philebus- 第1部分

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　360　BC



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PHILEBUS



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　Plato



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　translated　by　Benjamin　Jowett



PHILEBUS



　　PERSONS　OF　THE　DIALOGUE：　SOCRATES；　PROTARCHUS；　PHILEBUS。







　　Socrates。　Observe；　Protarchus；　the　nature　of　the　position　which



you　are　now　going　to　take　from　Philebus；　and　what　the　other　position



is　which　I　maintain；　and　which；　if　you　do　not　approve　of　it；　is　to



be　controverted　by　you。　Shall　you　and　I　sum　up　the　two　sides？



　　Protarchus。　By　all　means。



　　Soc。　Philebus　was　saying　that　enjoyment　and　pleasure　and　delight；



and　the　class　of　feelings　akin　to　them；　are　a　good　to　every　living



being；　whereas　I　contend；　that　not　these；　but　wisdom　and



intelligence　and　memory；　and　their　kindred；　right　opinion　and　true



reasoning；　are　better　and　more　desirable　than　pleasure　for　all　who　are



able　to　partake　of　them；　and　that　to　all　such　who　are　or　ever　will



be　they　are　the　most　advantageous　of　all　things。　Have　I　not　given；



Philebus；　a　fair　statement　of　the　two　sides　of　the　argument？



　　Philebus　Nothing　could　be　fairer；　Socrates。



　　Soc。　And　do　you；　the　position　which　is　assigned　to　you？



　　Pro。　I　cannot　do　otherwise；　since　our　excellent　Philebus　has　left



the　field。



　　Soc。　Surely　the　truth　about　these　matters　ought；　by　all　means；　to　be



ascertained。



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　Shall　we　further　agree…



　　Pro。　To　what？



　　Soc。　That　you　and　I　must　now　try　to　indicate　some　state　and



disposition　of　the　soul；　which　has　the　property　of　making　all　men



happy。



　　Pro。　Yes；　by　all　means。



　　Soc。　And　you　say　that　pleasure　and　I　say　that　wisdom；　is　such　a



state？



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　And　what　if　there　be　a　third　state；　which　is　better　than



either？　Then　both　of　us　are　vanquished…are　we　not？　But　if　this　life；



which　really　has　the　power　of　making　men　happy；　turn　out　to　be　more



akin　to　pleasure　than　to　wisdom；　the　life　of　pleasure　may　still　have



the　advantage　over　the　life　of　wisdom。



　　Pro。　True。



　　Soc。　Or　suppose　that　the　better　life　is　more　nearly　allied　to



wisdom；　then　wisdom　conquers；　and　pleasure　is　defeated；…do　you　agree？



　　Pro。　Certainly。



　　Soc。　And　what　do　you　say；　Philebus？



　　Phi。　I　say；　and　shall　always　say；　that　pleasure　is　easily　the



conqueror；　but　you　must　decide　for　yourself；　Protarchus。



　　Pro。　You；　Philebus；　have　handed　over　the　argument　to　me；　and　have　no



longer　a　voice　in　the　matter？



　　Phi。　True　enough。　Nevertheless　I　would　dear　myself　and　deliver　my



soul　of　you；　and　I　call　the　goddess　herself　to　witness　that　I　now　do



so。



　　Pro。　You　may　appeal　to　us；　we　too　be　the　witnesses　of　your　words。



And　now；　Socrates；　whether　Philebus　is　pleased　or　displeased；　we



will　proceed　with　the　argument。



　　Soc。　Then　let　us　begin　with　the　goddess　herself；　of　whom　Philebus



says　that　she　is　called　Aphrodite；　but　that　her　real　name　is　Pleasure。



　　Pro。　Very　good。



　　Soc。　The　awe　which　I　always　feel；　Protarchus；　about　the　names　of　the



gods　is　more　than　human…it　exceeds　all　other　fears。　And　now　I　would



not　sin　against　Aphrodite　by　naming　her　amiss；　let　her　be　called



what　she　pleases。　But　Pleasure　I　know　to　be　manifold；　and　with　her；　as



I　was　just　now　saying；　we　must　begin；　and　consider　what　her　nature　is。



She　has　one　name；　and　therefore　you　would　imagine　that　she　is　one；　and



yet　surely　she　takes　the　most　varied　and　even　unlike　forms。　For　do



we　not　say　that　the　intemperate　has　pleasure；　and　that　the　temperate



has　pleasure　in　his　very　temperance…that　the　fool　is　pleased　when　he



is　full　of　foolish　fancies　and　hopes；　and　that　the　wise　man　has



pleasure　in　his　wisdom？　and　how　foolish　would　any　one　be　who



affirmed　that　all　these　opposite　pleasures　are　severally　alike！



　　Pro。　Why；　Socrates；　they　are　opposed　in　so　far　as　they　spring　from



opposite　sources；　but　they　are　not　in　themselves　opposite。　For　must



not　pleasure　be　of　all　things　most　absolutely　like　pleasure…that　is；



like　himself？



　　Soc。　Yes；　my　good　friend；　just　as　colour　is　like　colour；…in　so　far



as　colours　are　colours；　there　is　no　difference　between　them；　and　yet



we　all　know　that　black　is　not　only　unlike；　but　even　absolutely　opposed



to　white：　or　again；　as　figure　is　like　figure；　for　all　figures　are



comprehended　under　one　class；　and　yet　particular　figures　may　be



absolutely　opposed　to　one　another；　and　there　is　an　infinite



diversity　of　them。　And　we　might　find　similar　examples　in　many　other



things；　therefore　do　not　rely　upon　this　argument；　which　would　go　to



prove　the　unity　of　the　most　extreme　opposites。　And　I　suspect　that　we



shall　find　a　similar　opposition　among　pleasures。



　　Pro。　Very　likely；　but　how　will　this　invalidate　the　argument？



　　Soc。　Why；　I　shall　reply；　that　dissimilar　as　they　are；　you　apply　to



them　a　now　predicate；　for　you　say　that　all　pleasant　things　are　good；



now　although　no　one　can　argue　that　pleasure　is　not　pleasure；　he　may



argue；　as　we　are　doing；　that　pleasures　are　oftener　bad　than　good；



but　you　call　them　all　good；　and　at　the　same　time　are　compelled；　if　you



are　pressed；　to　acknowledge　that　they　are　unlike。　And　so　you　must　tell



us　what　is　the　identical　quality　existing　alike　in　good　and　bad



pleasures；　which　makes。　you　designate　all　of　them　as　good。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean；　Socrates？　Do　you　think　that　any　one　who



asserts　pleasure　to　be　the　good；　will　tolerate　the　notion　that　some



Pleasures　are　good　and　others　bad？



　　Soc。　And　yet　you　will　acknowledge　that　they　are　different　from　one



another；　and　sometimes　opposed？



　　Pro。　Not　in　so　far　as　they　are　pleasures。



　　Soc。　That　is　a　return　to　the　old　position；　Protarchus；　and　so　we　are



to　say　（are　we？）　that　there　is　no　difference　in　pleasures；　but　that



they　are　all　alike；　and　the　examples　which　have　just　been　cited　do　not



pierce　our　dull　minds；　but　we　go　on　arguing　all　the　same；　like　the



weakest　and　most　inexperienced　reasoners？



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Why；　I　mean　to　say；　that　in　self…defence　I　may；　if　I　like；



follow　your　example；　and　assert　boldly　that　the　two　things　most　unlike



are　most　absolutely　alike；　and　the　result　will　be　that　you　and　I



will　prove　ourselves　to　be　very　tyros　in　the　art　of　disputing；　and　the



argument　will　be　blown　away　and　lost。　Suppose　that　we　put　back；　and



return　to　the　old　position；　then　perhaps　we　may　come　to　an



understanding　with　one　another。



　　Pro。　How　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　Shall　I；　Protarchus；　have　my　own　question　asked　of　me　by　you？



　　Pro。　What　question？



　　Soc。　Ask　me　whether　wisdom　and　science　and　mind；　and　those　other



qualities　which　I；　when　asked　by　you　at　first　what　is　the　nature　of



the　good；　affirmed　to　be　good；　are　not　in　the　same　case　with　the



pleasures　of　which　you　spoke。



　　Pro。　What　do　you　mean？



　　Soc。　The　sciences　are　a　numerous　class；　and　will　be　found　to　present



great　differences。　But　even　admitting　that；　like　the　pleasures；　they



are　opposite　as　well　as　different；　should　I　be　worthy　of　the　name　of



dialectician　if；　in　order　to　avoid　this　difficulty；　I　were　to　say



（as　you　are　saying　of　pleasure）　that　there　is　no　difference　between



one　science　and　another；…would　not　the　argument　founder　and



disappear　like　an　idle　tale；　although　we　might　ourselves　escape



drowning　by　clinging　to　a　fallacy？



　　Pro。　May　none　of　this　befall　us；　except　the　deliverance！　Yet　I



like　the　even…handed　justice　which　is　applied　to　both　our　arguments。



Let　us　assume；　then；　that　there　are　many　and　diverse　pleasures；　and



many　and　different　sciences。



　　Soc。　And　let　us　have　no　concealment；　Protarchus；　of　the



differences　between　my　good　and　yours；　but　let　us　bring　them　to　the



light　in　the　hope　that；　in　the　process　of　testing　them；　they　may



show　whether　pleasure　is　to　be　called　the　good；　or　wisdom；　or　some



third　quality；　for　surely　we　are　not　now　simply　contending　in　order



that　my　view　or　that　yours　may　prevail；　but　I　presume　that　we　ought



both　of　us　to　be　fighting　for　the　truth。



　　Pro。　Certainly　we　ought。



　　Soc。　Then　let　us　have　a　more　definite　understanding　and　establish



the　principle　on　which　the　argument　rests。



　　Pro。　What　principle？



　　Soc。　A　principle　about　which　all　men　are　always　in　a　difficulty；　and



some　men　sometimes　against　their　will。



　　Pro。　Speak　plainer。



　　Soc。　The　principle　which　has　just　turned　up；　which　is　a　marvel　of



nature；　for　that　one　should　be　many　or　many　one；　are　wonderful



propositions；　and　he　who　affirms　either　is　very　open　to　attack。



　　Pro。　Do　you　mean；　when　a　person　says　that　I；　Protarchus；　am　by



nature　one　and　also　many；　dividing　the　single　〃me〃　into　many　〃mens；〃



and　even　opposing　them　as　great　and　small；　light　and　heavy；　and　in　ten



thousand　other　ways？



　　Soc。　Those；　Protarchus；　are　the　common　and　acknowledged　paradoxes



about　the　one　and　many；　which　I　may　say　that　everybody　has　by　this



time　agreed　to　dismiss　as　childish　and　obvious　and　detrimental　to



the　true　course　of　thought；　and　no　more　favour　is　shown　to　that



other　puzzle；　in　which　a　person　proves　the　members　and　parts　of



anything　to　be　divided；　and　then　confessing　that　they　are　all　one；



says　laughingly　in　disproof　of　his　own　words：　Why；　here　is　a



miracle；　the　one　is　many　and　infinite；　and　the　many　are　only　one。



　　Pro。　But　what；　Socrates；　are　those　other　marvels　connected　with　this



subject　which；　as　you　imply；　have　not　yet　become　common　and



acknowledged？



　　Soc。　When；　my　boy；　the　one　does　not　belong　to　the　class　of　things



that　are　born　and　perish；　as　in　the　instances　which　we　were　giving；



for　in　those　cases；　and　when　unity　is　of　this　concrete　nature；　there



is；　as　I　was　saying；　a　universal　consent　that　no　refutation　is　needed；



but　when　the　assertion　is　made　that　man　is　one；　or　ox　is　one；　o