（that is； the figure）； which； therefore； must necessarily be found
in the object； because the object is given before your cognition；
and not by means of it。 If； therefore； space （and time also） were
not a mere form of your intuition； which contains conditions a priori；
under which alone things can bee external objects for you； and
without which subjective conditions the objects are in themselves
nothing； you could not construct any synthetical proposition
whatsoever regarding external objects。 It is therefore not merely
possible or probable； but indubitably certain； that space and time； as
the necessary conditions of all our external and internal
experience； are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions； in
relation to which all objects are therefore mere phenomena； and not
things in themselves； presented to us in this particular manner。 And
for this reason； in respect to the form of phenomena； much may be said
a priori； whilst of the thing in itself； which may lie at the
foundation of these phenomena； it is impossible to say anything。
II。 In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external
as well as internal sense； consequently of all objects of sense； as
mere phenomena； we may especially remark that all in our cognition
that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations。
（The feelings of pain and pleasure； and the will； which are not
cognitions； are excepted。） The relations； to wit； of place in an
intuition （extension）； change of place （motion）； and laws according to
which this change is determined （moving forces）。 That； however；
which is present in this or that place； or any operation going on；
or result taking place in the things themselves； with the exception of
change of place； is not given to us by intuition。 Now by means of mere
relations； a thing cannot be known in itself； and it may therefore
be fairly concluded； that； as through the external sense nothing but
mere representations of relations are given us； the said external
sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the
object to the subject； but not the essential nature of the object as a
thing in itself。
The same is the case with the internal intuition； not only
because； in the internal intuition； the representation of the external
senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied； but
because time； in which we place； and which itself antecedes the
consciousness of； these representations in experience； and which； as
the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed
in the mind； lies at the foundation of them； contains relations of the
successive； the coexistent； and of that which always must be
coexistent with succession； the permanent。 Now that which； as
representation； can antecede every exercise of thought （of an object）；
is intuition； and when it contains nothing but relations； it is the
form of the intuition； which； as it presents us with no
representation； except in so far as something is placed in the mind；
can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its
own activity； to wit… its presenting to itself representations；
consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself； that
is； it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form。
Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far
phenomenal； consequently； we must either refuse altogether to admit an
internal sense； or the subject； which is the object of that sense；
could only be represented by it as phenomenon； and not as it would
judge of itself； if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity； that
is； were intellectual。 The difficulty here lies wholly in the
question： How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself？
But this difficulty is mon to every theory。 The consciousness of
self （apperception） is the simple representation of the 〃ego〃； and
if by means of that representation alone； all the manifold
representations in the subject were spontaneously given； then our
internal intuition would be intellectual。 This consciousness in man
requires an internal perception of the manifold representations
which are previously given in the subject； and the manner in which
these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity； must；
on account of this difference （the want of spontaneity）； be called
sensibility。 If the faculty of self…consciousness is to apprehend what
lies in the mind； it must all act that and can in this way alone
produce an intuition of self。 But the form of this intuition； which
lies in the original constitution of the mind； determines； in the
representation of time； the manner in which the manifold
representations are to bine themselves in the mind； since the
subject intuites itself； not as it would represent itself
immediately and spontaneously； but according to the manner in which
the mind is internally affected； consequently； as it appears； and
not as it is。
III。 When we say that the intuition of external objects； and also
the self…intuition of the subject； represent both； objects and
subject； in space and time； as they affect our senses； that is； as
they appear… this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these
objects are mere illusory appearances。 For when we speak of things
as phenomena； the objects； nay； even the properties which we ascribe
to them； are looked upon as really given； only that； in so far as this
or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject； in
the relation of the given object to the subject； the object as
phenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in
itself。 Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to
me； or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self…consciousness；
although I maintain that the properties of space and time； in
conformity to which I set both； as the condition of their existence；
abide in my mode of intuition； and not in the objects in themselves。
It would be my own fault； if out of that which I should reckon as
phenomenon； I made mere illusory appearance。* But this will not
happen； because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous
intuitions。 On the contrary； if we ascribe objective reality to
these forms of representation； it bees impossible to avoid changing
everything into mere appearance。 For if we regard space and time as
properties； which must be found in objects as things in themselves； as
sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence； and reflect
on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved；
inasmuch as we are pelled to admit the existence of two infinite
things； which are nevertheless not substances； nor anything really
inhering in substances； nay； to admit that they are the necessary
conditions of the existence of all things； and moreover； that they
must continue to exist； although all existing things were annihilated…
we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere
illusory appearances。 Nay； even our own existence； which would in this
case depend upon the self…existent reality of such a mere nonentity as
time； would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance… an
absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of。
*The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object
itself in relation to our sensuous faculty； for example； the red
colour or the perfume to the rose。 But （illusory） appearance never can
be attributed as a predicate to an object； for this very reason；
that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it
only in relation to our sensuous faculty； or to the subject in
general； e。g。； the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn。
That which is never to be found in the object itself； but always in
the relation of the object to the subject； and which moreover is
inseparable from our representation of the object； we denominate
phenomenon。 Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly
attributed to objects of the senses as such； and in this there is no
illusion。 On the contrary； if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing
in itself； or to Saturn his handles； or extension to all external
objects； considered as things in themselves； without regarding the
determinate relation of these objects to the subject； and without
limiting my judgement to that relation… then； and then only； arises
illusion。
IV。 In natural theology； where we think of an object… God… which
never can be an object of intuition to us； and even to himself can
never be an object of sensuous intuition； we carefully avoid
attributing to his intuition the conditions of space and time… and
intuition all his cognition must be； and not thought； which always
includes limitation。 But with what right can we do this if we make
them forms of objects as things in themselves； and such； moreover；
as would continue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence
of things； even though the things themselves were annihilated？ For
as conditions of all existence in general； space and time must be
conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also。 But if we do
not thus make them objective forms of all things； there is no other
way left than to make them subjective forms of our mode of
intuition… external and internal； which is called sensuous； because it
is not primitive； that is； is not such as gives in itself the
existence of the object of the intuition （a mode of intuition which；
so far as we can judge； can belong only to the Creator）； but is
dependent on the existence of the object； is possible； therefore； only
on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is
affected by the object。
It is； moreover； not necessary that we should limit the mode of
intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man。 It may
well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this
respect agree with man （though as to this we cannot decide）； but
sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be
sensibility； for this very reason； that it is a deduced （intuitus
derivativus）； and not an original （intuitus originarius）； consequently
not an intellectual intuition； and this intuition； as such； fo