n it is； that thou doest （as much as lieth in thee） cut off； and in some sort violently take somewhat away； as often as thou art displeased with anything that happeneth。
IX。 Be not discontented； be not disheartened； be not out of hope； if often it succeed not so well with thee punctually and precisely to do all things according to the right dogmata； but being once cast off； return unto them again： and as for those many and more frequent occurrences； either of worldly distractions； or human infirmities； which as a man thou canst not but in some measure be subject unto； be not thou discontented with them； but however； love and affect that only which thou dust return unto： a philosopher's life； and proper occupation after the most exact manner。 And when thou dust return to thy philosophy； return not unto it as the manner of some is； after play and liberty as it were； to their schoolmasters and pedagogues； but as they that have sore eyes to their sponge and egg： or as another to his cataplasm； or as others to their fomentations： so shalt not thou make it a matter of ostentation at all to obey reason but of ease and comfort。 And remember that philosophy requireth nothing of thee； but what thy nature requireth； and wouldest thou thyself desire anything that is not according to nature？ for which of these sayest thou； that which is according to nature or against it； is of itself more kind and pleasing？ Is it not for that respect especially； that pleasure itself is to so many men's hurt and overthrow； most prevalent； because esteemed commonly most kind； and natural？ But consider well whether magnanimity rather； and true liberty； and true simplicity； and equanimity； and holiness； whether these be not most kind and natural？ And prudency itself； what more kind and amiable than it； when thou shalt truly consider with thyself； what it is through all the proper objects of thy rational intellectual faculty currently to go on without any fall or stumble？ As for the things of the world； their true nature is in a manner so involved with obscurity； that unto many philosophers； and those no mean ones； they seemed altogether incomprehensible。 and the Stoics themselves； though they judge them not altogether incomprehensible； yet scarce and not without much difficulty； comprehensible； so that all assent of ours is fallible； for who is he that is infallible in his conclusions？ 》From the nature of things； pass now unto their subjects and matter： how temporary； how vile are they I such as may be in the power and possession of some abominable loose liver； of some common strumpet； of some notorious oppressor and extortioner。 Pass from thence to the dispositions of them that thou doest ordinarily converse with； how hardly do we bear； even with the most loving and amiable！ that I may not say； how hard it is for us to bear even with our own selves； in such obscurity； and impurity of things： in such and so continual a flux both of the substances and time； both of the motions themselves； and things moved； what it is that we can fasten upon； either to honour； and respect especially； or seriously； and studiously to seek after； I cannot so much as conceive For indeed they are things contrary。 X。 Thou must comfort thyself in the expectation of thy natural dissolution； and in the meantime not grieve at the delay； but rest contented in those two things。 First； that nothing shall happen unto thee； which is not according to the nature of the universe。 Secondly； that it is in thy power； to do nothing against thine own proper God； and inward spirit。 For it is not in any man's power to constrain thee to transgress against him。 XI。 What is the use that now at this present I make of my soul？ Thus from time to time and upon all occasions thou must put this question to thyself； what is now that part of mine which they call the rational mistress part； employed about？ Whose soul do I now properly possess？ a child's？ or a youth's？ a woman's？ or a tyrant's？ some brute； or some wild beast's soul？ XII。 What those things are in themselves； which by the greatest part are esteemed good； thou mayest gather even from this。 For if a man shall hear things mentioned as good； which are really good indeed； such as are prudence； temperance； justice； fortitude； after so much heard and conceived； he cannot endure to hear of any more； for the word good is properly spoken of them。 But as for those which by the vulgar are esteemed good； if he shall hear them mentioned as good； he doth hearken for more。 He is well contented to hear； that what is spoken by the comedian； is but familiarly and popularly spoken； so that even the vulgar apprehend the difference。 For why is it else； that this offends not and needs not to be excused； when virtues are styled good： but that which is spoken in commendation of wealth； pleasure； or honour； we entertain it only as merrily and pleasantly spoken？ Proceed therefore； and inquire further； whether it may not be that those things also which being mentioned upon the stage were merrily； and with great applause of the multitude； scoffed at with this jest； that they that possessed them had not in all the world of their own； （such was their affluence and plenty） so much as a place where to avoid their excrements。 Whether； I say； those ought not also in very deed to be much respected； and esteemed of； as the only things that are truly good。
XIII。 All that I consist of； is either form or matter。 No corruption can reduce either of these unto nothing： for neither did I of nothing become a subsistent creature。 Every part of mine then。 will by mutation be disposed into a certain part of the whole world； and that in time into another part； and so in infinitum； by which kind of mutation； I also became what I am； and so did they that begot me； and they before them； and so upwards in infinitum。 For so we may be allowed to speak； though the age and government of the world； be to some certain periods of time limited； and confined。 XIV。 Reason； and rational power； are faculties which content themselves with themselves； and their own proper operations。 And as for their first inclination and motion； that they take from themselves。 But their progress is right to the end and object； which is in their way； as it were； and lieth just before them： that is； which is feasible and possible； whether it be that which at the first they proposed to themselves； or no。 For which reason also such actions are termed katorqwseiz to intimate the directness of the way； by which they are achieved。 Nothing must be thought to belong to a man； which doth not belong unto him as he is a man。 These； the event of purposes； are not things required in a man。 The nature of man doth not profess any such things。 The final ends and consummations of actions are nothing at all to a man's nature。 The end therefore of a man； or the summum bonum whereby that end is fulfilled； cannot consist in the consummation of actions purposed and intended。 Again； concerning these outward worldly things； were it so that any of them did properly belong unto man； then would it not belong unto man； to condemn them and to stand in opposition with them。 Neither would he be praiseworthy that can live without them； or he good； （if these were good indeed） who of his own accord doth deprive himself of any of them。 But we see contrariwise； that the more a man doth withdraw himself from these wherein external pomp and greatness doth consist； or any other like these； or the better he doth bear with the loss of these； the better he is accounted。
XV。 Such as thy thoughts and ordinary cogitations are； such will thy mind be in time。 For the soul doth as it were receive its tincture from the fancies； and imaginations。 Dye it therefore and thoroughly soak it with the assiduity of these cogitations。 As for example。 Wheresoever thou mayest live； there it is in thy power to live well and happy。 But thou mayest live at the Court； there then also mayest thou live well and happy。 Again； that which everything is made for； he is also made unto that； and cannot but naturally incline unto it。 That which anything doth naturally incline unto； therein is his end。 Wherein the end of everything doth consist； therein also doth his good and benefit consist。 Society therefore is the proper good of a rational creature。 For that we are made for society； it hath long since been demonstrated。 Or can any man make any question of this； that whatsoever is naturally worse and inferior； is ordinarily subordinated to that which is better？ and that those things that are best； are made one for another？ And those things that have souls； are better than those that have none？ and of those that have； those best that have rational souls？
XVI。 To desire things impossible is the part of a mad man。 But it is a thing impossible； that wicked man should not commit some such things。 Neither doth anything happen to any man； which in the ordinary course of nature as natural unto him doth not happen。 Again； the same things happen unto others also。 And truly； if either he that is ignorant that such a thing hath happened unto him； or he that is ambitious to be commended for his magnanimity； can be patient； and is not grieved： is it not a grievous thing； that either ignorance； or a vain desire to please and to be commended； should be more powerful and effectual than true prudence？ As for the things themselves； they touch not the soul； neither can they have any access unto it： neither can they of themselves any ways either affect it； or move it。 For she herself alone can affect and move herself； and according as the dogmata and opinions are； which she doth vouchsafe herself； so are those things which； as accessories； have any co…existence with her。
XVII。 After one consideration； man is nearest unto us； as we are bound to do them good； and to bear with them。 But as he may oppose any of our true proper actions； so man is unto me but as a thing indifferent： even as the sun； or the wind； or some wild beast。 By some of these it may be； that some operation or other of mine； may be hindered； however； of my mind and resolution itself； there can be no let or impediment； by reason of that ordinary constant both exception （or reservation wherewith it inclineth） and ready conv