substance； it does not follow that the conception of influence； that
is； how one substance can be the cause of something in another
substance； will be understood from that。 Thus it is evident that a
particular act of the understanding is here necessary； and so in the
other instances。
III。 With respect to one category； namely； that of munity；
which is found in the third class； it is not so easy as with the
others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive
judgement which corresponds to it in the table of the logical
functions。
In order to assure ourselves of this accordance； we must observe
that in every disjunctive judgement； the sphere of the judgement （that
is； the plex of all that is contained in it） is represented as a
whole divided into parts； and； since one part cannot be contained in
the other； they are cogitated as co…ordinated with； not subordinated
to each other； so that they do not determine each other
unilaterally； as in a linear series； but reciprocally； as in an
aggregate… （if one member of the division is posited； all the rest are
excluded； and conversely）。
Now a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things； for one
thing is not subordinated； as effect； to another as cause of its
existence； but； on the contrary； is co…ordinated contemporaneously and
reciprocally； as a cause in relation to the determination of the
others （for example； in a body… the parts of which mutually attract
and repel each other）。 And this is an entirely different kind of
connection from that which we find in the mere relation of the cause
to the effect （the principle to the consequence）； for in such a
connection the consequence does not in its turn determine the
principle； and therefore does not constitute； with the latter； a
whole… just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole。
The process of understanding by which it represents to itself the
sphere of a divided conception； is employed also when we think of a
thing as divisible； and in the same manner as the members of the
division in the former exclude one another； and yet are connected in
one sphere； so the understanding represents to itself the parts of the
latter； as having… each of them… an existence （as substances）；
independently of the others； and yet as united in one whole。
SS 8
In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one
more leading division； which contains pure conceptions of the
understanding； and which； although not numbered among the
categories； ought； according to them； as conceptions a priori； to be
valid of objects。 But in this case they would augment the number of
the categories； which cannot be。 These are set forth in the
proposition； so renowned among the schoolmen… 〃Quodlibet ens est UNUM；
VERUM； BONUM。〃 Now； though the inferences from this principle were
mere tautological propositions； and though it is allowed only by
courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics； yet a thought
which maintained itself for such a length of time； however empty it
seems to be； deserves an investigation of its origin； and justifies
the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the
understanding； which； as is often the case； has only been
erroneously interpreted。 These pretended transcendental predicates
are； in fact； nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all
cognition of objects； and they employ； as the basis for this
cognition； the categories of quantity； namely； unity； plurality； and
totality。 But these； which must be taken as material conditions；
that is； as belonging to the possibility of things themselves； they
employed merely in a formal signification； as belonging to the logical
requisites of all cognition； and yet most unguardedly changed these
criteria of thought into properties of objects； as things in
themselves。 Now； in every cognition of an object； there is unity of
conception； which may be called qualitative unity； so far as by this
term we understand only the unity in our connection of the manifold；
for example； unity of the theme in a play； an oration； or a story。
Secondly； there is truth in respect of the deductions from it。 The
more true deductions we have from a given conception； the more
criteria of its objective reality。 This we might call the
qualitative plurality of characteristic marks； which belong to a
conception as to a mon foundation； but are not cogitated as a
quantity in it。 Thirdly； there is perfection… which consists in
this； that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the
conception； and accords pletely with that conception and with no
other。 This we may denominate qualitative pleteness。 Hence it is
evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition
are merely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed
to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them。 That is to say； the
three categories； in which the unity in the production of the
quantum must be homogeneous throughout； are transformed solely with
a view to the connection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one
act of consciousness； by means of the quality of the cognition；
which is the principle of that connection。 Thus the criterion of the
possibility of a conception （not of its object） is the definition of
it； in which the unity of the conception； the truth of all that may be
immediately deduced from it； and finally； the pleteness of what has
been thus deduced； constitute the requisites for the reproduction of
the whole conception。 Thus also； the criterion or test of an
hypothesis is the intelligibility of the received principle of
explanation； or its unity （without help from any subsidiary
hypothesis）… the truth of our deductions from it （consistency with
each other and with experience）… and lastly； the pleteness of the
principle of the explanation of these deductions； which refer to
neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis；
restoring analytically and a posteriori； what was cogitated
synthetically and a priori。 By the conceptions； therefore； of unity；
truth； and perfection； we have made no addition to the
transcendental table of the categories； which is plete without
them。 We have； on the contrary； merely employed the three categories
of quantity； setting aside their application to objects of experience；
as general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with itself。
CHAPTER II Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the
Understanding。
SECTION I Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction
in general。 SS 9
Teachers of jurisprudence； when speaking of rights and claims；
distinguish in a cause the question of right （quid juris） from the
question of fact （quid facti）； and while they demand proof of both；
they give to the proof of the former； which goes to establish right or
claim in law； the name of deduction。 Now we make use of a great number
of empirical conceptions； without opposition from any one； and
consider ourselves； even without any attempt at deduction； justified
in attaching to them a sense； and a supposititious signification；
because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their
objective reality。 There exist also； however； usurped conceptions；
such as fortune； fate； which circulate with almost universal
indulgence； and yet are occasionally challenged by the question； 〃quid
juris？〃 In such cases； we have great difficulty in discovering any
deduction for these terms； inasmuch as we cannot produce any
manifest ground of right； either from experience or from reason； on
which the claim to employ them can be founded。
Among the many conceptions； which make up the very variegated web of
human cognition； some are destined for pure use a priori；
independent of all experience； and their title to be so employed
always requires a deduction； inasmuch as； to justify such use of them；
proofs from experience are not sufficient； but it is necessary to know
how these conceptions can apply to objects without being derived
from experience。 I term； therefore； an examination of the manner in
which conceptions can apply a priori to objects； the transcendental
deduction of conceptions； and I distinguish it from the empirical
deduction； which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained
through experience and reflection thereon； consequently； does not
concern itself with the right； but only with the fact of our obtaining
conceptions in such and such a manner。 We have already seen that we
are in possession of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions；
which nevertheless agree with each other in this； that they both apply
to objects pletely a priori。 These are the conceptions of space and
time as forms of sensibility； and the categories as pure conceptions
of the understanding。 To attempt an empirical deduction of either of
these classes would be labour in vain； because the distinguishing
characteristic of their nature consists in this； that they apply to
their objects； without having borrowed anything from experience
towards the representation of them。 Consequently； if a deduction of
these conceptions is necessary； it must always be transcendental。
Meanwhile； with respect to these conceptions； as with respect to all
our cognition； we certainly may discover in experience； if not the
principle of their possibility； yet the occasioning causes of their
production。 It will be found that the impressions of sense give the
first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of
cognition； and for the production of experience； which contains two
very dissimilar elements； namely； a matter for cognition； given by the
senses； and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter； arising
out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought； and these； on
occasion given by sensuous impressions； are called into exercise and
produce conceptions。 Such an investigation into the first efforts of
our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to
general conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility； and we have to
thank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this
inquiry。 But a deduction of the pure a