which is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles； is an
immediate cognition； but that these angles are together equal to two
right angles； is an inference or conclusion。 Now； as we are constantly
employing this mode of thought and have thus bee quite accustomed
to it； we no longer remark the above distinction； and； as in the
case of the so…called deceptions of sense； consider as immediately
perceived； what has really been inferred。 In every reasoning or
syllogism； there is a fundamental proposition； afterwards a second
drawn from it； and finally the conclusion； which connects the truth in
the first with the truth in the second… and that infallibly。 If the
judgement concluded is so contained in the first proposition that it
can be deduced from it without the meditation of a third notion； the
conclusion is called immediate （consequentia immediata）； I prefer
the term conclusion of the understanding。 But if； in addition to the
fundamental cognition； a second judgement is necessary for the
production of the conclusion； it is called a conclusion of the reason。
In the proposition： All men are mortal； are contained the
propositions： Some men are mortal； Nothing that is not mortal is a
man； and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first。
On the other hand； the proposition： all the learned are mortal； is not
contained in the main proposition （for the conception of a learned man
does not occur in it）； and it can be deduced from the main proposition
only by means of a mediating judgement。
In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule （the major） by means of
the understanding。 In the next place I subsume a cognition under the
condition of the rule （and this is the minor） by means of the
judgement。 And finally I determine my cognition by means of the
predicate of the rule （this is the conclusio）； consequently； I
determine it a priori by means of the reason。 The relations；
therefore； which the major proposition； as the rule； represents
between a cognition and its condition； constitute the different
kinds of syllogisms。 These are just threefold… analogously with all
judgements； in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the
relation of a cognition in the understanding… namely； categorical；
hypothetical； and disjunctive。
When as often happens； the conclusion is a judgement which may
follow from other given judgements； through which a perfectly
different object is cogitated； I endeavour to discover in the
understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not
stand under certain conditions according to a general rule。 If I
find such a condition； and if the object mentioned in the conclusion
can be subsumed under the given condition； then this conclusion
follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of
cognition。 From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the
great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest
possible number of principles （general conditions）； and thus to
produce in it the highest unity。
C。 OF THE PURE USE OF REASON。
Can we isolate reason； and； if so； is it in this case a peculiar
source of conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone； and
through which it can be applied to objects； or is it merely a
subordinate faculty； whose duty it is to give a certain form to
given cognitions… a form which is called logical； and through which
the cognitions of the understanding are subordinated to each other；
and lower rules to higher （those； to wit； whose condition prises in
its sphere the condition of the others）； in so far as this can be done
by parison？ This is the question which we have at present to
answer。 Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a
requirement of reason； for the purpose of bringing the understanding
into plete accordance with itself； just as understanding subjects
the manifold content of intuition to conceptions； and thereby
introduces connection into it。 But this principle prescribes no law to
objects； and does not contain any ground of the possibility of
cognizing or of determining them as such； but is merely a subjective
law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding。
The purpose of this law is； by a parison of the conceptions of
the understanding； to reduce them to the smallest possible number；
although； at the same time； it does not justify us in demanding from
objects themselves such a uniformity as might contribute to the
convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding； or
in expecting that it will itself thus receive from them objective
validity。 In one word； the question is： 〃does reason in itself； that
is； does pure reason contain a priori synthetical principles and
rules； and what are those principles？〃
The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us
sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the
transcendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition
will rest。
1。 Reason； as observed in the syllogistic process； is not applicable
to intuitions； for the purpose of subjecting them to rules… for this
is the province of the understanding with its categories… but to
conceptions and judgements。 If pure reason does apply to objects and
the intuition of them； it does so not immediately； but mediately…
through the understanding and its judgements； which have a direct
relation to the senses and their intuition； for the purpose of
determining their objects。 The unity of reason is therefore not the
unity of a possible experience； but is essentially different from this
unity； which is that of the understanding。 That everything which
happens has a cause； is not a principle cognized and prescribed by
reason。 This principle makes the unity of experience possible and
borrows nothing from reason； which； without a reference to possible
experience； could never have produced by means of mere conceptions any
such synthetical unity。
2。 Reason； in its logical use； endeavours to discover the general
condition of its judgement （the conclusion）； and a syllogism is itself
nothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition
under a general rule （the major）。 Now as this rule may itself be
subjected to the same process of reason； and thus the condition of the
condition be sought （by means of a prosyllogism） as long as the
process can be continued； it is very manifest that the peculiar
principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the
conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby
the unity of the former is pleted。
But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason；
unless we admit that； if the conditioned is given； the whole series of
conditions subordinated to one another… a series which is consequently
itself unconditioned… is also given； that is； contained in the
object and its connection。
But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical； for；
analytically； the conditioned certainly relates to some condition； but
not to the unconditioned。 From this principle also there must
originate different synthetical propositions； of which the pure
understanding is perfectly ignorant； for it has to do only with
objects of a possible experience； the cognition and synthesis of which
is always conditioned。 The unconditioned； if it does really exist；
must be especially considered in regard to the determinations which
distinguish it from whatever is conditioned； and will thus afford us
material for many a priori synthetical propositions。
The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure
reason will； however； be transcendent in relation to phenomena； that
is to say； it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of
this principle。 It is therefore pletely different from all
principles of the understanding； the use made of which is entirely
immanent； their object and purpose being merely the possibility of
experience。 Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as
follows。 To discover whether the principle that the series of
conditions （in the synthesis of phenomena； or of thought in general）
extends to the unconditioned is objectively true； or not； what
consequences result therefrom affecting the empirical use of the
understanding； or rather whether there exists any such objectively
valid proposition of reason； and whether it is not； on the contrary； a
merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still
higher conditions； to approach pleteness in the series of them； and
thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of
reason。 We must ascertain； I say； whether this requirement of reason
has not been regarded； by a misunderstanding； as a transcendental
principle of pure reason； which postulates a thorough pleteness
in the series of conditions in objects themselves。 We must show；
moreover； the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into
syllogisms； the major proposition of which pure reason has supplied… a
proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a petitio
than of a postulatum… and that proceed from experience upwards to
its conditions。 The solution of these problems is our task in
transcendental dialectic； which we are about to expose even at its
source； that lies deep in human reason。 We shall divide it into two
parts； the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions
of pure reason； the second of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms。
BOOK I。
OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON。
The conceptions of pure reason… we do not here speak of the
possibility of them… are not obtained by reflection； but by
inference or conclusion。 The conceptions of understanding are also
cogitated a priori antecedently to experience； and render it possible；
but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena；
in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical
consciousness。 Through them alone are cognition and the
determination of an object possible。 It is from them； accordingly；
that we receive material for reasoning； and antecedently to them we
possess no a priori conceptions of objects fr