experience to the existence of a necessary being。* Thus this
argument really begins at experience； and is not pletely a
priori； or ontological。 The object of all possible experience being
the world； it is called the cosmological proof。 It contains no
reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects； by which
this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds；
and in this respect it differs from the physico…theological proof；
which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar constitution
of our sensuous world。
*This inference is too well known to require more detailed
discussion。 It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of
causality； that everything which is contingent has a cause； which；
if itself contingent； must also have a cause； and so on； till the
series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary
cause； without which it would not possess pleteness。
The proof proceeds thus： A necessary being can be determined only in
one way； that is； it can be determined by only one of all possible
opposed predicates； consequently； it must be pletely determined
in and by its conception。 But there is only a single conception of a
thing possible； which pletely determines the thing a priori： that
is； the conception of the ens realissimum。 It follows that the
conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by and in
which we can cogitate a necessary being。 Consequently； a Supreme Being
necessarily exists。
In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical
propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all
her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most
extreme character。 We shall postpone an investigation of this argument
for the present； and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by
which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress； and appeals
to the agreement of two witnesses； the one with the credentials of
pure reason； and the other with those of empiricism； while； in fact；
it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice； for the
purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness。 That it
may possess a secure foundation； it bases its conclusions upon
experience； and thus appears to be pletely distinct from the
ontological argument； which places its confidence entirely in pure a
priori conceptions。 But this experience merely aids reason in making
one step… to the existence of a necessary being。 What the properties
of this being are cannot be learned from experience； and therefore
reason abandons it altogether； and pursues its inquiries in the sphere
of pure conception； for the purpose of discovering what the properties
of an absolutely necessary being ought to be； that is； what among
all possible things contain the conditions （requisita） of absolute
necessity。 Reason believes that it has discovered these requisites
in the conception of an ens realissimum… and in it alone； and hence
concludes： The ens realissimum is an absolutely necessary being。 But
it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception
of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a
being of absolute necessity； that is； that we may infer the
existence of the latter from that of the former… a proposition which
formed the basis of the ontological argument； and which is now
employed in the support of the cosmological argument； contrary to
the wish and professions of its inventors。 For the existence of an
absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone。 But if I
say： 〃The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this
kind； and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of
a necessary being；〃 I am obliged to admit； that the latter may be
inferred from the former。 Thus it is properly the ontological argument
which figures in the cosmological； and constitutes the whole
strength of the latter； while the spurious basis of experience has
been of no further use than to conduct us to the conception of
absolute necessity； being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the
presence of this attribute in any determinate existence or thing。
For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character； we must
abandon the sphere of experience； and rise to that of pure
conceptions； which we examine with the purpose of discovering
whether any one contains the conditions of the possibility of an
absolutely necessary being。 But if the possibility of such a being
is thus demonstrated； its existence is also proved； for we may then
assert that； of all possible beings there is one which possesses the
attribute of necessity… in other words； this being possesses an
absolutely necessary existence。
All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they
are presented in the formal manner employed by the schools； which we
now proceed to do。
If the proposition： 〃Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an
ens realissimum；〃 is correct （and it is this which constitutes the
nervus probandi of the cosmological argument）； it must； like all
affirmative judgements； be capable of conversion… the conversio per
accidens； at least。 It follows； then； that some entia realissima are
absolutely necessary beings。 But no ens realissimum is in any
respect different from another； and what is valid of some is valid
of all。 In this present case； therefore； I may employ simple
conversion； and say： 〃Every ens realissimum is a necessary being。〃 But
as this proposition is determined a priori by the conceptions
contained in it； the mere conception of an ens realissimum must
possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity。 But this is
exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument； and not
recognized by the cosmological； although it formed the real ground
of its disguised and illusory reasoning。
Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating
the existence of a Supreme Being； is not only； like the first；
illusory and inadequate； but possesses the additional blemish of an
ignoratio elenchi… professing to conduct us by a new road to the
desired goal； but bringing us back； after a short circuit； to the
old path which we had deserted at its call。
I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect
nest of dialectical assumptions； which transcendental criticism does
not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate。 I shall merely
enumerate these； leaving it to the reader； who must by this time be
well practised in such matters； to investigate the fallacies
residing therein。
The following fallacies； for example； are discoverable in this
mode of proof： 1。 The transcendental principle： 〃Everything that is
contingent must have a cause〃… a principle without significance；
except in the sensuous world。 For the purely intellectual conception
of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition； like
that of causality； which is itself without significance or
distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world。 But in
the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its
sphere。 2。 〃From the impossibility of an infinite ascending series
of causes in the world of sense a first cause is inferred〃； a
conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not
justify even in the sphere of experience； and still less when an
attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere。 3。 Reason allows
itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds； with regard to the
pletion of this series。 It removes all conditions （without which；
however； no conception of Necessity can take place）； and； as after
this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions； it
accepts this as a pletion of the conception it wishes to form of
the series。 4。 The logical possibility of a conception of the total of
reality （the criterion of this possibility being the absence of
contradiction） is confound。 ed with the transcendental； which requires
a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis… a principle
which again refers us to the world of experience。 And so on。
The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of
proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere
conceptions… a proof which must be ontological； and of which we feel
ourselves quite incapable。 With this purpose； we reason from an actual
existence… an experience in general； to an absolutely necessary
condition of that existence。 It is in this case unnecessary to
demonstrate its possibility。 For after having proved that it exists；
the question regarding its possibility is superfluous。 Now； when we
wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being； we do
not look out for some being the conception of which would enable us to
prehend the necessity of its being… for if we could do this； an
empirical presupposition would be unnecessary； no； we try to
discover merely the negative condition （conditio sine qua non）；
without which a being would not be absolutely necessary。 Now this
would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning； from a
consequence to its principle； but in the present case it unfortunately
happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered
in but a single being； the conception of which must consequently
contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of
absolute necessity； and thus entitle me to infer this absolute
necessity a priori。 That is； it must be possible to reason conversely；
and say： The thing； to which the conception of the highest reality
belongs； is absolutely necessary。 But if I cannot reason thus… and I
cannot； unless I believe in the sufficiency of the ontological
argument… I find insurmountable obstacles in my new path； and am
really no farther than the point from which I set out。 The
conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori
regarding the internal determinations of a thing； and is for this
reason an ideal without equal or parallel； the general conception of
it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all
possible things。 But the conception does not satisfy the question
regarding its existence… which was the p