ground； for the purpose of being able to cogitate the universality
of the principle in a more determinate way。 For example； I cogitate
the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental
idea。 But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in
itself； because all of the conceptions by which I can cogitate an
object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of its
existence； nay； the conditions of the objective validity of my
conceptions are excluded by the idea… by the very fact of its being an
idea。 The conceptions of reality； substance； causality； nay； even that
of necessity in existence； have no significance out of the sphere of
empirical cognition； and cannot； beyond that sphere； determine any
object。 They may； accordingly； be employed to explain the
possibility of things in the world of sense； but they are utterly
inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself
considered as a whole； because in this case the ground of
explanation must lie out of and beyond the world； and cannot；
therefore； be an object of possible experience。 Now； I may admit the
existence of an inprehensible being of this nature… the object of a
mere idea； relatively to the world of sense； although I have no ground
to admit its existence absolutely and in itself。 For if an idea
（that of a systematic and plete unity； of which I shall presently
speak more particularly） lies at the foundation of the most extended
empirical employment of reason； and if this idea cannot be
adequately represented in concreto； although it is indispensably
necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest
possible degree… I am not only authorized； but pelled； to realize
this idea； that is； to posit a real object corresponding thereto。
But I cannot profess to know this object； it is to me merely a
something； to which； as the ground of systematic unity in cognition； I
attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed
by the understanding in the sphere of experience。 Following the
analogy of the notions of reality； substance； causality； and
necessity； I cogitate a being； which possesses all these attributes in
the highest degree； and； as this idea is the offspring of my reason
alone； I cogitate this being as self…subsistent reason； and as the
cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest
possible harmony and unity。 Thus I abstract all conditions that
would limit my idea； solely for the purpose of rendering systematic
unity possible in the world of empirical diversity； and thus
securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in
that sphere。 This I am enabled to do； by regarding all connections and
relations in the world of sense； as if they were the dispositions of a
supreme reason； of which our reason is but a faint image。 I then
proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions which have；
properly； no meaning or application； except in the world of sense。 But
as I am authorized to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a
being in a relative respect alone； that is； as the substratum of the
greatest possible unity in experience… I may attribute to a being
which I regard as distinct from the world； such properties as belong
solely to the sphere of sense and experience。 For I do not desire； and
am not justified in desiring； to cognize this object of my idea； as it
exists in itself； for I possess no conceptions sufficient for or task；
those of reality； substance； causality； nay； even that of necessity in
existence； losing all significance； and being merely the signs of
conceptions； without content and without applicability； when I attempt
to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense。 I cogitate
merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest
possible systematic unity of experience； solely for the purpose of
employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs
reason in its empirical exercise。
It is evident； at the first view； that we cannot presuppose the
reality of this transcendental object； by means of the conceptions
of reality； substance； causality； and so on； because these conceptions
cannot be applied to anything that is distinct from the world of
sense。 Thus the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely
relative； it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of
experience； such a being is but a something； of whose existence in
itself we have not the least conception。 Thus； too； it bees
sufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being in
relation to objects given by sense； although we can never have the
least conception of this being； or of its absolute necessity。
And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental
dialectic； and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason… which
bee dialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness。
Pure reason is； in fact； occupied with itself； and not with any
object。 Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of
an empirical conception； it is only the cognitions of the
understanding that are presented to it； for the purpose of receiving
the unity of a rational conception； that is； of being connected
according to a principle。 The unity of reason is the unity of
system； and this systematic unity is not an objective principle；
extending its dominion over objects； but a subjective maxim； extending
its authority over the empirical cognition of objects。 The
systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment
of the understanding not only advances the extension of that
employment； but ensures its correctness； and thus the principle of a
systematic unity of this nature is also objective； although only in an
indefinite respect （principium vagum）。 It is not； however； a
constitutive principle； determining an object to which it directly
relates； it is merely a regulative principle or maxim； advancing and
strengthening the empirical exercise of reason； by the opening up of
new paths of which the understanding is ignorant； while it never
conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience。
But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity； without at the
same time cogitating an object of the idea… an object that cannot be
presented in any experience； which contains no concrete example of a
plete systematic unity。 This being （ens rationis ratiocinatae） is
therefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real
absolutely and in itself。 On the contrary； it forms merely the
problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces
among the phenomena of the sensuous world。 We look upon this
connection； in the light of the above…mentioned idea； as if it drew
its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea。
And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure
foundation for the systematic unity of experience… a unity
indispensable to reason； advantageous to the understanding； and
promotive of the interests of empirical cognition。
We mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an
enouncement； or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of
a real thing； which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a
systematic constitution of the universe。 On the contrary； it is left
pletely undetermined what the nature or properties of this
so…called ground may be。 The idea is merely to be adopted as a point
of view； from which this unity； so essential to reason and so
beneficial to the understanding； may be regarded as radiating。 In
one word； this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a
regulative principle； by means of which Reason； so far as in her lies；
extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of
experience。
The first object of an idea of this kind is the ego； considered
merely as a thinking nature or soul。 If I wish to investigate the
properties of a thinking being； I must interrogate experience。 But I
find that I can apply none of the categories to this object； the
schema of these categories； which is the condition of their
application； being given only in sensuous intuition。 But I cannot thus
attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena
of the internal sense。 Instead； therefore； of an empirical
conception of what the soul really is； reason takes the conception
of the empirical unity of all thought； and； by cogitating this unity
as unconditioned and primitive； constructs the rational conception
or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable；
possessing personal identity； and in connection with other real things
external to it； in one word； it constructs the idea of a simple
self…subsistent intelligence。 But the real aim of reason in this
procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for
the explanation of the phenomena of the soul。 That is； reason
desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal
sense as existing in one subject； all powers as deduced from one
fundamental power； all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a
being which is permanent and always the same； and all phenomena in
space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of
thought。 Essential simplicity （with the other attributes predicated of
the ego） is regarded as the mere schema of this regulative
principle； it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the
properties of the soul。 For these properties may rest upon quite
different grounds； of which we are pletely ignorant； just as the
above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it
is in itself； even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it；
inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea； which cannot be represented
in concreto。 Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea
of this kind； if we only take proper care not to consider it as more
than an idea； that is； if we regard it as valid merely in relation
to the employment of reason； in the sphere of the phenomena of the
soul。 Under the guidance of this idea； or principle； no empirical laws
of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain that which