parmenides- 第3部分

knowledge　of　each　kind　of　being　which　we　have？



　　Certainly。



　　But　the　ideas　themselves；　as　you　admit；　we　have　not；　and　cannot



have？



　　No；　we　cannot。



　　And　the　absolute　natures　or　kinds　are　known　severally　by　the



absolute　idea　of　knowledge？



　　Yes。



　　And　we　have　not　got　the　idea　of　knowledge？



　　No。



　　Then　none　of　the　ideas　are　known　to　us；　because　we　have　no　share



in　absolute　knowledge？



　　I　suppose　not。



　　Then　the　nature　of　the　beautiful　in　itself；　and　of　the　good　in



itself；　and　all　other　ideas　which　we　suppose　to　exist　absolutely；



are　unknown　to　us？



　　It　would　seem　so。



　　I　think　that　there　is　a　stranger　consequence　still。



　　What　is　it？



　　Would　you；　or　would　you　not　say；　that　absolute　knowledge；　if　there



is　such　a　thing；　must　be　a　far　more　exact　knowledge　than　our



knowledge；　and　the　same　of　beauty　and　of　the　rest？



　　Yes。



　　And　if　there　be　such　a　thing　as　participation　in　absolute　knowledge；



no　one　is　more　likely　than　God　to　have　this　most　exact　knowledge？



　　Certainly。



　　But　then；　will　God；　having　absolute　knowledge；　have　a　knowledge　of



human　things？



　　Why　not？



　　Because；　Socrates；　said　Parmenides；　we　have　admitted　that　the



ideas　are　not　valid　in　relation　to　human　things；　nor　human　things　in



relation　to　them；　the　relations　of　either　are　limited　to　their



respective　spheres。



　　Yes；　that　has　been　admitted。



　　And　if　God　has　this　perfect　authority；　and　perfect　knowledge；　his



authority　cannot　rule　us；　nor　his　knowledge　know　us；　or　any　human



thing；　just　as　our　authority　does　not　extend　to　the　gods；　nor　our



knowledge　know　anything　which　is　divine；　so　by　parity　of　reason



they；　being　gods；　are　not　our　masters；　neither　do　they　know　the　things



of　men。



　　Yet；　surely；　said　Socrates；　to　deprive　God　of　knowledge　is



monstrous。



　　These；　Socrates；　said　Parmenides；　are　a　few；　and　only　a　few　of　the



difficulties　in　which　we　are　involved　if　ideas　really　are　and　we



determine　each　one　of　them　to　be　an　absolute　unity。　He　who　hears



what　may　be　said　against　them　will　deny　the　very　existence　of　them…and



even　if　they　do　exist；　he　will　say　that　they　must　of　necessity　be



unknown　to　man；　and　he　will　seem　to　have　reason　on　his　side；　and　as　we



were　remarking　just　now；　will　be　very　difficult　to　convince；　a　man



must　be　gifted　with　very　considerable　ability　before　he　can　learn　that



everything　has　a　class　and　an　absolute　essence；　and　still　more



remarkable　will　he　be　who　discovers　all　these　things　for　himself；



and　having　thoroughly　investigated　them　is　able　to　teach　them　to



others。



　　I　agree　with　you；　Parmenides；　said　Socrates；　and　what　you　say　is



very　much　to　my　mind。



　　And　yet；　Socrates；　said　Parmenides；　if　a　man；　fixing　his　attention



on　these　and　the　like　difficulties；　does　away　with　ideas　of　things　and



will　not　admit　that　every　individual　thing　has　its　own　determinate



idea　which　is　always　one　and　the　same；　he　will　have　nothing　on　which



his　mind　can　rest；　and　so　he　will　utterly　destroy　the　power　of



reasoning；　as　you　seem　to　me　to　have　particularly　noted。



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　But；　then；　what　is　to　become　of　philosophy？　Whither　shall　we　turn；



if　the　ideas　are　unknown？



　　I　certainly　do　not　see　my　way　at　present。



　　Yes；　said　Parmenides；　and　I　think　that　this　arises；　Socrates；　out　of



your　attempting　to　define　the　beautiful；　the　just；　the　good；　and　the



ideas　generally；　without　sufficient　previous　training。　I　noticed



your　deficiency；　when　I　heard　you　talking　here　with　your　friend



Aristoteles；　the　day　before　yesterday。　The　impulse　that　carries　you



towards　philosophy　is　assuredly　noble　and　divine；　but　there　is　an



art　which　is　called　by　the　vulgar　idle　talking；　and　which　is　of



imagined　to　be　useless；　in　that　you　must　train　and　exercise



yourself；　now　that　you　are　young；　or　truth　will　elude　your　grasp。



　　And　what　is　the　nature　of　this　exercise；　Parmenides；　which　you　would



recommend？



　　That　which　you　heard　Zeno　practising；　at　the　same　time；　I　give　you



credit　for　saying　to　him　that　you　did　not　care　to　examine　the



perplexity　in　reference　to　visible　things；　or　to　consider　the　question



that　way；　but　only　in　reference　to　objects　of　thought；　and　to　what　may



be　called　ideas。



　　Why；　yes；　he　said；　there　appears　to　me　to　be　no　difficulty　in



showing　by　this　method　that　visible　things　are　like　and　unlike　and　may



experience　anything。



　　Quite　true；　said　Parmenides；　but　I　think　that　you　should　go　a　step



further；　and　consider　not　only　the　consequences　which　flow　from　a



given　hypothesis；　but　also　the　consequences　which　flow　from　denying



the　hypothesis；　and　that　will　be　still　better　training　for　you。



　　What　do　you　mean？　he　said。



　　I　mean；　for　example；　that　in　the　case　of　this　very　hypothesis　of



Zeno's　about　the　many；　you　should　inquire　not　only　what　will　be　the



consequences　to　the　many　in　relation　to　themselves　and　to　the　one；　and



to　the　one　in　relation　to　itself　and　the　many；　on　the　hypothesis　of



the　being　of　the　many；　but　also　what　will　be　the　consequences　to　the



one　and　the　many　in　their　relation　to　themselves　and　to　each　other；　on



the　opposite　hypothesis。　Or；　again；　if　likeness　is　or　is　not；　what



will　be　the　consequences　in　either　of　these　cases　to　the　subjects　of



the　hypothesis；　and　to　other　things；　in　relation　both　to　themselves



and　to　one　another；　and　so　of　unlikeness；　and　the　same　holds　good　of



motion　and　rest；　of　generation　and　destruction；　and　even　of　being



and　not…being。　In　a　word；　when　you　suppose　anything　to　be　or　not　to



be；　or　to　be　in　any　way　affected；　you　must　look　at　the　consequences　in



relation　to　the　thing　itself；　and　to　any　other　things　which　you



choose…to　each　of　them　singly；　to　more　than　one；　and　to　all；　and　so　of



other　things；　you　must　look　at　them　in　relation　to　themselves　and　to



anything　else　which　you　suppose　either　to　be　or　not　to　be；　if　you



would　train　yourself　perfectly　and　see　the　real　truth。



　　That；　Parmenides；　is　a　tremendous　business　of　which　you　speak；　and　I



do　not　quite　understand　you；　will　you　take　some　hypothesis　and　go



through　the　steps？…then　I　shall　apprehend　you　better。



　　That；　Socrates；　is　a　serious　task　to　impose　on　a　man　of　my　years。



　　Then　will　you；　Zeno？　said　Socrates。



　　Zeno　answered　with　a　smile：…Let　us　make　our　petition　to　Parmenides



himself；　who　is　quite　right　in　saying　that　you　are　hardly　aware　of　the



extent　of　the　task　which　you　are　imposing　on　him；　and　if　there　were



more　of　us　I　should　not　ask　him；　for　these　are　not　subjects　which



any　one；　especially　at　his　age；　can　well　speak　of　before　a　large



audience；　most　people　are　not　aware　that　this　round…about　progress



through　all　things　is　the　only　way　in　which　the　mind　can　attain



truth　and　wisdom。　And　therefore；　Parmenides；　I　join　in　the　request



of　Socrates；　that　I　may　hear　the　process　again　which　I　have　not



heard　for　a　long　time。



　　When　Zeno　had　thus　spoken；　Pythodorus；　according　to　Antiphon's



report　of　him；　said；　that　he　himself　and　Aristoteles　and　the　whole



company　entreated　Parmenides　to　give　an　example　of　the　process。　I



cannot　refuse；　said　Parmenides；　and　yet　I　feel　rather　like　Ibycus；



who；　when　in　his　old　age；　against　his　will；　he　fell　in　love；



compared　himself　to　an　old　racehorse；　who　was　about　to　run　in　a



chariot　race；　shaking　with　fear　at　the　course　he　knew　so　well…this　was



his　simile　of　himself。　And　I　also　experience　a　trembling　when　I



remember　through　what　an　ocean　of　words　I　have　to　wade　at　my　time　of



life。　But　I　must　indulge　you；　as　Zeno　says　that　I　ought；　and　we　are



alone。　Where　shall　I　begin？　And　what　shall　be　our　first　hypothesis；　if



I　am　to　attempt　this　laborious　pastime？　Shall　I　begin　with　myself；　and



take　my　own　hypothesis　the　one？　and　consider　the　consequences　which



follow　on　the　supposition　either　of　the　being　or　of　the　not　being　of



one？



　　By　all　means；　said　Zeno。



　　And　who　will　answer　me？　he　said。　Shall　I　propose　the　youngest？　He



will　not　make　difficulties　and　will　be　the　most　likely　to　say　what



he　thinks；　and　his　answers　will　give　me　time　to　breathe。



　　I　am　the　one　whom　you　mean；　Parmenides；　said　Aristoteles；　for　I　am



the　youngest　and　at　your　service。　Ask；　and　I　will　answer。



　　Parmenides　proceeded：　If　one　is；　he　said；　the　one　cannot　be　many？



　　Impossible。



　　Then　the　one　cannot　have　parts；　and　cannot　be　a　whole？



　　Why　not？



　　Because　every　part　is　part　of　a　whole；　is　it　not？



　　Yes。



　　And　what　is　a　whole？　would　not　that　of　which　no　part　is　wanting　be　a



whole？



　　Certainly。



　　Then；　in　either　case；　the　one　would　be　made　up　of　parts；　both　as



being　a　whole；　and　also　as　having　parts？



　　To　be　sure。



　　And　in　either　case；　the　one　would　be　many；　and　not　one？



　　True。



　　But；　surely；　it　ought　to　be　one　and　not　many？



　　It　ought。



　　Then；　if　the　one　is　to　remain　one；　it　will　not　be　a　whole；　and



will　not　have　parts？



　　No。



　　But　if　it　has　no　parts；　it　will　have　neither　beginning；　middle；



nor　end；　for　these　would　of　course　be　parts　of　it。



　　Right。



　　But　then；　again；　a　beginning　and　an　end　are　the　limits　of



everything？



　　Certainly。



　　Then　the　one；　having　neither　beginning　nor　end；　is　unlimited？



　　Yes；　unlimited。



　　And　therefore　formless；　for　it　cannot　partake　either　of　round　or



straight。



　　But　why？



　　Why；　because　the　round　is　that　of　which　all　the　extreme　points　are



equidistant　from　the　centre？



　　Yes。



　　And　the　straight　is　that　of　which　the　centre　intercepts　the　view



of　the　extremes？



　　True。



　　Then　the　one　would　have　parts　and　would　be　many；　if　it　partook



either　of　a　straight　or　of　a　circular　form？



　　Assuredly。



　　But　having　no　parts；　it　will　be　neither　straight　nor　round？



　　Right。



　　And；　being　of　such　a　n