their own exclusive possession； the key to the truths which they
impart to the public。
Quod mecum nescit； solus vult scire videri。
At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of
his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits
the public without its knowledge… I mean； the Critique of Pure Reason。
This can never bee popular and； indeed； has no occasion to be so；
for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as
little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle
objections brought against these truths。 On the other hand； since both
inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of
speculation； it bees the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon
a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and；
thus； to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are
sure； sooner or later； to cause even to the masses。 It is only by
criticism that metaphysicians （and； as such； theologians too） can be
saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of
their doctrines。 Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of
materialism； fatalism； atheism； free…thinking； fanaticism； and
superstition； which are universally injurious… as well as of
idealism and scepticism； which are dangerous to the schools； but can
scarcely pass over to the public。 If governments think proper to
interfere with the affairs of the learned； it would be more consistent
with a wise regard for the interests of science； as well as for
those of society； to favour a criticism of this kind； by which alone
the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis； than to
support the ridiculous despotism of the schools； which raise a loud
cry of danger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs； of
which the public has never taken any notice； and the loss of which；
therefore； it can never feel。
This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of
reason in pure cognition； for pure cognition must always be
dogmatic； that is； must rest on strict demonstration from sure
principles a priori… but to dogmatism； that is； to the presumption
that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition；
derived from （philosophical） conceptions； according to the
principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing…
without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has
e into the possession of these principles。 Dogmatism is thus the
dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its
own powers； and in opposing this procedure； we must not be supposed to
lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to
itself the name of popularity； nor yet to scepticism； which makes
short work with the whole science of metaphysics。 On the contrary； our
criticism is the necessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific
system of metaphysics which must perform its task entirely a priori；
to the plete satisfaction of speculative reason； and must；
therefore； be treated； not popularly； but scholastically。 In
carrying out the plan which the Critique prescribes； that is； in the
future system of metaphysics； we must have recourse to the strict
method of the celebrated Wolf； the greatest of all dogmatic
philosophers。 He was the first to point out the necessity of
establishing fixed principles； of clearly defining our conceptions；
and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny；
instead of rashly jumping at conclusions。 The example which he set
served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation
which is not yet extinct in Germany。 He would have been peculiarly
well fitted to give a truly scientific character to metaphysical
studies； had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a criticism of
the organum； that is； of pure reason itself。 That be failed to
perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the
dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age； and on this
point the philosophers of his time； as well as of all previous
times； have nothing to reproach each other with。 Those who reject at
once the method of Wolf； and of the Critique of Pure Reason； can
have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science； to change
labour into sport； certainty into opinion； and philosophy into
philodoxy。
In this second edition； I have endeavoured； as far as possible； to
remove the difficulties and obscurity which； without fault of mine
perhaps； have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute
thinkers。 In the propositions themselves； and in the demonstrations by
which they are supported； as well as in the form and the entire plan
of the work； I have found nothing to alter； which must be attributed
partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole
before offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case。
For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there
is nothing isolated or independent； but every Single part is essential
to all the rest； and hence； the slightest imperfection； whether defect
or positive error； could not fail to betray itself in use。 I
venture； further； to hope； that this system will maintain the same
unalterable character for the future。 I am led to entertain this
confidence； not by vanity； but by the evidence which the equality of
the result affords； when we proceed； first； from the simplest elements
up to the plete whole of pure reason and； and then； backwards
from the whole to each part。 We find that the attempt to make the
slightest alteration； in any part； leads inevitably to contradictions；
not merely in this system； but in human reason itself。 At the same
time； there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of
the doctrines contained in this work。 In the present edition； I have
endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of the aesthetical part；
especially with regard to the conception of time； to clear away the
obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions
of the understanding； to supply the supposed want of sufficient
evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure
understanding； and； lastly； to obviate the misunderstanding of the
paralogisms which immediately precede the rational psychology。
Beyond this point… the end of the second main division of the
〃Transcendental Dialectic〃… I have not extended my alterations；*
partly from want of time； and partly because I am not aware that any
portion of the remainder has given rise to misconceptions among
intelligent and impartial critics； whom I do not here mention with
that praise which is their due； but who will find that their
suggestions have been attended to in the work itself。
*The only addition； properly so called… and that only in the
method of proof… which I have made in the present edition； consists of
a new refutation of psychological idealism； and a strict
demonstration… the only one possible； as I believe… of the objective
reality of external intuition。 However harmless idealism may be
considered… although in reality it is not so… in regard to the
essential ends of metaphysics； it must still remain a scandal to
philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume； as
an article of mere belief； the existence of things external to
ourselves （from which； yet； we derive the whole material of
cognition for the internal sense）； and not to be able to oppose a
satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question。 As there is
some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in
the text； I propose to alter the passage in question as follows：
〃But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me。 For all the
determining grounds of my existence which can be found in me are
representations and； as such； do themselves require a permanent；
distinct from them； which may determine my existence in relation to
their changes； that is； my existence in time； wherein they change。〃 It
may； probably； be urged in opposition to this proof that； after all； I
am only conscious immediately of that which is in me； that is； of my
representation of external things； and that； consequently； it must
always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this
representation does or does not exist externally to me。 But I am
conscious； through internal experience； of my existence in time
（consequently； also； of the determinability of the former in the
latter）； and that is more than the simple consciousness of my
representation。 It is； in fact； the same as the empirical
consciousness of my existence； which can only be determined in
relation to something； which； while connected with my existence； is
external to me。 This consciousness of my existence in time is；
therefore； identical with the consciousness of a relation to something
external to me； and it is； therefore； experience； not fiction；
sense； not imagination； which inseparably connects the external with
my internal sense。 For the external sense is； in itself； the
relation of intuition to something real； external to me； and the
reality of this something； as opposed to the mere imagination of it；
rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience as
the condition of its possibility。 If with the intellectual
consciousness of my existence； in the representation： I am； which
acpanies all my judgements； and all the operations of my
understanding； I could； at the same time； connect a determination of
my existence by intellectual intuition； then the consciousness of a
relation to something external to me would not be necessary。 But the
internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined；
though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness； is itself
sensible and attached to the condition of time。 Hence this
determination of my existence； and consequently my internal experience
itself； must depend on something permanent which is not in me； which
can be； therefore； only in something external to me； to which I must
look upon myself as being related。 Thus the reality of the external
sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal； in order
to the possibility of exper