philebus- 第10部分

out　of　the　communion　of　external　and　internal　sensations　in　the



body；　there　are　also　cases　in　which　the　mind　contributes　an；



opposite　element　to　the　body；　whether　of　pleasure　or　pain；　and　the　two



unite　and　form　one　mixture。　Concerning　these　I　have　already



remarked；　that　when　a　man　is　empty　he　desires　to　be　full；　and　has



pleasure　in　hope　and　pain　in　vacuity。　But　now　I　must　further　add



what　I　omitted　before；　that　in　all　these　and　similar　emotions　in　which



body　and　mind　are　opposed　（and　they　are　innumerable）；　pleasure　and



pain　coalesce　in　one。



　　Pro。　I　believe　that　to　be　quite　true。



　　Soc。　There　still　remains　one　other　sort　of　admixture　of　pleasures



and　pains。



　　Pro。　What　is　that？



　　Soc。　The　union　which；　as　we　were　saying；　the　mind　often



experiences　of　purely　mental　feelings。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Why；　do　we　not　speak　of　anger；　fear；　desire；　sorrow；　love；



emulation；　envy；　and　the　like；　as　pains　which　belong　to　the　soul　only？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　And　shall　we　not　find　them　also　full　of　the　most　wonderful



pleasures？　need　I　remind　you　of　the　anger







　　　　　Which　stirs　even　a　wise　man　to　violence；



　　　　　And　is　sweeter　than　honey　and　the　honeycomb？







And　you　remember　how　pleasures　mingle　with　pains　in　lamentation　and



bereavement？



　　Pro。　Yes；　there　is　a　natural　connection　between　them。



　　Soc。　And　you　remember　also　how　at　the　sight　of　tragedies　the



spectators　smile　through　their　tear？



　　Pro。　Certainly　I　do。



　　Soc。　And　are　you　aware　that　even　at　a　comedy　the　soul　experiences



a　mixed　feeling　of　pain　and　pleasure？



　　Pro。　I　do　not　quite　understand　you。



　　Soc。　I　admit；　Protarchus；　that　there　is　some　difficulty　in



recognizing　this　mixture　of　feelings　at　a　comedy。



　　Pro。　There　is；　I　think。



　　Soc。　And　the　greater　the　obscurity　of　the　case　the　more　desirable



the　examination　of　it　because　the　difficulty　in　detecting　other



cases　of　mixed　pleasures　and　pains　will　be　less。



　　Pro。　Proceed。



　　Soc。　I　have　just　mentioned　envy；　would　you　not　call　that　a　pain　of



the　soul？



　　Pro。　Yes



　　Soc。　And　yet　the　envious　man　finds　something　in　the　misfortunes　of



his　neighbours　at　which　he　is　pleased？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　ignorance；　and　what　is　termed　clownishness；　are　surely　an



evil？



　　Pro。　To　be　sure。



　　Soc。　From　these　considerations　learn　to　know　the　nature　of　the



ridiculous。



　　Pro。　Explain。



　　Soc。　The　ridiculous　is　in　short　the　specific　name　which　is　used　to



describe　the　vicious　form　of　a　certain　habit；　and　of　vice　in　general



it　is　that　kind　which　is　most　at　variance　with　the　inscription　at



Delphi。



　　Pro。　You　mean；　Socrates；　〃Know　thyself。〃



　　Soc。　I　do；　and　the　opposite　would　be；　〃Know　not　thyself。〃



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　now；　O　Protarchus；　try　to　divide　this　into　three。



　　Pro。　Indeed　I　am　afraid　that　I　cannot。



　　Soc。　Do　you　mean　to　say　that　I　must　make　the　division　for　you？



　　Pro。　Yes；　and　what　is　more；　I　beg　that　you　will。



　　Soc。　Are　there　not　three　ways　in　which　ignorance　of　self　may　be



shown？



　　Pro。　What　are　they？



　　Soc。　In　the　first　place；　about　money；　the　ignorant　may　fancy　himself



richer　than　he　is。



　　Pro。　Yes；　that　is　a　very　common　error。



　　Soc。　And　still　more　often　he　will　fancy　that　he　is　taller　or



fairer　than　he　is；　or　that　he　has　some　other　advantage　of　person　which



he　really　has　not。



　　Pro。　Of　course。



　　Soc。　And　yet　surely　by　far　the　greatest　number　err　about　the　goods



of　the　mind；　they　imagine　themselves　to　be　much　better　men　than　they



are。



　　Pro。　Yes；　that　is　by　far　the　commonest　delusion。



　　Soc。　And　of　all　the　virtues；　is　not　wisdom　the　one　which　the　mass　of



mankind　are　always　claiming；　and　which　most　arouses　in　them　a　spirit



of　contention　and　lying　conceit　of　wisdom？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　may　not　all　this　be　truly　called　an　evil　condition？



　　Pro。　Very　evil。



　　Soc　But　we　must　pursue　the　division　a　step　further；　Protarchus；　if



we　would　see　in　envy　of　the　childish　sort　a　singular　mixture　of



pleasure　and　pain。



　　Pro。　How　can　we　make　the　further　division　which　you　suggest？



　　Soc。　All　who　are　silly　enough　to　entertain　this　lying　conceit　of



themselves　may　of　course　be　divided；　like　the　rest　of　mankind；　into



two　classes…one　having　power　and　might；　and　the　other　the　reverse。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Let　this；　then；　be　the　principle　of　division；　those　of　them　who



are　weak　and　unable　to　revenge　themselves；　when　they　are　laughed　at；



may　be　truly　called　ridiculous；　but　those　who　can　defend　themselves



may　be　more　truly　described　as　strong　and　formidable；　for　ignorance　in



the　powerul　is　hateful　and　horrible；　because　hurtful　to　others　both　in



reality　and　in　fiction；　but　powerless　ignorance　may　be　reckoned；　and



in　truth　is；　ridiculous。



　　Pro。　That　is　very　true；　but　I　do　not　as　yet　see　where　is　the



admixture　of　pleasures　and　pains。



　　Soc。　Well；　then；　let　us　examine　the　nature　of　envy。



　　Pro。　Proceed。



　　Soc。　Is　not　envy　an　unrighteous　pleasure；　and　also　an　unrighteous



pain？



　　Pro。　Most　true。



　　Soc。　There　is　nothing　envious　or　wrong　in　rejoicing　at　the



misfortunes　of　enemies？



　　Pro。　Certainly　not。



　　Soc。　But　to　feel　joy　instead　of　sorrow　at　the　sight　of　our



friends'　misfortunes…is　not　that　wrong？



　　Pro。　Undoubtedly。



　　Soc。　Did　we　not　say　that　ignorance　was　always　an　evil？



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　three　kinds　of　vain　conceit　in　our　friends　which　we



enumerated…the　vain　conceit　of　beauty；　of　wisdom；　and　of　wealth；　are



ridiculous　if　they　are　weak；　and　detestable　when　they　are　powerful：



May　we　not　say；　as　I　was　saying　before；　that　our　friends　who　are　in



this　state　of　mind；　when　harmless　to　others；　are　simply　ridiculous？



　　Pro。　They　are　ridiculous。



　　Soc。　And　do　we　not　acknowledge　this　ignorance　of　theirs　to　be　a



misfortune？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　do　we　feel　pain　or　pleasure　in　laughing　at　it？



　　Pro。　Clearly　we　feel　pleasure。



　　Soc。　And　was　not　envy　the　source　of　this　pleasure　which　we　feel　at



the　misfortunes　of　friends？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Then　the　argument　shows　that　when　we　laugh　at　the　folly　of



our　friends；　pleasure；　in　mingling　with　envy；　mingles　with　pain；　for



envy　has　been　acknowledged　by　us　to　be　mental　pain；　and　laughter　is



pleasant；　and　so　we　envy　and　laugh　at　the　same　instant。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　the　argument　implies　that　there　are　combinations　of



pleasure　and　pain　in　lamentations；　and　in　tragedy　and　comedy；　not　only



on　the　stage；　but　on　the　greater　stage　of　human　life；　and　so　in



endless　other　cases。



　　Pro。　I　do　not　see　how　any　one　can　deny　what　you　say；　Socrates；



however　eager　he　may　be　to　assert　the　opposite　opinion。



　　Soc。　I　mentioned　anger；　desire；　sorrow；　fear；　love；　emulation；　envy；



and　similar　emotions；　as　examples　in　which　we　should　find　a　mixture　of



the　two　elements　so　often　named；　did　I　not？



　　Pro。　Yes。



　　Soc。　We　may　observe　that　our　conclusions　hitherto　have　had　reference



only　to　sorrow　and　envy　and　anger。



　　Pro。　I　see。



　　Soc。　Then　many　other　cases　still　remain？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　why　do　you　suppose　me　to　have　pointed　out　to　you　the



admixture　which　takes　place　in　comedy？　Why　but　to　convince　you　that



there　was　no　difficulty　in　showing　the　mixed　nature　of　fear　and　love



and　similar　affections；　and　I　thought　that　when　I　had　given　you　the



illustration；　you　would　have　let　me　off；　and　have　acknowledged　as　a



general　truth　that　the　body　without　the　soul；　and　the　soul　without　the



body；　as　well　as　the　two　united；　are　susceptible　of　all　sorts　of



admixtures　of　pleasures　and　pains；　and　so　further　discussion　would



have　been　unnecessary。　And　now　I　want　to　know　whether　I　may　depart；　or



will　you　keep　me　here　until　midnight？　I　fancy　that　I　may　obtain　my



release　without　many　words；…if　I　promise　that　to…morrow　I　will　give



you　an　account　of　all　these　cases。　But　at　present　I　would　rather



sail　in　another　direction；　and　go　to　other　matters　which　remain　to



be　settled；　before　the　judgment　can　be　given　which　Philebus　demands。



　　Pro。　Very　good；　Socrates；　in　what　remains　take　your　own　course。



　　Soc。　Then　after　the　mixed　pleasures　the　unmixed　should　have　their



turn；　this　is　the　natural　and　necessary　order。



　　Pro。　Excellent。



　　Soc。　These；　in　turn；　then；　I　will　now　endeavour　to　indicate；　for



with　the　maintainers　of　the　opinion　that　all　pleasures　are　a　cessation



of　pain；　I　do　not　agree；　but；　as　I　was　saying；　I　use　them　as



witnesses；　that　there　are　pleasures　which　seem　only　and　are　not；　and



there　are　others　again　which　have　great　power　and　appear　in　many



forms；　yet　are　intermingled　with　pains；　and　are　partly　alleviations　of



agony　and　distress；　both　of　body　and　mind。



　　Pro。　Then　what　pleasures；　Socrates；　should　we　be　right　in　conceiving



to　be　true？



　　Soc。　True　pleasures　are　those　which　are　given　by　beauty　of　colour



and　form；　and　most　of　of　those　which　arise　from　smells；　those　of



sound；　again；　and　in　general　those　of　which　the　want　is　painless　and



unconscious；　and　of　which　the　fruition　is　palpable　to　sense　and



pleasant　and　unalloyed　with　pain。



　　Pro。　Once　more；　Socrates；　I　must　ask　what　you　mean。



　　Soc。　My　meaning　is　certainly　not　obvious；　and　I　will　endeavour　to　be



plainer。　I　do　not　mean　by　beauty　of　form　such　beauty　as　that　of



animals　or　pictures；　which　the　many　would　suppose　to　be　my　meaning；



but；　says　the　argument；　understand　me　to　mean　straight　lines　and



circles；　and　the　plane　solid　figures　which　are　formed　out　of　them　by



turning…lathes　and　rulers　and　measurers　of　angles；　for　these　I



affirm　to　be　not　only　relatively　beautiful；　like　other　things；　but



they　are　eternally　and　absolutely　beautiful；　and　they　have　peculiar



p