without this they have no property at all。 For I have truly no
property in that which another can by right take from me when he
pleases against my consent。 Hence it is a mistake to think that the
supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it
will； and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily； or take
any part of them at pleasure。 This is not much to be feared in
governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part in
assemblies which are variable； whose members upon the dissolution of
the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their country；
equally with the rest。 But in governments where the legislative is
in one lasting assembly； always in being； or in one man as in absolute
monarchies； there is danger still； that they will think themselves
to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community； and so
will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they
think fit from the people。 For a man's property is not at all
secure； though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of
it between him and his fellow…subjects； if he who commands those
subjects have power to take from any private man what part he
pleases of his property； and use and dispose of it as he thinks good。
139。 But government； into whosesoever hands it is put； being as I
have before shown； entrusted with this condition； and for this end；
that men might have and secure their properties； the prince or senate；
however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of
property between the subjects one amongst another； yet can never
have a power to take to themselves the whole； or any part of the
subjects' property； without their own consent； for this would be in
effect to leave them no property at all。 And to let us see that even
absolute power； where it is necessary； is not arbitrary by being
absolute； but is still limited by that reason and confined to those
ends which required it in some cases to be absolute； we need look no
farther than the common practice of martial discipline。 For the
preservation of the army； and in it of the whole commonwealth；
requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior
officer； and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most
dangerous or unreasonable of them； but yet we see that neither the
sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a
cannon； or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish； can
command that soldier to give him one penny of his money； nor the
general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post； or not
obeying the most desperate orders； cannot yet with all his absolute
power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier's
estate； or seize one jot of his goods； whom yet he can command
anything； and hang for the least disobedience。 Because such a blind
obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his
power… viz。； the preservation of the rest； but the disposing of his
goods has nothing to do with it。
140。 It is true governments cannot be supported without great
charge； and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection
should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it。
But still it must be with his own consent… i。e。； the consent of the
majority； giving it either by themselves or their representatives
chosen by them； for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy
taxes on the people by his own authority； and without such consent
of the people； he thereby invades the fundamental law of property； and
subverts the end of government。 For what property have I in that which
another may by right take when he pleases to himself？
141。 Fourthly。 The legislative cannot transfer the power of making
laws to any other hands； for it being but a delegated power from the
people； they who have it cannot pass it over to others。 The people
alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth； which is by
constituting the legislative； and appointing in whose hands that shall
be。 And when the people have said； 〃We will submit； and be governed by
laws made by such men； and in such forms；〃 nobody else can say other
men shall make laws for them； nor can they be bound by any laws but
such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to
make laws for them。
142。 These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the
society and the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative
power of every commonwealth； in all forms of government。 First： They
are to govern by promulgated established laws； not to be varied in
particular cases； but to have one rule for rich and poor； for the
favourite at Court； and the countryman at plough。 Secondly： These laws
also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good
of the people。 Thirdly： They must not raise taxes on the property of
the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or
their deputies。 And this properly concerns only such governments where
the legislative is always in being； or at least where the people
have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies； to be
from time to time chosen by themselves。 Fourthly： Legislative
neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody
else； or place it anywhere but where the people have。
Chapter XII
The Legislative； Executive； and Federative Power
of the Commonwealth
143。 THE legislative power is that which has a right to direct how
the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the
community and the members of it。 Because those laws which are
constantly to be executed； and whose force is always to continue；
may be made in a little time； therefore there is no need that the
legislative should be always in being； not having always business to
do。 And because it may be too great temptation to human frailty； apt
to grasp at power； for the same persons who have the power of making
laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them； whereby
they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make； and
suit the law； both in its making and execution； to their own private
advantage； and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the
rest of the community； contrary to the end of society and
government。 Therefore in well…ordered commonwealths； where the good of
the whole is so considered as it ought； the legislative power is put
into the hands of divers persons who； duly assembled； have by
themselves； or jointly with others； a power to make laws； which when
they have done； being separated again； they are themselves subject
to the laws they have made； which is a new and near tie upon them to
take care that they make them for the public good。
144。 But because the laws that are at once； and in a short time
made； have a constant and lasting force； and need a perpetual
execution； or an attendance thereunto； therefore it is necessary there
should be a power always in being which should see to the execution of
the laws that are made； and remain in force。 And thus the
legislative and executive power come often to be separated。
145。 There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call
natural； because it is that which answers to the power every man
naturally had before he entered into society。 For though in a
commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons； still； in
reference to one another； and； as such； are governed by the laws of
the society； yet； in reference to the rest of mankind； they make one
body； which is； as every member of it before was； still in the state
of Nature with the rest of mankind； so that the controversies that
happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it
are managed by the public； and an injury done to a member of their
body engages the whole in the reparation of it。 So that under this
consideration the whole community is one body in the state of Nature
in respect of all other states or persons out of its community。
146。 This； therefore； contains the power of war and peace； leagues
and alliances； and all the transactions with all persons and
communities without the commonwealth； and may be called federative
if any one pleases。 So the thing be understood； I am indifferent as to
the name。
147。 These two powers； executive and federative； though they be
really distinct in themselves； yet one comprehending the execution
of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are
parts of it； the other the management of the security and interest
of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or
damage from； yet they are always almost united。 And though this
federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great
moment to the commonwealth； yet it is much less capable to be directed
by antecedent； standing； positive laws than the executive； and so must
necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it
is in； to be managed for the public good。 For the laws that concern
subjects one amongst another； being to direct their actions； may
well enough precede them。 But what is to be done in reference to
foreigners depending much upon their actions； and the variation of
designs and interests； must be left in great part to the prudence of
those who have this power committed to them； to be managed by the best
of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth。
148。 Though； as I said； the executive and federative power of
every community be really distinct in themselves； yet they are
hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of
distinct persons。 For both of them requiring the force of the
society for their exercise； it is almost impracticable to place the
force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands； or
that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons
that might act separately； whereby the force of the public would be
under different commands； which would