course in the case of a patient who is in danger； but is ignorant of
the nature of the disease。 He observes the symptoms； and concludes；
according to the best of his judgement； that it is a case of phthisis。
His belief is； even in his own judgement； only contingent： another man
might； perhaps e nearer the truth。 Such a belief； contingent
indeed； but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for
the attainment of certain ends； I term Pragmatical belief。
The usual test； whether that which any one maintains is merely his
persuasion； or his subjective conviction at least； that is； his firm
belief； is a bet。 It frequently happens that a man delivers his
opinions with so much boldness and assurance； that he appears to be
under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error。 The
offer of a bet startles him； and makes him pause。 Sometimes it turns
out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat； but not at ten。
For he does not hesitate； perhaps； to venture a ducat； but if it is
proposed to stake ten； he immediately bees aware of the possibility
of his being mistaken… a possibility which has hitherto escaped his
observation。 If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the
happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition； our
judgement drops its air of triumph； we take the alarm； and discover
the actual strength of our belief。 Thus pragmatical belief has
degrees； varying in proportion to the interests at stake。
Now； in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in
reference to some object； and where； accordingly； our judgement is
purely theoretical； we can still represent to ourselves； in thought；
the possibility of a course of action； for which we suppose that we
have sufficient grounds； if any means existed of ascertaining the
truth of the matter。 Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements
an analogon of practical judgements； to which the word belief may
properly be applied； and which we may term doctrinal belief。 I
should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition…
if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of
experience… that； at least； some one of the planets； which we see；
is inhabited。 Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion； but
the strong belief； on the correctness of which I would stake even many
of the advantages of life； that there are inhabitants in other worlds。
Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God
belongs to doctrinal belief。 For； although in respect to the
theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any
theory which necessarily involves this idea； as the condition of my
explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents； but； on
the contrary； am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything
were mere nature； still teleological unity is so important a condition
of the application of my reason to nature； that it is impossible for
me to ignore it… especially since； in addition to these
considerations； abundant examples of it are supplied by experience。
But the sole condition； so far as my knowledge extends； under which
this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature； is the
assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things
according to the wisest ends。 Consequently； the hypothesis of a wise
author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the
investigation of nature… is the condition under which alone I can
fulfil an end which is contingent indeed； but by no means unimportant。
Moreover； since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the
utility of this assumption； and since nothing decisive can be
adduced against it； it follows that it would be saying far too
little to term my judgement； in this case； a mere opinion； and that；
even in this theoretical connection； I may assert that I firmly
believe in God。 Still； if we use words strictly； this must not be
called a practical； but a doctrinal belief； which the theology of
nature （physico…theology） must also produce in my mind。 In the
wisdom of a Supreme Being； and in the shortness of life； so inadequate
to the development of the glorious powers of human nature； we may find
equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal belief in the future life
of the human soul。
The expression of belief is； in such cases； an expression of modesty
from the objective point of view； but； at the same time； of firm
confidence； from the subjective。 If I should venture to term this
merely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am
entitled to assume； a more plete conception； with regard to another
world and to the cause of the world； might then be justly required
of me than I am； in reality； able to give。 For； if I assume
anything； even as a mere hypothesis； I must； at least； know so much of
the properties of such a being as will enable me； not to form the
conception； but to imagine the existence of it。 But the word belief
refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me； and to its
subjective influence on the conduct of my reason； which forces me to
hold it fast； though I may not be in a position to give a
speculative account of it。
But mere doctrinal belief is； to some extent； wanting in
stability。 We often quit our hold of it； in consequence of the
difficulties which occur in speculation； though in the end we
inevitably return to it again。
It is quite otherwise with moral belief。 For in this sphere action
is absolutely necessary； that is； I must act in obedience to the moral
law in all points。 The end is here incontrovertibly established； and
there is only one condition possible； according to the best of my
perception； under which this end can harmonize with all other ends；
and so have practical validity… namely； the existence of a God and
of a future world。 I know also； to a certainty； that no one can be
acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity
of ends under the moral law。 But since the moral precept is； at the
same time； my maxim （as reason requires that it should be）； I am
irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a
future life； and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this
belief； since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims； the
renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes。
Thus； while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond
the limits of experience end in disappointment； there is still
enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view。 No one； it
is true； will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a
future life； for； if he knows this； be is just the man whom I have
long wished to find。 All knowledge； regarding an object of mere
reason； can be municated； and I should thus be enabled to hope that
my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension； through the
instrumentality of his instruction。 No； my conviction is not
logical； but moral certainty； and since it rests on subjective grounds
（of the moral sentiment）； I must not even say： It is morally certain
that there is a God； etc。； but： I am morally certain； that is； my
belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral
nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former
torn from me as of losing the latter。
The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is
that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral
sentiments。 If we give up this assumption； and take a man who is
entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws； the question which
reason proposes； bees then merely a problem for speculation and
may； indeed； be supported by strong grounds from analogy； but not by
such as will pel the most obstinate scepticism to give way。* But in
these questions no man is free from all interest。 For though the
want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral
interests； still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear
the existence of God and a future life。 For he cannot pretend to any
certainty of the non…existence of God and of a future life； unless…
since it could only be proved by mere reason； and therefore
apodeictically… he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both；
which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do。 This would be
a negative belief； which could not； indeed； produce morality and
good sentiments； but still could produce an analogon of these； by
operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil
dispositions。
*The human mind （as； I believe； every rational being must of
necessity do） takes a natural interest in morality； although this
interest is not undivided； and may not be practically in
preponderance。 If you strengthen and increase it； you will find the
reason bee docile； more enlightened； and more capable of uniting
the speculative interest with the practical。 But if you do not take
care at the outset； or at least midway； to make men good； you will
never force them into an honest belief。
But； it will be said； is this all that pure reason can effect； in
opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience？ Nothing more
than two articles of belief？ mon sense could have done as much as
this； without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter！
I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason…
even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only
negative… for on this point something more will be said in the next
section。 But； I ask； do you require that that knowledge which concerns
all men； should transcend the mon understanding； and should only be
revealed to you by philosophers？ The very circumstance which has
called forth your censure； is the best confirmation of the correctness
of our previous assertions； since it discloses； what could not have
been foreseen； that Nature is not chargeable with any partial
distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men
without distinction and that； in respect to the essential ends of
human nature； we cannot advance further with the help of the highest
philosophy； than under the guidance which natu