faculty。 And generally； is it not in thy power to instruct him better； that is in an error？ For whosoever sinneth； doth in that decline from his purposed end； and is certainly deceived； And again； what art thou the worse for his sin？ For thou shalt not find that any one of these； against whom thou art incensed； hath in very deed done anything whereby thy mind （the only true subject of thy hurt and evil） can be made worse than it was。 And what a matter of either grief or wonder is this； if he that is unlearned； do the deeds of one that is unlearned？ Should not thou rather blame thyself； who； when upon very good grounds of reason； thou mightst have thought it very probable； that such a thing would by such a one be committed； didst not only not foresee it； but moreover dost wonder at it； that such a thing should be。 But then especially； when thou dost find fault with either an unthankful； or a false man； must thou reflect upon thyself。 For without all question； thou thyself art much in fault； if either of one that were of such a disposition； thou didst expect that he should be true unto thee： or when unto any thou didst a good turn； thou didst not there bound thy thoughts； as one that had obtained his end； nor didst not think that from the action itself thou hadst received a full reward of the good that thou hadst done。 For what wouldst thou have more？ Unto him that is a man； thou hast done a good turn： doth not that suffice thee？ What thy nature required； that hast thou done。 Must thou be rewarded for it？ As if either the eye for that it seeth； or the feet that they go； should require satisfaction。 For as these being by nature appointed for such an use； can challenge no more； than that they may work according to their natural constitution： so man being born to do good unto others whensoever he doth a real good unto any by helping them out of error； or though but in middle things； as in matter of wealth； life； preferment； and the like； doth help to further their desires he doth that for which he was made； and therefore can require no more。
THE TENTH BOOK
I。 O my soul； the time I trust will be； when thou shalt be good； simple； single； more open and visible； than that body by which it is enclosed。 Thou wilt one day be sensible of their happincss； whose end is love； and their affections dead to all worldly things。 Thou shalt one day be full； and in want of no external thing： not seeking pleasure from anything； either living or insensible； that this world can afford； neither wanting time for the continuation of thy pleasure； nor place and opportunity； nor the favour either of the weather or of men。 When thou shalt have content in thy present estate； and all things present shall add to thy content： when thou shalt persuade thyself； that thou hast all things； all for thy good； and all by the providence of the Gods： and of things future also shalt be as confident； that all will do well； as tending to the maintenance and preservation in some sort； of his perfect welfare and happiness； who is perfection of life； of goodness； and beauty； who begets all things； and containeth all things in himself； and in himself doth recollect all things from all places that are dissolved； that of them he may beget others again like unto them。 Such one day shall be thy disposition； that thou shalt be able； both in regard of the Gods； and in regard of men； so to fit and order thy conversation； as neither to complain of them at any time； for anything that they do； nor to do anything thyself； for which thou mayest justly be condemned。
II。 As one who is altogether governed by nature； let it be thy care to observe what it is that thy nature in general doth require。 That done； if thou find not that thy nature； as thou art a living sensible creature； will be the worse for it； thou mayest proceed。 Next then thou must examine； what thy nature as thou art a living sensible creature； doth require。 And that； whatsoever it be； thou mayest admit of and do it； if thy nature as thou art a reasonable living creature； will not be the worse for it。 Now whatsoever is reasonable； is also sociable； Keep thyself to these rules； and trouble not thyself about idle things。
III。 Whatsoever doth happen unto thee； thou art naturally by thy natural constitution either able； or not able to bear。 If thou beest able； be not offended； but bear it according to thy natural constitution； or as nature hath enabled thee。 If thou beest not able； be not offended。 For it will soon make an end of thee； and itself； （whatsoever it be） at the same time end with thee。 But remember； that whatsoever by the strength of opinion； grounded upon a certain apprehension of both true profit and duty； thou canst conceive tolerable； that thou art able to bear that by thy natural constitution。
IV。 Him that offends； to teach with love and meek ness； and to show him his error。 But if thou canst not； then to blame thyself； or rather not thyself neither； if thy will and endeavours have not been wanting。
V。 Whatsoever it be that happens unto thee； it is that which from all time was appointed unto thee。 For by the same coherence of causes； by which thy substance from all eternity was appointed to be； was also whatsoever should happen unto it； destinated and appointed。
VI。 Either with Epicurus； we must fondly imagine the atoms to be the cause of all things； or we must needs grant a nature。 Let this then be thy first ground； that thou art part of that universe； which is governed by nature。 Then secondly； that to those parts that are of the same kind and nature as thou art； thou hast relation of kindred。 For of these； if I shall always be mindful； first as I am a part； I shall never be displeased with anything； that falls to my particular share of the common chances of the world。 For nothing that is behoveful unto the whole； can be truly hurtful to that which is part of it。 For this being the common privilege of all natures； that they contain nothing in themselves that is hurtful unto them； it cannot be that the nature of the universe （whose privilege beyond other particular natures； is； that she cannot against her will by any higher external cause be constrained；） should beget anything and cherish it in her bosom that should tend to her own hurt and prejudice。 As then I bear in mind that I am a part of such an universe； I shall not be displeased with anything that happens。 And as I have relation of kindred to those parts that are of the same kind and nature that I am； so I shall be careful to do nothing that is prejudicial to the community； but in all my deliberations shall they that are of my kind ever be； and the common good； that； which all my intentions and resolutions shall drive unto； as that which is contrary unto it； I shall by all means endeavour to prevent and avoid。 These things once so fixed and concluded； as thou wouldst think him a happy citizen； whose constant study and practice were for the good and benefit of his fellow citizens； and the carriage of the city such towards him； that he were well pleased with it ； so must it needs be with thee； that thou shalt live a happy life。
VII。 All parts of the world； （all things I mean that are contained within the whole world； must of necessity at some time or other come to corruption。 Alteration I should say； to speak truly and properly； but that I may be the better understood； I am content at this time to use that more common word。 Now say I； if so be that this be both hurtful unto them； and yet unavoidable； would not； thinkest thou； the whole itself be in a sweet case； all the parts of it being subject to alteration； yea and by their making itself fitted for corruption； as consisting of things different and contrary？ And did nature then either of herself thus project and purpose the affliction and misery of her parts； and therefore of purpose so made them； not only that haply they might； but of necessity that they should fall into evil； or did not she know what she did； when she made them？ For either of these two to say； is equally absurd。 But to let pass nature in general； and to reason of things particular according to their own particular natures； how absurd and ridiculous is it； first to say that all parts of the whole are； by their proper natural constitution； subject to alteration； and then when any such thing doth happen； as when one doth fall sick and dieth； to take on and wonder as though some strange thing had happened？ Though this besides might move not so grievously to take on when any such thing doth happen； that whatsoever is dissolved； it is dissolved into those things； whereof it was compounded。 For every dissolution is either a mere dispersion； of the elements into those elements again whereof everything did consist； or a change； of that which is more solid into earth； and of that which is pure and subtile or spiritual； into air。 So that by this means nothing is lost； but all resumed again into those rational generative seeds of the universe； and this universe； either after a certain period of time to lie consumed by fire； or by continual changes to be renewed； and so for ever to endure。 Now that solid and spiritual that we speak of； thou must not conceive it to be that very same； which at first was； when thou wert born。 For alas！ all this that now thou art in either kind； either for matter of substance； or of life； hath but two or three days ago partly from meats eaten； and partly from air breathed in； received all its influx； being the same then in no other respect； than a running river； maintained by the perpetual influx and new supply of waters； is the same。 That therefore which thou hast since received； not that which came from thy mother； is that which comes to change and corruption。 But suppose that that for the general substance； and more solid part of it； should still cleave unto thee never so close； yet what is that to the proper qualities and affections of it； by which persons are distinguished； which certainly