although phenomena are not things in themselves； and are
nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized； it is my
duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold
in phenomena themselves； while the representation of this manifold
in apprehension is always successive。 For example； the apprehension of
the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me； is
successive。 Now es the question whether the manifold of this
house is in itself successive… which no one will be at all willing
to grant。 But； so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the
transcendental signification thereof； I find that the house is not a
thing in itself； but only a phenomenon； that is； a representation； the
transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown。 What then am I
to understand by the question： 〃How can the manifold be connected in
the phenomenon itself… not considered as a thing in itself； but merely
as a phenomenon？〃 Here that which lies in my successive apprehension
is regarded as representation； whilst the phenomenon which is given
me； notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a plex of these
representations； is regarded as the object thereof； with which my
conception； drawn from the representations of apprehension； must
harmonize。 It is very soon seen that； as accordance of the cognition
with its object constitutes truth； the question now before us can only
relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth； and that the
phenomenon； in opposition to the representations of apprehension；
can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them； if it is
subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other
apprehension； and which renders necessary a mode of connection of
the manifold。 That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of
this necessary rule of apprehension； is the object。
Let us now proceed to our task。 That something happens； that is to
say； that something or some state exists which before was not；
cannot be empirically perceived； unless a phenomenon precedes； which
does not contain in itself this state。 For a reality which should
follow upon a void time； in other words； a beginning； which no state
of things precedes； can just as little be apprehended as the void time
itself。 Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which
follows upon another perception。 But as this is the case with all
synthesis of apprehension； as I have shown above in the example of a
house； my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently
distinguished from other apprehensions。 But I remark also that if in a
phenomenon which contains an occurrence； I call the antecedent state
of my perception； A； and the following state； B； the perception B
can only follow A in apprehension； and the perception A cannot
follow B； but only precede it。 For example； I see a ship float down
the stream of a river。 My perception of its place lower down follows
upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river； and
it is impossible that； in the apprehension of this phenomenon； the
vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the
stream。 Here； therefore； the order in the sequence of perceptions in
apprehension is determined； and by this order apprehension is
regulated。 In the former example； my perceptions in the apprehension
of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation； or
vice versa； or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical
intuition； by going from left to right； and from right to left。
Accordingly； in the series of these perceptions； there was no
determined order； which necessitated my beginning at a certain
point； in order empirically to connect the manifold。 But this rule
is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens；
and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the
apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary。
I must； therefore； in the present case； deduce the subjective
sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena； for
otherwise the former is quite undetermined； and one phenomenon is
not distinguishable from another。 The former alone proves nothing as
to the connection of the manifold in an object； for it is quite
arbitrary。 The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a
phenomenon； according to which order the apprehension of one thing
（that which happens） follows that of another thing （which precedes）；
in conformity with a rule。 In this way alone can I be authorized to
say of the phenomenon itself； and not merely of my own apprehension；
that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein。 That is； in
other words； I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this
order。
In conformity with this rule； then； it is necessary that in that
which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule；
according to which in this event follows always and necessarily； but I
cannot reverse this and go back from the event； and determine （by
apprehension） that which antecedes it。 For no phenomenon goes back
from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point； although
it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time； from a given
time； on the other hand； there is always a necessary progression to
the determined succeeding time。 Therefore； because there certainly
is something that follows； I must of necessity connect it with
something else； which antecedes； and upon which it follows； in
conformity with a rule； that is necessarily； so that the event； as
conditioned； affords certain indication of a condition； and this
condition determines the event。
Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event； upon which this event
must follow in conformity with a rule。 All sequence of perception
would then exist only in apprehension； that is to say； would be merely
subjective； and it could not thereby be objectively determined what
thing ought to precede； and what ought to follow in perception。 In
such a case； we should have nothing but a play of representations；
which would possess no application to any object。 That is to say； it
would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon
from another； as regards relations of time； because the succession
in the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort； and
therefore there would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the
succession； and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary。
And； in this case； I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow
one upon the other； but only that one apprehension follows upon
another。 But this is merely subjective； and does not determine an
object； and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an
object… not even in the phenomenal world。
Accordingly； when we know in experience that something happens； we
always presuppose that something precedes； whereupon it follows in
conformity with a rule。 For otherwise I could not say of the object
that it follows； because the mere succession in my apprehension； if it
be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding； does
not authorize succession in the object。 Only； therefore； in
reference to a rule； according to which phenomena are determined in
their sequence； that is； as they happen； by the preceding state； can I
make my subjective synthesis （of apprehension） objective； and it is
only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is
possible。
No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all
the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the
procedure of the human understanding。 According to these opinions；
it is by means of the perception and parison of similar
consequences following upon certain antecedent phenomena that the
understanding is led to the discovery of a rule； according to which
certain events always follow certain phenomena； and it is only by this
process that we attain to the conception of cause。 Upon such a
basis； it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical；
and the rule which it furnishes us with… 〃Everything that happens must
have a cause〃… would be just as contingent as experience itself。 The
universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly
spurious attributes of it。 Indeed； it could not possess universal
validity； inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori； but
founded on deduction。 But the same is the case with this law as with
other pure a priori representations （e。g。； space and time）； which we
can draw in perfect clearness and pleteness from experience； only
because we had already placed them therein； and by that means； and
by that alone； had rendered experience possible。 Indeed； the logical
clearness of this representation of a rule； determining the series
of events； is possible only when we have made use thereof in
experience。 Nevertheless； the recognition of this rule； as a condition
of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time； was the ground of
experience itself and consequently preceded it a priori。
It is now our duty to show by an example that we never； even in
experience； attribute to an object the notion of succession or
effect （of an event… that is； the happening of something that did
not exist before）； and distinguish it from the subjective succession
of apprehension； unless when a rule lies at the foundation； which
pels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any
other； and that； indeed； it is this necessity which first renders
possible the representation of a succession in the object。
We have representations within us； of which also we can be
conscious。 But； however widely extended； however accurate and
thoroughgoing this consciousness may be； these representations are
still nothing more than representations； that is； internal
determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time。 Now how
happens it that to these representations we should set an object； or
that； in addition to their subjective reality； as modifications； we
should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective
reality？ It is clear that objective significancy cannot consist in a
relation to another representation （of that whi