more perspicacity and solidity； or more integrity and wisdom
in pronouncing judgment。 For this reason I have no doubt that
if you deign to take the trouble in the first place of
correcting this work （for being conscious not only of my
infirmity； but also of my ignorance； I should not dare to
state that it was free from errors）； and then； after adding to
it these things that are lacking to it； pleting those which
are imperfect； and yourselves taking the trouble to give a
more ample explanation of those things which have need of it；
or at least making me aware of the defects so that I may apply
myself to remedy them when this is done and when finally the
reasonings by which I prove that there is a God； and that the
human soul differs from the body； shall be carried to that
point of perspicuity to which I am sure they can be carried in
order that they may be esteemed as perfectly exact
demonstrations； if you deign to authorize your approbation and
to render public testimony to their truth and certainty； I do
not doubt； I say； that henceforward all the errors and false
opinions which have ever existed regarding these two questions
will soon be effaced from the minds of men。 For the truth
itself will easily cause all men of mind and learning to
subscribe to your judgment； and your authority will cause the
atheists； who are usually more arrogant than learned or
judicious； to rid themselves of their spirit of contradiction
or lead them possibly themselves to defend the reasonings
which they find being received as demonstrations by all
persons of consideration； lest they appear not to understand
them。 And； finally； all others will easily yield to such a
mass of evidence； and there will be none who dares to doubt
the existence of God and the real and true distinction between
the human soul and the body。 It is for you now in your
singular wisdom to judge of the importance of the
establishment of such beliefs ＇you who see the disorders
produced by the doubt of them＇5 。 But it would not bee me
to say more in consideration of the cause of God and religion
to those who have always been the most worthy supports of the
Catholic Church。
Preface to the Reader
I have already slightly touched on these two questions of
God and the human soul in the Discourse on the Method of
rightly conducting the Reason and seeking truth in the
Sciences； published in French in the year 1637。 Not that I
had the design of treating these with any thoroughness； but
only so to speak in passing； and in order to ascertain by the
judgment of the readers how I should treat them later on。 For
these questions have always appeared to me to be of such
importance that I judged it suitable to speak of them more
than once； and the road which I follow in the explanation of
them is so little trodden； and so far removed from the
ordinary path； that I did not judge it to be expedient to set
it forth at length in French and in a Discourse which might be
read by everyone； in case the feebler minds should believe
that it was permitted to them to attempt to follow the same
path。
But； having in this Discourse on Method begged all those
who have found in my writings somewhat deserving of censure to
do me the favour of acquainting me with the grounds of it；
nothing worthy of remark has been objected to in them beyond
two matters： to these two I wish here to reply in a few words
before undertaking their more detailed discussion。
The first objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that the human mind reflecting on itself does not
perceive itself to be other than a thing that thinks； that its
nature or its essence consists only in its being a thing that
thinks； in the sense that this word only excludes all other
things which might also be supposed to pertain to the nature
of the soul。 To this objection I reply that it was not my
intention in that place to exclude these in accordance with
the order that looks to the truth of the matter （as to which I
was not then dealing）； but only in accordance with the order
of my thought ＇perception＇； thus my meaning was that so far as
I was aware； I knew nothing clearly as belonging to my
essence； excepting that I was a thing that thinks； or a thing
that has in itself the faculty of thinking。 But I shall show
hereafter how from the fact that I know no other thing which
pertains to my essence； it follows that there is no other
thing which really does belong to it。
The second objection is that it does not follow from the
fact that I have in myself the idea of something more perfect
than I am； that this idea is more perfect than I； and much
less that what is represented by this idea exists。 But I
reply that in this term idea there is here something
equivocal； for it may either be taken materially； as an act of
my understanding； and in this sense it cannot be said that it
is more perfect than I； or it may be taken objectively； as the
thing which is represented by this act； which； although we do
not suppose it to exist outside of my understanding； may； none
the less； be more perfect than I； because of its essence。 And
in following out this Treatise I shall show more fully how；
from the sole fact that I have in myself the idea of a thing
more perfect than myself； it follows that this thing truly
exists。
In addition to these two objections I have also seen two
fairly lengthy works on this subject； which； however； did not
so much impugn my reasonings as my conclusions； and this by
arguments drawn from the ordinary atheistic sources。 But；
because such arguments cannot make any impression on the minds
of those who really understand my reasonings； and as the
judgments of many are so feeble and irrational that they very
often allow themselves to be persuaded by the opinions which
they have first formed； however false and far removed from
reason they may be； rather than by a true and solid but
subsequently received refutation of these opinions； I do not
desire to reply here to their criticisms in case of being
first of all obliged to state them。 I shall only say in
general that all that is said by the atheist against the
existence of God； always depends either on the fact that we
ascribe to God affections which are human； or that we
attribute so much strength and wisdom to our minds that we
even have the presumption to desire to determine and
understand that which God can and ought to do。 In this way
all that they allege will cause us no difficulty； provided
only we remember that we must consider our minds as things
which are finite and limited； and God as a Being who is
inprehensible and infinite。
Now that I have once for all recognised and acknowledged
the opinions of men； I at once begin to treat of God and the
Human soul； and at the same time to treat of the whole of the
First Philosophy； without however expecting any praise from
the vulgar and without the hope that my book will have many
readers。 On the contrary； I should never advise anyone to
read it excepting those who desire to meditate seriously with
me； and who can detach their minds from affairs of sense； and
deliver themselves entirely from every sort of prejudice。 I
know too well that such men exist in a very small number。 But
for those who； without caring to prehend the order and
connections of my reasonings； form their criticisms on
detached portions arbitrarily selected； as is the custom with
many； these； I say； will not obtain much profit from reading
this Treatise。 And although they perhaps in several parts
find occasion of cavilling； they can for all their pains make
no objection which is urgent or deserving of reply。
And inasmuch as I make no promise to others to satisfy
them at once； and as I do not presume so much on my own powers
as to believe myself capable of foreseeing all that can cause
difficulty to anyone； I shall first of all set forth in these
Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself
that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge of the
truth； in order to see if； by the same reasons which persuaded
me； I can also persuade others。 And； after that； I shall
reply to the objections which have been made to me by persons
of genius and learning to whom I have sent my Meditations for
examination； before submitting them to the press。 For they
have made so many objections and these so different； that I
venture to promise that it will be difficult for anyone to
bring to mind criticisms of any consequence which have not
been already touched upon。 This is why I beg those who read
these Meditations to form no judgment upon them unless they
have given themselves the trouble to read all the objections
as well as the replies which I have made to them。6
Synopsis of the Six Following Meditations。
In the first Meditation I set forth the reasons for which
we may； generally speaking； doubt about all things and
especially about material things； at least so long as we have
no other foundations for the sciences than those which we have
hitherto possessed。 But although the utility of a Doubt which
is so general does not at first appear； it is at the same time
very great； inasmuch as it delivers us from every kind of
prejudice； and sets out for us a very simple way by which the
mind may detach itself from the senses； and finally it makes
it impossible for us ever to doubt those things which we have
once discovered to be true。
In the second Meditation； mind； which making use of the
liberty which pertains to it； takes for granted that all those
things of whose existence it has the least doubt； are non…
existent； recognises that it is however absolutely impossible
that it does not itself exist。 This point is likewise of the
greatest moment； inasmuch as by this means a distinction is
easily drawn between the things which pertain to mind that is
to say to the intellectual nature and those which pertain to
body。
But because it may be that some expect from me in this
place a statement of the reasons establishing the immortality
of the soul； I feel that I should here make known to them that
having aimed at