adopt。
In all former confederations the privileges of the Union furnished more elements of discord than of power； since they multiplied the claims of the nation without augmenting the means of enforcing them： and in accordance with this fact it may be remarked that the real weakness of federal governments has almost always been in the exact ratio of their nominal power。 Such is not the case in the American Union； in which； as in ordinary governments； the Federal Government has the means of enforcing all it is empowered to demand。
The human understanding more easily invents new things than new words； and we are thence constrained to employ a multitude of improper and inadequate expressions。 When several nations form a permanent league and establish a supreme authority； which； although it has not the same influence over the members of the community as a national government； acts upon each of the Confederate States in a body； this Government； which is so essentially different from all others； is denominated a Federal one。 Another form of society is afterwards discovered； in which several peoples are fused into one and the same nation with regard to certain common interests； although they remain distinct； or at least only confederate； with regard to all their other concerns。 In this case the central power acts directly upon those whom it governs； whom it rules； and whom it judges； in the same manner； as； but in a more limited circle than； a national government。 Here the term Federal Government is clearly no longer applicable to a state of things which must be styled an incomplete national Government： a form of government has been found out which is neither exactly national nor federal； but no further progress has been made； and the new word which will one day designate this novel invention does not yet exist。
The absence of this new species of confederation has been the cause which has brought all Unions to Civil War； to subjection； or to a stagnant apathy； and the peoples which formed these leagues have been either too dull to discern； or too pusillanimous to apply this great remedy。 The American Confederation perished by the same defects。
But the Confederate States of America had been long accustomed to form a portion of one empire before they had won their independence； they had not contracted the habit of governing themselves； and their national prejudices had not taken deep root in their minds。 Superior to the rest of the world in political knowledge； and sharing that knowledge equally amongst themselves； they were little agitated by the passions which generally oppose the extension of federal authority in a nation； and those passions were checked by the wisdom of the chief citizens。 The Americans applied the remedy with prudent firmness as soon as they were conscious of the evil； they amended their laws； and they saved their country。
Chapter VIII： The Federal Constitution … Part V
Advantages Of The Federal System In General； And Its Special Utility In America
Happiness and freedom of small nations … Power of great nations … Great empires favorable to the growth of civilization … Strength often the first element of national prosperity … Aim of the Federal system to unite the twofold advantages resulting from a small and from a large territory …Advantages derived by the United States from this system … The law adapts itself to the exigencies of the population； population does not conform to the exigencies of the law … Activity； amelioration； love and enjoyment of freedom in the American communities … Public spirit of the Union the abstract of provincial patriotism … Principles and things circulate freely over the territory of the United States … The Union is happy and free as a little nation； and respected as a great empire。
In small nations the scrutiny of society penetrates into every part； and the spirit of improvement enters into the most trifling details； as the ambition of the people is necessarily checked by its weakness； all the efforts and resources of the citizens are turned to the internal benefit of the community； and are not likely to evaporate in the fleeting breath of glory。 The desires of every individual are limited； because extraordinary faculties are rarely to be met with。 The gifts of an equal fortune render the various conditions of life uniform； and the manners of the inhabitants are orderly and simple。 Thus； if one estimate the gradations of popular morality and enlightenment； we shall generally find that in small nations there are more persons in easy circumstances； a more numerous population； and a more tranquil state of society； than in great empires。
When tyranny is established in the bosom of a small nation； it is more galling than elsewhere； because； as it acts within a narrow circle； every point of that circle is subject to its direct influence。 It supplies the place of those great designs which it cannot entertain by a violent or an exasperating interference in a multitude of minute details； and it leaves the political world； to which it properly belongs； to meddle with the arrangements of domestic life。 Tastes as well as actions are to be regulated at its pleasure； and the families of the citizens as well as the affairs of the State are to be governed by its decisions。 This invasion of rights occurs； however； but seldom； and freedom is in truth the natural state of small communities。 The temptations which the Government offers to ambition are too weak； and the resources of private individuals are too slender； for the sovereign power easily to fall within the grasp of a single citizen； and should such an event have occurred； the subjects of the State can without difficulty overthrow the tyrant and his oppression by a simultaneous effort。
Small nations have therefore ever been the cradle of political liberty； and the fact that many of them have lost their immunities by extending their dominion shows that the freedom they enjoyed was more a consequence of the inferior size than of the character of the people。
The history of the world affords no instance of a great nation retaining the form of republican government for a long series of years； *r and this has led to the conclusion that such a state of things is impracticable。 For my own part； I cannot but censure the imprudence of attempting to limit the possible and to judge the future on the part of a being who is hourly deceived by the most palpable realities of life； and who is constantly taken by surprise in the circumstances with which he is most familiar。 But it may be advanced with confidence that the existence of a great republic will always be exposed to far greater perils than that of a small one。
＇Footnote r： I do not speak of a confederation of small republics； but of a great consolidated Republic。＇
All the passions which are most fatal to republican institutions spread with an increasing territory； whilst the virtues which maintain their dignity do not augment in the same proportion。 The ambition of the citizens increases with the power of the State； the strength of parties with the importance of the ends they have in view； but that devotion to the common weal which is the surest check on destructive passions is not stronger in a large than in a small republic。 It might； indeed； be proved without difficulty that it is less powerful and less sincere。 The arrogance of wealth and the dejection of wretchedness； capital cities of unwonted extent； a lax morality； a vulgar egotism； and a great confusion of interests； are the dangers which almost invariably arise from the magnitude of States。 But several of these evils are scarcely prejudicial to a monarchy； and some of them contribute to maintain its existence。 In monarchical States the strength of the government is its own； it may use； but it does not depend on； the community； and the authority of the prince is proportioned to the prosperity of the nation； but the only security which a republican government possesses against these evils lies in the support of the majority。 This support is not； however； proportionably greater in a large republic than it is in a small one； and thus； whilst the means of attack perpetually increase both in number and in influence； the power of resistance remains the same； or it may rather be said to diminish； since the propensities and interests of the people are diversified by the increase of the population； and the difficulty of forming a compact majority is constantly augmented。 It has been observed； moreover； that the intensity of human passions is heightened； not only by the importance of the end which they propose to attain； but by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them at the same time。 Every one has had occasion to remark that his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far greater than those which he would have felt in solitude。 In great republics the impetus of political passion is irresistible； not only because it aims at gigantic purposes； but because it is felt and shared by millions of men at the same time。
It may therefore be asserted as a general proposition that nothing is more opposed to the well…being and the freedom of man than vast empires。 Nevertheless it is important to acknowledge the peculiar advantages of great States。 For the very reason which renders the desire of power more intense in these communities than amongst ordinary men； the love of glory is also more prominent in the hearts of a class of citizens； who regard the applause of a great people as a reward worthy of their exertions； and an elevating encouragement to man。 If we would learn why it is that great nations contribute more powerfully to the spread of human improvement than small States； we shall discover an adequate cause in the rapid and energetic circulation of ideas； and in those great cities which are the intellectual centres where all the rays of human genius are reflected and combined。 To this it may be added that most important discoveries demand a display of national power which the Government of a small State is unable to make； in great nations the Government entertains a greater number of general notions； and is more completely disengaged from the routine of precedent and the egotis