the ethics(part iv)- 第13部分

in　the　following　Part。















APPENDIX。



What　have　said　in　this　Part　concerning　the　right　way　of　life　has　not　been　



arranged；　so　as　to　admit　of　being　seen　at　one　view；　but　has　been　set　forth　



piece…meal；　according　as　I　thought　each　Proposition　could　most　readily　be　



deduced　from　what　preceded　it。　I　propose；　therefore；　to　rearrange　my　



remarks　and　to　bring　them　under　leading　heads。







I。　All　our　endeavours　or　desires　so　follow　from　the　necessity　of　our　



nature；　that　they　can　be　understood　either　through　it　alone；　as　their　



proximate　cause；　or　by　virtue　of　our　being　a　part　of　nature；　which　cannot　



be　adequately　conceived　through　itself　without　other　individuals。







II。　Desires；　which　follow　from　our　nature　in　such　a　manner；　that　they　can　



be　understood　through　it　alone；　are　those　which　are　referred　to　the　mind；　



in　so　far　as　the　latter　is　conceived　to　consist　of　adequate　ideas：　the　



remaining　desires　are　only　referred　to　the　mind；　in　so　far　as　it　conceives　



things　inadequately；　and　their　force　and　increase　are　generally　defined　



not　by　the　power　of　man；　but　by　the　power　of　things　external　to　us：　



wherefore　the　former　are　rightly　called　actions；　the　latter　passions；　for　



the　former　always　indicate　our　power；　the　latter；　on　the　other　hand；　show　



our　infirmity　and　fragmentary　knowledge。







III。　Our　actions；　that　is；　those　desires　which　are　defined　by　man's　power　



or　reason；　are　always　good。　The　rest　maybe　either　good　or　bad。







IV。　Thus　in　life　it　is　before　all　things　useful　to　perfect　the　



understanding　or　reason；　as　far　as　we　can；　and　in　this　alone　man's　



highest　happiness　or　blessedness　consists；　indeed　blessedness　is　nothing　



else　but　the　contentment　of　spirit；　which　arises　from　the　intuitive　



knowledge　of　God：　now；　to　perfect　the　understanding　is　nothing　else　



but　to　understand　God；　God's　attributes；　and　the　actions　which　follow　



from　the　necessity　of　his　nature。　Wherefore　of　a　man；　who　is　led　by　reason；　



the　ultimate　aim　or　highest　desire；　whereby　he　seeks　to　govern　all　his　



fellows；　is　that　whereby　he　is　brought　to　the　adequate　conception　of　



himself　and　of　all　things　within　the　scope　of　his　intelligence。







V。　Therefore；　without　intelligence　there　is　not　rational　life：　and　things　



are　only　good；　in　so　far　as　they　aid　man　in　his　enjoyment　of　the　



intellectual　life；　which　is　defined　by　intelligence。　Contrariwise；　



whatsoever　things　hinder　man's　perfecting　of　his　reason；　and　capability　



to　enjoy　the　rational　life；　are　alone　called　evil。







VI。　As　all　things　whereof　man　is　the　efficient　cause　are　necessarily　good；　



no　evil　can　befall　man　except　through　external　causes；　namely；　by　virtue



of　man　being　a　part　of　universal　nature；　whose　laws　human　nature　is　



compelled　to；　obey；　and　to　conform　to　in　almost　infinite　ways。







VII。　It　is　impossible；　that　man　should　not　be　a　part　of　nature；　or　that　



he　should　not　follow　her　general　order；　but　if　he　be　thrown　among　



individuals　whose　nature　is　in　harmony　with　his　own；　his　power　of　action　



will　thereby　be　aided　and　fostered；　whereas；　if　he　be　thrown　among　such　as　



are　but　very　little　in　harmony　with　his　nature；　he　will　hardly　be　able　to　



accommodate　himself　to　them　without　undergoing　a　great　change　himself。







VIII。　Whatsoever　in　nature　we　deem　to　be　evil；　or　to　be　capable　of　



injuring　our　faculty　for　existing　and　enjoying　the　rational　life；　we　may　



endeavour　to　remove　in　whatever　way　seems　safest　to　us；　on　the　other　hand；　



whatsoever　we　deem　to　be　good　or　useful　for　preserving　our　being；　and　



enabling　us　to　enjoy　the　rational　life；　we　may　appropriate　to　our　use　and　



employ　as　we　think　best。　Everyone　without　exception　may；　by　sovereign　



right　of　nature；　do　whatsoever　he　thinks　will　advance　his　own　interest。







IX。　Nothing　can　be　in　more　harmony　with　the　nature　of　any　given　thing　



than　other　individuals　of　the　same　species；　therefore　（cf。　vii。）　for　man　



in　the　preservation　of　his　being　and　the　enjoyment　of　the　rational　life　



there　is　nothing　more　useful　than　his　fellow…man　who　is　led　by　reason。　



Further；　as　we　know　not　anything　among　individual　things　which　is　more　



excellent　than　a　man　led　by　reason；　no　man　can　better　display　the　power　of　



his　skill　and　disposition；　than　in　so　training　men；　that　they　come　at　last　



to　live　under　the　dominion　of　their　own　reason。







X。　In　so　far　as　men　are　influenced　by　envy　or　any　kind　of　hatred；　one　



towards　another；　they　are　at　variance；　and　are　therefore　to　be　feared　in　



proportion；　as　they　are　more　powerful　than　their　fellows。







XI。　Yet　minds　are　not　conquered　by　force；　but　by　love　and　high…mindedness。







XII。　It　is　before　all　things　useful　to　men　to　associate　their　ways　of　life；　



to　bind　themselves　together　with　such　bonds　as　they　think　most　fitted　to　



gather　them　all　into　unity；　and　generally　to　do　whatsoever　serves　to　



strengthen　friendship。







XIII。　But　for　this　there　is　need　of　skill　and　watchfulness。　For　men　are　



diverse　（seeing　that　those　who　live　under　the　guidance　of　reason　are　few）；　



yet　are　they　generally　envious　and　more　prone　to　revenge　than　to　sympathy。　



No　small　force　of　character　is　therefore　required　to　take　everyone　as　he　



is；　and　to　restrain　one's　self　from　imitating　the　emotions　of　others。　But　



those　who　carp　at　mankind；　and　are　more　skilled　in　railing　at　vice　than　



in　instilling　virtue；　and　who　break　rather　than　strengthen　men's　



dispositions；　are　hurtful　both　to　themselves　and　others。　Thus　many　from　



too　great　impatience　of　spirit；　or　from　misguided　religious　zeal；　have　



preferred　to　live　among　brutes　rather　than　among　men；　as　boys　or　youths；　



who　cannot　peaceably　endure　the　chidings　of　their　parents；　will　enlist　as　



soldiers　and　choose　the　hardships　of　war　and　the　despotic　discipline　in　



preference　to　the　comforts　of　home　and　the　admonitions　of　their　father：　



suffering　any　burden　to　be　put　upon　them；　so　long　as　they　may　spite　



their　parents。







XIV。　Therefore；　although　men　are　generally　governed　in　everything　by　their　



own　lusts；　yet　their　association　in　common　brings　many　more　advantages　



than　drawbacks。　Wherefore　it　is　better　to　bear　patiently　the　wrongs　they　



may　do　us；　and　to　strive　to　promote　whatsoever　serves　to　bring　about　



harmony　and　friendship。







XV。　Those　things；　which　beget　harmony；　are　such　as　are　attributable　to　



justice；　equity；　and　honourable　living。　For　men　brook　ill　not　only　what　is　



unjust　or　iniquitous；　but　also　what　is　reckoned　disgraceful；　or　that　a　man　



should　slight　the　received　customs　of　their　society。　For　winning　love　those　



qualities　are　especially　necessary　which　have　regard　to　religion　and　piety　



（cf。　IV：xxxvii。Notes。i。；　&。ii。；　IV：xlvi。Note；　and　IV：lxxiii。Note）。







XVI。　Further；　harmony　is　often　the　result　of　fear：　but　such　harmony　is　



insecure。　Further；　fear　arises　from　infirmity　of　spirit　and　moreover　



belongs　not　to　the　exercise　of　reason：　the　same　is　true　of　compassion；　



though　this　latter　seems　to　bear　a　certain　resemblance　to　piety。







XVII。　Men　are　also　gained　over　by　liberality；　especially　such　as　have　



not　the　means　to　buy　what　is　necessary　to　sustain　life。　However；　to　give　



aid　to　every　poor　man　is　far　beyond　the　power　and　the　advantage　of　any　



private　person。　For　the　riches　of　any　private　person　are　wholly　inadequate　



to　meet　such　a　call。　Again；　an　individual　man's　resources　of　character　



are　too　limited　for　him　to　be　able　to　make　all　men　his　friends。　Hence　



providing　for　the　poor　is　a　duty；　which　falls　on　the　State　as　a　whole；　



and　has　regard　only　to　the　general　advantage。







XVIII。　In　accepting　favours；　and　in　returning　gratitude　our　duty　must　be　



wholly　different　（cf。　IV：lxx。Note；　IV：lxxi。　Note）。　







XIX。　Again；　meretricious　love；　that　is；　the　lust　of　generation　arising　



from　bodily　beauty；　and　generally　every　sort　of　love；　which　owns　anything　



save　freedom　of　soul　as　its　cause；　readily　passes　into　hate；　unless　indeed；　



what　is　worse；　it　is　a　species　of　madness；　and　then　it　promotes　discord　



rather　than　harmony　（cf。　III：xxxi。Coroll。）。







XX。　As　concerning　marriage；　it　is　certain　that　this　is　in　harmony　with　



reason；　if　the　desire　for　physical　union　be　not　engendered　solely　by　



bodily　beauty；　but　also　by　the　desire　to　beget　children　and　to　train　them　



up　wisely；　and　moreover；　if　the　love　of　both；　to　wit；　of　the　man　and　of　



the　woman；　is　not　caused　by　bodily　beauty　only；　but　also　by　freedom　of　soul。







XXI。　Furthermore；　flattery　begets　harmony；　but　only　by　means　of　the　vile　



offence　of　slavishness　or　treachery。　None　are　more　readily　taken　with　



flattery　than　the　proud；　who　wish　to　be　first；　but　are　not。







XXII。　There　is　in　abasement　a　spurious　appearance　of　piety　and　



religion。　Although　abasement　is　the　opposite　to　pride；　yet　is　he　that　



abases　himself　most　akin　to　the　proud　（IV：lvii。Note）。







XXIII。　Shame　also　brings　about　harmony；　but　only　in　such　matters　as　cannot　



be　hid。　Further；　as　shame　is　a　species　of　pain；　it　does　not　concern　the　



exercise　of　reason。　







XXIV。　The　remaining　emotions　of　pain　towards　men　are　directly　opposed



to　justice；　equity；　honour；　piety；　and　religion；　and；　although　



indignation　seems　to　bear　a　certain　resemblance　to　equity；　yet　is　life　



but　lawless；　where　every　man　may　pass　judgment　on　another's　deeds；　and　



vindicate　his　own　or　other　men's　rights。　







XXV。　Correctness　of　conduct　（modestia）；　that　is；　the　desire　of　pleasing　



men　which　is　determined　by　reason；　is　attributable　to　piety　（as　we　said　



in　IV：xxxvii。Note。i。）。　But；　if　it　spring　from　emotion；　it　is　ambition；　



or　the　desire　whereby；　men；　under　the　false　cloak　of　piety；　generally　



stir　up　discords　and　seditions。　For　he　who　desires　to　aid　his　fellows。