lect09- 第4部分

Law　which　forbids　the　removal　of　suits　to　the　Justices　on　the






petition　of　a　defendant。　'For；'　it　adds；　'although　at　first　sight






the　tenant　may　seem　to　be　plaintiff　and　the　lord　defendant；　yet






in　reality；　regard　being　had　to　the　fact　that　the　lord　distrains






and　sues　for　services　and　dues　behind；　he　is　rather　plaintiff　or






complainant　than　defendant。'　The　action　of　Replevin　is　in　fact　an






excellent　illustration　of　the　difference　between　ancient　and






modern　juridical　principles。　According　to　ideas　now　confirmed　in






us；　the　person　who　sets　a　Court　of　Justice　in　motion　is　the






person　who　complains　of　a　wrong。　In　the　case　supposed；　this　is






not　the　man　distrained　upon　but　the　man　who　distrains。　He　it　is






who　has　suffered　an　injury　for　which　he　made　reprisals　on　his






adversary's　property。　Yet　it　is　his　adversary　who　has　to　start






the　legal　procedure　and　to　constitute　himself　plaintiff　in　the






Action　of　Replevin。　The　reason　why　a　modern　Court　of　Justice






would　insist　on　taking　the　whole　dispute　into　its　own　hands；　and






dealing　with　it　in　its　own　way　from　the　very　beginning；　is　that；






having　always　the　full　command　of　the　public　force；　it　is　sure　of






being　able　to　compel　the　submission　of　the　defendant　to　its






jurisdiction　and　of　coercing　him　in　the　end　till　he　does　justice；






however　long　the　coercion　may　be　delayed。　But　at　the　era　to　which






the　procedure　in　distress　originally　belonged；　the　Court　had　no






such　assurance　of　power；　and　hence　the　person　assumed　to　have　a






grievance　is　allowed　to　proceed　according　to　the　primitive






method；　which　has　the　advantage　of　giving　the　other　side　the






strongest　inducements　to　call　in　the　judicial　authority　of　the






State　and　submit　to　its　decision。






　　　　The　information　furnished　to　us　respecting　this　primitive






procedure　by　the　various　bodies　of　Continental　Teutonic　law　known






collectively　as　the　Leges　Barbarorum　is　of　a　very　interesting






kind。　Almost　all　of　them　contain　references　to　Pignoratio　or






distraint　of　goods。　The　Visigothic　law　expressly　prohibits　it；






and；　at　the　other　end　of　the　scale；　the　Lombardic　law　has　a　trace






of　that　licence　of　distress　which　has　survived　in　the　English






Common…law　and　permits　it　after　simple　demand　of　payment。　But　the






Salic　law；　which　the　most　learned　Germans　now　believe　to　have






been　drawn　up　at　some　period　between　the　time　at　which　Tacitus






wrote　and　the　time　at　which　the　Franks　broke　into　the　Empire；






contains　a　series　of　very　peculiar　and　instructive　provisions　on






the　subject；　which　have　been　for　the　first　time　fully　interpreted






by　Sohm。　Under　this　system；　Distress　is　not　yet　a　judicial






remedy；　it　is　still　an　extrajudicial　mode　of　redress；　but　it　has






been　incorporated　with　a　regular　and　highly　complex　procedure。　A






succession　of　notices　have　to　be　given　in　solemn　form　by　the






complainant　to　the　person　of　whom　he　complains；　and　whose






property　he　proposes　to　seize。　Nor　can　he　proceed　to　seizure






until　he　has　summoned　this　person　before　the　Popular　Court；　and






until　the　Popular　Officer　of　the　Court；　the　Thunginus；　has






pronounced　a　formula　licensing　distraint。　Then；and　not　till　then；






he　can　make　what　we　should　call　a　distress　upon　his　adversary。　It






seems　quite　clear　that；　before　the　Conquest；　attempts　were　made






in　England　to　narrow　the　liberty　of　distraint　by　the　same　class






of　restrictions　which　we　find　in　the　Salic　Law　and　the　allied






Teutonic　bodies　of　usage。　These　provisions　have　their　close






counterpart　in　the　ordinance　of　Canute　that　no　man　is　to　take






nams　unless　he　has　demanded　right　three　times　in　the　Hundred；　if






he　obtain　no　justice　the　third　time；　he　is　to　go　to　the






Shire…gemot；　the　shire　is　to　appoint　him　a　fourth　time；　and；　if






that　fails；　he　may　take　the　distress。






　　　　It　is　to　be　remarked　that　the　process　of　the　Salic　Law　which






answers　to　our　distress　is　especially　a　remedy　in　certain　cases






of　breach　of　contract。　Distraint；　the　seizing　of　nams；　was






certainly　employed　to　enforce　a　similar　class　of　demands　under






old　English　law　before　the　Conquest；　and　the　practice　seems　to






have　been　known　in　Bracton's　day；　though　the　brevity　of　his






notice　does　not　permit　us　to　understand　fully　its　course　and






character。　In　this　respect　the　Pignoration　of　the　Continental






Teutonic　law　is　more　archaic　than　the　distress　with　which　we　are






familiar　in　England；　since　the　fragment　of　the　system　which　has






survived　in　our　Common　law　（and　it　is　to　this　that　it　probably






owes　its　survival）　was　from　the　first　pre…eminently　a　remedy　by






which　the　lord　compelled　his　tenants　to　render　him　their






services。　But　on　the　other　hand　it　is　interesting　to　observe　that






our　English　distress　is　in　some　particulars　of　a　more　archaic






character　than　the　corresponding　compulsory　process　of　the　Leges






Barbarorum。　Thus　notice　of　the　intention　to　distrain　was　never　in






England　essential　to　the　legality　of　distress　（Trent　v。　Hunt；　9






Exch。　Rep。　20）；　although　statute…law　renders　it　necessary　to　make






a　sale　of　the　distrained　property　legal；　and　again；　in　the　oldest






ascertainable　state　of　our　Common…law；　though　distraint　sometimes






followed　a　proceeding　in　the　lord's　Court；　yet　it　did　not






necessarily　presuppose　or　require　it。






　　　　It　should　be　understood　that　the　Frankish　procedure　was






completely　at　the　disposal　of　the　complainant。　It　is　not　a






strictly　judicial　procedure；　but　rather　a　procedure　regulating






extrajudicial　redress。　If　the　complainant　observes　the　proper






forms；　the　part　of　the　Court　in　licensing　seizure　is　purely






passive。　Even　after　the　exhaustive　examination　which　this　part　of






the　Salic　Law　has　undergone　from　Professor　Sohm；　it　is　very






difficult　to　say　whether　at　any　point　of　the　procedure　the






defendant　had　the　opportunity　of　putting　in　a　substantial






defence；　but　it　seems　certain　that；　whenever　he　could　do　this；　he






appeared　virtually　as　a　plaintiff　like　the　distrainee　in　our






Action　of　Replevin；　and　there　is　no　doubt　that；　if　he　submitted






or　was　unsuccessful　in　attacking　the　proceedings　of　the　other






side；　he　paid　not　only　the　original　debt　but　various　additional






penalties　entailed　by　neglect　to　comply　with　previous　notices　to






discharge　it。　Such　a　procedure　seems　to　us　founded　on　the　now






monstrous　assumption　that　plaintiffs　are　always　in　the　right　and






defendants　always　in　the　wrong。　Yet　the　assumption　would　not






perhaps　have　struck　the　earliest　authors　of　legal　improvement　as






altogether　monstrous；　nor　could　they　have　quite　comprehended　the






modern　principle　which　compels　the　complainant　to　establish　at






all　events　a　prim*　facie　case。　With　them；　the　man　most　likely　to






be　in　the　right　would　appear　to　be　the　man　who　faced　the　manifold






risks　attending　the　effort　to　obtain　redress；　the　man　who






complained　to　the　Popular　Assembly；　the　man　who　cried　for　justice






to　the　King　sitting　in　the　gate。　It　is　only　when　violent　wrong






has　ceased　to　be　rife；　when　the　dangers　of　contesting　the






oppressions　of　powerful　men　have　become　insignificant；　when　the






law　has　been　long　and　regularly　administered　according　to






technical　procedure；　that　unjust　claims　are　seen　to　be　hardly






less　common　than　unjust　refusals　to　satisfy　them。　In　one






particular　case；　the　complaint　of　the　King；　the　old　assumption






that　complainants　are　presumably　in　the　right　was　kept　long　alive






among　us；　and　had　much　to　do　with　the　obstinate　dislike　of






lawyers　to　allowing　prisoners　to　be　defended　by　Counsel。






　　　　Gaius　speaking　of　the　Legis　Actiones　generally；　observes　that






'they　fell　into　discredit；　because　through　the　excessive　subtlety






of　the　ancient　lawyers；　things　came　to　such　a　pass　that　he　who






committed　the　smallest　error　failed　altogether。'






　　　　Blackstone；　many　centuries　afterwards；　has　the　following






remark　on　the　English　Law　of　Distress：　'The　many　particulars






which　attend　the　taking　of　a　distress　used　formerly　to　make　it　a






hazardous　kind　of　proceeding；　for；　if　any　one　irregularity　was






committed；　it　vitiated　the　whole。'






　　　　I　quote　these　passages；　not　only　on　account　of　the　curious






similarity　of　language　between　two　writers　of　whom　the　later






could　not　possibly　have　read　the　earlier；　but　because　the






excessive　technicality　of　ancient　law　which　they　both　notice　goes






some　way　to　explain　the　severity　and　one…sidedness　of　the　old






Teutonic　procedure。　The　power　of　seizing　a　man's　property






extra…judicially　in　satisfaction　of　your　demand　was；　as　Professor






Sohm　justly　remarks；　a　sort　of　two…edged　sword。　You　might　bring






your　adversary　to　the　ground　by　it；　but　you　were　extremely　likely






to　injure　yourself。　For；　unless　the　complainant　who　sought　to






distrain　went　through　all　the　acts　and　words　required　by　the　law






with　the　most　rigorous　accuracy；　he　in　his　turn；　besides　fai