all assigned limits between itself and the idea。
But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and
where ideas are operative causes （of actions and their objects）；
that is to say； in the region of ethics； but also in regard to
nature herself； Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas。 A
plant； and animal； the regular order of nature… probably also the
disposition of the whole universe… give manifest evidence that they
are possible only by means of and according to ideas； that； indeed； no
one creature； under the individual conditions of its existence；
perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind…
just as little as man with the idea of humanity； which nevertheless he
bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions； that；
notwithstanding； these ideas are in the highest sense individually；
unchangeably； and pletely determined； and are the original causes
of things； and that the totality of connected objects in the
universe is alone fully adequate to that idea。 Setting aside the
exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher； the
mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of
regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof
according to ends； that is； ideas； is an effort which deserves
imitation and claims respect。 But as regards the principles of ethics；
of legislation； and of religion； spheres in which ideas alone render
experience possible； although they never attain to full expression
therein； he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit；
which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very
empirical rules； the validity of which as principles is destroyed by
ideas。 For as regards nature； experience presents us with rules and is
the source of truth； but in relation to ethical laws experience is the
parent of illusion； and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to
limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do； from
what is done。
We must； however； omit the consideration of these important
subjects； the development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and
dignity of philosophy； and confine ourselves for the present to the
more humble but not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation
for those majestic edifices of moral science。 For this foundation
has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which
reason in its confident but vain search for treasures has made in
all directions。 Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly
acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason； its
principles and ideas； that we may be able properly to determine and
value its influence and real worth。 But before bringing these
introductory remarks to a close； I beg those who really have
philosophy at heart… and their number is but small… if they shall find
themselves convinced by the considerations following as well as by
those above； to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea
its original signification； and to take care that it be not lost among
those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are
loosely designated… that the interests of science may not thereby
suffer。 We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode
of representation； without the necessity of encroaching upon terms
which are proper to others。 The following is a graduated list of them。
The genus is representation in general （representation。 Under it
stands representation with consciousness （perceptio）。 A perception
which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state； is
a sensation （sensatio）； an objective perception is a cognition
（cognitio）。 A cognition is either an intuition or a conception
（intuitus vel conceptus）。 The former has an immediate relation to
the object and is singular and individual； the latter has but a
mediate relation； by means of a characteristic mark which may be
mon to several things。 A conception is either empirical or pure。
A pure conception； in so far as it has its origin in the understanding
alone； and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image； is called
notio。 A conception formed from notions； which transcends the
possibility of experience； is an idea； or a conception of reason。 To
one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions； it must be quite
intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an
idea。 It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of
understanding。
SECTION II。 Of Transcendental Ideas。
Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our
cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori；
conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience； or
rather； indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an
empirical cognition of objects。 The form of judgements… converted into
a conception of the synthesis of intuitions… produced the categories
which direct the employment of the understanding in experience。 This
consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms；
when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions； following the rule of
the categories； will contain the origin of particular a priori
conceptions； which we may call pure conceptions of reason or
transcendental ideas； and which will determine the use of the
understanding in the totality of experience according to principles。
The function of reason in arguments consists in the universality
of a cognition according to conceptions； and the syllogism itself is a
judgement which is determined a priori in the whole extent of its
condition。 The proposition： 〃Caius is mortal；〃 is one which may be
obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone； but my
wish is to find a conception which contains the condition under
which the predicate of this judgement is given… in this case； the
conception of man… and after subsuming under this condition； taken
in its whole extent （all men are mortal）； I determine according to
it the cognition of the object thought； and say： 〃Caius is mortal。〃
Hence； in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a
certain object； after having thought it in the major in its whole
extent under a certain condition。 This plete quantity of the extent
in relation to such a condition is called universality
（universalitas）。 To this corresponds totality （universitas） of
conditions in the synthesis of intuitions。 The transcendental
conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception
of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned。 Now as the
unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions； and；
conversely； the totality of conditions is itself always unconditioned；
a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained
by means of the conception of the unconditioned； in so far as it
contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned。
To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates
by means of the categories； the number of pure rational conceptions
will correspond。 We must therefore seek for； first； an unconditioned
of the categorical synthesis in a subject； secondly； of the
hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series； thirdly； of the
disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system。
There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms； each of
which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned… one to
the subject which cannot be employed as predicate； another to the
presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself； and the
third to an aggregate of the members of the plete division of a
conception。 Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the
synthesis of conditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of
human reason… at least as modes of elevating the unity of the
understanding to the unconditioned。 They may have no valid
application； corresponding to their transcendental employment； in
concreto； and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the
understanding how； while extending them as widely as possible； to
maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and
harmony。
But； while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the
unconditioned as the mon title of all conceptions of reason； we
again light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense
with； and which nevertheless； owing to the ambiguity attaching to it
from long abuse； we cannot employ with safety。 The word absolute is
one of the few words which； in its original signification； was
perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey… a
conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits； and
the loss… or； which is the same thing； the incautious and loose
employment… of which must be followed by the loss of the conception
itself。 And； as it is a conception which occupies much of the
attention of reason； its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all
transcendental philosophy。 The word absolute is at present
frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a
thing considered in itself and intrinsically。 In this sense absolutely
possible would signify that which is possible in itself （interne）…
which is； in fact； the least that one can predicate of an object。 On
the other hand； it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is
valid in all respects… for example； absolute sovereignty。 Absolutely
possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all
relations and in every respect； and this is the most that can be
predicated of the possibility of a thing。 Now these significations
do in truth frequently coincide。 Thus； for example； that which is
intrinsically impossible； is also impossible in all relations； that
is； absolutely impossible。 But in most cases they differ from each
other toto caelo； and I can by no means conclude that； because a thing
is in itself possible； it is also possible in all relations； and
therefore absolutely。 Nay； more； I shall in the sequel show that
absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity；
and that； therefore； it must not be considered as synonymous w