my memory； it appeared as though they could not have proceeded
from my mind； so that they must necessarily have been produced
in me by some other things。 And having no knowledge of those
objects excepting the knowledge which the ideas themselves
gave me； nothing was more likely to occur to my mind than that
the objects were similar to the ideas which were caused。 And
because I likewise remembered that I had formerly made use of
my senses rather than my reason； and recognised that the ideas
which I formed of myself were not so distinct as those which I
perceived through the senses； and that they were most
frequently even posed of portions of these last； I
persuaded myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which
had not formerly e to me through the senses。 Nor was it
without some reason that I believed that this body （which be a
certain special right I call my own） belonged to me more
properly and more strictly than any other； for in fact I could
never be separated from it as from other bodies； I experienced
in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections；
and finally I was touched by the feeling of pain and the
titillation of pleasure in its parts； and not in the parts of
other bodies which were separated from it。 But when I
inquired； why； from some； I know not what； painful sensation；
there follows sadness of mind； and from the pleasurable
sensation there arises joy； or why this mysterious pinching of
the stomach which I call hunger causes me to desire to eat；
and dryness of throat causes a desire to drink； and so on； I
could give no reason excepting that nature taught me so； for
there is certainly no affinity （that I at least can
understand） between the craving of the stomach and the desire
to eat； any more than between the perception of whatever
causes pain and the thought of sadness which arises from this
perception。 And in the same way it appeared to me that I had
learned from nature all the other judgments which I formed
regarding the objects of my senses； since I remarked that
these judgments were formed in me before I had the leisure to
weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make
them。
But afterwards many experiences little by little
destroyed all the faith which I had rested in my senses； for I
from time to time observed that those towers which from afar
appeared to me to be round； more closely observed seemed
square； and that colossal statues raised on the summit of
these towers； appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from
the bottom； and so in an infinitude of other cases I found
error in judgments founded on the external senses。 And not
only in those founded on the external senses； but even in
those founded on the internal as well； for is there anything
more intimate or more internal than pain？ And yet I have
learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut
off； that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which
had been amputated； which made me think that I could not be
quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me；
even although I felt pain in it。 And to those grounds of
doubt I have lately added two others； which are very general；
the first is that I never have believed myself to feel
anything in waking moments which I cannot also sometimes
believe myself to feel when I sleep； and as I do not think
that these things which I seem to feel in sleep； proceed from
objects outside of me； I do not see any reason why I should
have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive
while awake。 The other was that being still ignorant； or
rather supposing myself to be ignorant； of the author of my
being； I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so
constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters
which seemed to me to be most certain。 And as to the grounds
on which I was formerly persuaded of the truth of sensible
objects； I had not much trouble in replying to them。 For
since nature seemed to cause me to lean towards many things
from which reason repelled me； I did not believe that I should
trust much to the teachings of nature。 And although the ideas
which I receive by the senses do not depend on my will； I did
not think that one should for that reason conclude that they
proceeded from things different from myself； since possibly
some faculty might be discovered in me￥though hitherto unknown
to me￥which produced them。
But now that I begin to know myself better； and to
discover more clearly the author of my being； I do not in
truth think that I should rashly admit all the matters which
the senses seem to teach us； but； on the other hand； I do not
think that I should doubt them all universally。
And first of all； because I know that all things which I
apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as I
apprehend them； it suffices that I am able to apprehend one
thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be
certain that the one is different from the other； since they
may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotence
of God； and it does not signify by what power this separation
is made in order to pel me to judge them to be different：
and； therefore； just because I know certainly that I exist；
and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing
necessarily pertains to my nature or essence； excepting that I
am a thinking thing； I rightly conclude that my essence
consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thin ＇or a
substance whose whole essence or nature is to think＇。 And
although possibly （or rather certainly； as I shall say in a
moment） I possess a body with which I am very intimately
conjoined； yet because； on the one side； I have a clear and
distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and
unextended thing； and as； on the other； I possess a distinct
idea of body； inasmuch as it is only an extended and
unthinking thing； it is certain that this I ＇that is to say；
my soul by which I am what I am＇； is entirely and absolutely
distinct from my body； and can exist without it。
I further find in myself faculties imploying modes of
thinking peculiar to themselves； to wit； the faculties of
imagination and feeling； without which I can easily conceive
myself clearly and distinctly as a plete being； while； on
the other hand； they cannot be so conceived apart from me；
that is without an intelligent substance in which they reside；
for ＇in the notion we have of these faculties； or； to use the
language of the Schools＇ in their formal concept； some kind of
intellection is prised； from which I infer that they are
distinct from me as its modes are from a thing。 I observe
also in me some other faculties such as that of change of
position； the assumption of different figures and such like；
which cannot be conceived； any more than can the preceding；
apart from some substance to which they are attached； and
consequently cannot exist without it； but it is very clear
that these faculties； if it be true that they exist； must be
attached to some corporeal or extended substance； and not to
an intelligent substance； since in the clear and distinct
conception of these there is some sort of extension found to
be present； but no intellection at all。 There is certainly
further in me a certain passive faculty of perception； that
is； of receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible things；
but this would be useless to me ＇and I could in no way avail
myself of it＇； if there were not either in me or in some other
thing another active faculty capable of forming and producing
these ideas。 But this active faculty cannot exist in me
＇inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks＇ seeing that it does not
presuppose thought； and also that those ideas are often
produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same；
and often even against my will； it is thus necessarily the
case that the faculty resides in some substance different from
me in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas
that are produced by this faculty is formally or eminently
contained； as I remarked before。 And this substance is either
a body； that is； a corporeal nature in which there is
contained formally ＇and really＇ all that which is objectively
＇and by representation＇ in those ideas； or it is God Himself；
or some other creature more noble than body in which that same
is contained eminently。 But； since God is no deceiver； it is
very manifest that He does not municate to me these ideas
immediately and by Himself； nor yet by the intervention of
some creature in which their reality is not formally； but only
eminently； contained。 For since He has given me no faculty to
recognise that this is the case； but； on the other hand； a
very great inclination to believe ＇that they are sent to me
or＇ that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects； I do
not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit
if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal
objects。 Hence we must allow that corporeal things exist。
However； they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the
senses； since this prehension by the senses is in many
instances very obscure and confused； but we must at least
admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and
distinctly； that is to say； all things which； speaking
generally； are prehended in the object of pure mathematics；
are truly to be recognised as external objects。
As to other things； however； which are either particular
only； as； for example； that the sun is of such and such a
figure； etc。； or which are less clearly and distinctly
conceived； such as light； sound； pain and the like； it is
certain that although they are very dubious and uncertain； yet
on the sole ground that God is not a deceiver； and that
consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my
opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of
correcting； I may assuredly hope to conclude that I have
within me the means of arriving at the truth even here。 And
first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature
teaches me there is some truth contained； for by nature；
considered in general； I now understand no othe