deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument； and thus
enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported。 If
an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds； he may be
refuted with ease； not； however to the advantage of the dogmatist； who
likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like
manner driven into a corner by his opponent。 But； if parties employ
the direct method of procedure； they will soon discover the
difficulty； nay； the impossibility of proving their assertions； and
will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence； or they will；
by the help of criticism； discover with ease the dogmatical
illusions by which they had been mocked； and pel reason to renounce
its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight and to confine
itself within the limits of its proper sphere… that of practical
principles。
CHAPTER II。 The Canon of Pure Reason。
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is
inpetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation； but； on
the contrary； stands in need of discipline to check its deviations
from the straight path and to expose the illusions which it
originates。 But； on the other hand； this consideration ought to
elevate and to give it confidence； for this discipline is exercised by
itself alone； and it is subject to the censure of no other power。
The bounds； moreover； which it is forced to set to its speculative
exercise； form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of
opponents； and thus what remains of its possessions； after these
exaggerated claims have been disallowed； is secure from attack or
usurpation。 The greatest； and perhaps the only； use of all
philosophy of pure reason is； accordingly； of a purely negative
character。 It is not an organon for the extension； but a discipline
for the determination； of the limits of its exercise； and without
laying claim to the discovery of new truth； it has the modest merit of
guarding against error。
At the same time； there must be some source of positive cognitions
which belong to the domain of pure reason and which bee the
causes of error only from our mistaking their true character； while
they form the goal towards which reason continually strives。 How
else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human
mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the
world of experience？ It hopes to attain to the possession of a
knowledge in which it has the deepest interest。 It enters upon the
path of pure speculation； but in vain。 We have some reason； however；
to expect that； in the only other way that lies open to it… the path
of practical reason… it may meet with better success。
I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the
proper employment of certain faculties of cognition。 Thus general
logic； in its analytical department； is a formal canon for the
faculties of understanding and reason。 In the same way； Transcendental
Analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding； for it
alone is petent to enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions。
But； when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is
possible； no canon can exist。 But the synthetical cognition of pure
speculative reason is； as has been shown； pletely impossible。 There
cannot； therefore； exist any canon for the speculative exercise of
this faculty… for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical；
and； consequently； transcendental logic； in this respect； is merely
a discipline； and not a canon。 If； then； there is any proper mode of
employing the faculty of pure reason… in which case there must be a
canon for this faculty… this canon will relate； not to the
speculative； but to the practical use of reason。 This canon we now
proceed to investigate。
SECTION I。 Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason。
There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture
beyond the field of experience； to attempt to reach the utmost
bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone； and not to rest
satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of
its cognitions into a self…subsistent systematic whole。 Is the
motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative； or in its
practical interests alone？
Setting aside； at present； the results of the labours of pure reason
in its speculative exercise； I shall merely inquire regarding the
problems the solution of which forms its ultimate aim； whether reached
or not； and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and
intermediate。 These highest aims must； from the nature of reason；
possess plete unity； otherwise the highest interest of humanity
could not be successfully promoted。
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things：
the freedom of the will； the immortality of the soul； and the
existence of God。 The speculative interest which reason has in those
questions is very small； and； for its sake alone； we should not
undertake the labour of transcendental investigation… a labour full of
toil and ceaseless struggle。 We should be loth to undertake this
labour； because the discoveries we might make would not be of the
smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation。 We
may find out that the will is free； but this knowledge only relates to
the intelligible cause of our volition。 As regards the phenomena or
expressions of this will； that is； our actions； we are bound； in
obedience to an inviolable maxim； without which reason cannot be
employed in the sphere of experience； to explain these in the same way
as we explain all the other phenomena of nature； that is to say；
according to its unchangeable laws。 We may have discovered the
spirituality and immortality of the soul； but we cannot employ this
knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life； nor the peculiar
nature of the future； because our conception of an incorporeal
nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our
knowledge； and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely
fictitious。 If； again； we prove the existence of a supreme
intelligence； we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims
existing in the arrangement of the world prehensible； but we should
not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or
disposition； or inferring any where it is not perceived。 For it is a
necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not
overlook natural causes； or refuse to listen to the teaching of
experience； for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from
something that transcends all our knowledge。 In one word； these
three propositions are； for the speculative reason； always
transcendent； and cannot be employed as immanent principles in
relation to the objects of experience； they are； consequently； of no
use to us in this sphere； being but the valueless results of the
severe but unprofitable efforts of reason。
If； then； the actual cognition of these three cardinal
propositions is perfectly useless； while Reason uses her utmost
endeavours to induce us to admit them； it is plain that their real
value and importance relate to our practical； and not to our
speculative interest。
I term all that is possible through free will； practical。 But if the
conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical； reason
can have only a regulative； and not a constitutive； influence upon it；
and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its
empirical laws。 In the moral philosophy of prudence； for example；
the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends；
which are aimed at by our inclinations； into one ultimate end… that of
happiness… and to show the agreement which should exist among the
means of attaining that end。 In this sphere； accordingly； reason
cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action；
for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses； and is
inpetent to give us laws which are pure and determined pletely a
priori。 On the other hand； pure practical laws； the ends of which have
been given by reason entirely a priori； and which are not
empirically conditioned； but are； on the contrary； absolutely
imperative in their nature； would be products of pure reason。 Such are
the moral laws； and these alone belong to the sphere of the
practical exercise of reason； and admit of a canon。
All the powers of reason； in the sphere of what may be termed pure
philosophy； are； in fact； directed to the three above…mentioned
problems alone。 These again have a still higher end… the answer to the
question； what we ought to do； if the will is free； if there is a
God and a future world。 Now； as this problem relates to our in
reference to the highest aim of humanity； it is evident that the
ultimate intention of nature； in the constitution of our reason； has
been directed to the moral alone。
We must take care； however； in turning our attention to an object
which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philosophy； not to
injure the unity of our system by digressions； nor； on the other hand；
to fail in clearness； by saying too little on the new subject of
discussion。 I hope to avoid both extremes； by keeping as close as
possible to the transcendental； and excluding all psychological；
that is； empirical； elements。
*All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain；
and consequently… in an indirect manner； at least… to objects of
feeling。 But as feeling is not a faculty of representation； but lies
out of the sphere of our powers of cognition； the elements of our
judgements； in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain； that is； the
elements of our practical judgements； do not belong to
transcendental philosophy； which has to do with pure a priori
cognitions alone。
I have to remark； in the first place； that at present I treat of the
conception of freedom in the practical sense only； and set aside the
corresponding transcendental conception； which cannot be employed as a
ground of explanation in the phenomenal world； but is itself a problem
for pure reason。 A will is purely animal （arbitrium brutum） when it i